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INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner Lorin Blauer seeks review of the following Decisions entered by the 
Utah Career Service Review Board ("CSRB") in the above-referenced proceedings: 
CSRB's Hearing Officer's Order Regarding Allocation of Burden of Proof, issued 
September 30, 2009 herein (R. 1456, Appendix at Attachment 1); the Hearing Officer's 
Order Motion for Reconsideration of Burden of Proof, issued November 16, 2009 
(R. 1537, Appendix at Attachment 2); the Career Service Review Board Hearing 
Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order (Step 5 Decision), . 
issued January 7, 2010 (R. 1566, Appendix at Attachment 3); and CSRB's Order and 
Decision of the Respondent Utah Career Service Review Board issued in this matter on 
December 20,2010 (R. 1946, Appendix at Attachment 4). 
JURISDICTION 
By this petition, Petitioner seeks review of orders entered by CSRB, an 
administrative body created under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-201, following formal 
adjudicative proceedings before the CSRB Hearing Officer, and then before the CSRB 
itself. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether CSRB properly declined to rule on Plaintiff's claim of violation of 
Utah Administrative Code R. 477-15-2 and 3 on jurisdictional grounds. This was a 
conclusion of law, which this Court should review de novo for correctness {see 
970401.2 
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i 
Ameritemps, Inc. v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2007 UT 8, f 6, 152 P.3d 298; Beaver County v. 
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, f 8, 31 P.3d 1147). 
2. Whether the hearing officer erred in precluding Grievant's offered rebuttal 
testimony concerning what accommodations could have been made to permit him to 
retain his employment with DWS. The complete preclusion of rebuttal testimony is 
reviewed de novo for correctness - State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, 44 P. 3d 805. 
3. Whether CSRB erred in concluding that, under the facts as presented, DWS 
representatives had not failed to define Mr. Blauer's job performance parameters in 
violation of Utah Administrative Code R. 477-10-1, et seq. This decision is reviewable 
for correctness - see Ae Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT App 35, ^ j 6, 996 P.2d 
1072 (absent a grant of discretion, appellate courts use correction of error standard in 
reviewing agency's application of statutory term). 
4. Whether the Hearing officer erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, 
letters critical of Mr. Blauer's job performance constituted "written reprimands" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l). This matter was determined by the hearing officer 
pursuant to motion ruling on September 30, 2009, as affirmed in the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order issued January 7, 2010, and is therefore 
reviewed de novo for correctness - Heber Light & Power Co. v. Utah Public Service 
Comm., 2010 UT 27; Salt Lake City v. Weiner, 2009 UT A 249, 219 3d 72). 
DETERMINATIVE CASE LAW AND 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, P.3d , 2008 WL 660522 (Utah 
App.), 2008 UT App 84 
Q7A/1A1 1 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l, etseq. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(a) and (3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l) 
Utah Code Ann. §67-19a-403 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-408 
Utah Administrative Code R477-10-1, et seq. 
Utah Administrative Code R-477-3-2 and 3 
Utah Administrative Code R-477-15-2 and 3 
Utah Administrative Code R-477-2-5 
Utah Administrative Code R-477-7-7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding began in the fall of 2003, with Petitioner Lorin Blauer appealing 
his reassignment from his prior duties as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III to duties 
comprising the equivalent of a full-time Administrative Law Judge, despite documented 
medical evidence that he was precluded by disability from fulfilling the assigned position 
or duties. By ruling dated November 12, 2003, CSRB declined jurisdiction of the 
grievance, claiming that it was not reviewable by CSRB under existing law (R. 20, 
Appendix at Attachment 5). 
Mr. Blauer then filed an action before the Third Judicial District Court styled: 
Blauer v. Utah Dept. of Workforce Services (Civil No. 040900221), seeking de novo 
review of CSRB's ruling. By Memorandum Decision dated August 16, 2004, the Court 
remanded Mr. Blauer5 s six claims of personnel rule violations incident to his 
reassignment for consideration by CSRB (R. 1676, Appendix at Attachment 6). The 
Court's remand of Mr. Blauer's personnel rule violation claims was reflected in Order 
dated December 8, 2004 (R. 1683, Appendix at Attachment 7). 
970401.2 
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I 
Upon remand to CSRB, Respondent Utah Dept. of Workforce Services moved to 
dismiss the claims remanded to CSRB, again on jurisdictional grounds. By decision 
dated December 6, 2006, CSRB again dismissed the remanded claims, again ruling that 
CSRB had no jurisdiction to hear them (R. 659, Appendix at Attachment 8). 
Mr. Blauer then appealed CSRB's December 6, 2006 decision to this Court. By 
Memorandum Decision dated March 13, 2008, this Court reversed CSRB's decision and 
remanded Mr. Blauer's claims of personnel rule violations to CSRB for a hearing on the 
merits (R. 1699, Appendix at Attachment 9). Respondent DWS unsuccessfully petitioned 
the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision 
(R. 1904, Appendix at Attachment 10). By Order dated August 6, 2008, the Utah 
Supreme Court denied DWS' petition for writ of certiorari (R 1720, Appendix at 
Attachment 11). 
Mr. Blauer's grievance was finally scheduled for hearing before Hearing Officer 
James H. Beadles commencing November 18, 2009. Prior to the hearing, however, and 
in response to motions concerning the burden of proof on one claim, Mr. Beadles ruled 
that, as a matter of law, none of DWS' challenged written declarations concerning 
Mr. Blauer's job performance constituted "written reprimands" under Utah law 
(Appendix at Attachments 1 and 2). 
Evidence was taken November 18, 19, 23, and December 7, 2009. On January 7, 
2010, Hearing Officer James H. Beadles issued his Findings of Facts, Conclusions of 
Law, Decision and Order (Appendix at Attachment 3). Mr. Blauer thereafter filed his 
Notice of Step 6 Appeal on January 19, 2010; CSRB issued its ruling theron by 
4 
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memorandum decision dated December 20, 2010 (R. 1946, Appendix at Attachment 4). 
Petitioner then petitioned this Court on January 3, 2011 (R. 2032). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Background Facts 
1. Mr. Blauer first accepted employment with DWS' predecessor in the fall of 
1980 (TR at 69-70). By 1998, Mr. Blauer had for some time occupied the position of 
Legal/ Enforcement Counsel III, and worked with Supervisor Virginia S. Smith (TR at 
79; Grievant Exh. 5). 
2. The position of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III was generally described in a 
job description issued by the Utah State Dept. of Human Resource Management (TR at 
86-89; Grievant Exh. 6). It described the overall purpose and distinguishing 
characteristics of the title, listed certain examples of tasks associated with that title, 
itemized knowledge, skills and abilities required, and set out other requirements for the 
title (Grievant Exh. 6), adding "other tasks as assigned" (TR at 95-96; Grievant Exh. 6 at 
P . i). 
3. In concert with his supervisor, therefore, Mr. Blauer worked out an agreed-
upon job description for his particular responsibilities, summarized in a "position 
description questionnaire" (TR at 89-90; Grievant Exh. 5). Mr. Blauer's responsibilities, 
as set out in the position description questionnaire, include the following: (a) 50% 
Workforce Appeals Board ("Properly advises the Board on all issues which may affect . 
each decision and all issues raised on appeal to the Board. Researchs [sic] issues of law 
for Board cases as necessary. Draft decisions of the Board, when requested. Represents 
5 
970401.2 
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I 
the Board before the Court of Appeals.'5); (b) 20% information release ("Provides legal 
support and advise to the Department and the Disclosure Officer on information release 
issues and confidentiality of information collected or housed in the Department for every 
program administered by the Department, including disclosure requirements of the 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Responds to subpoenas, court orders, 
and other requests for information."); (c) 10% general unemployment insurance and 
employment security issues ("Provide legal support to the Department on issues 
pertaining generally to unemployment insurance and employment security, including 
vocational training, job search and placement."); (d) 10% special assignments ("Provides 
legal counsel for the Department in the form of formal and informal legal opinions and 
carries out special assignments as requested by the Director"); and (e) 10% training 
("Provides training to Department employees and external customers. Receives 
training"). Grievant Exh 5. Mr. Blauer's position description questionnaire was never 
revised after March of 1998 (TR at 183). 
4. In addition to the position description questionnaire, Mr. Blauer was 
furnished with periodic Performance Plans on an annual basis for specific periods (TR at 
516-517 and Grievant Exh. 34). Mr. Blauer, however, had no Performance Plan in place 
between June 30, 2001, and July 1, 2003 (TR at 526-529; Grievant Exhs. 33 and 34). 
5. Over the course of his years of service to DWS as Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III, Mr. Blauer would occasionally hold unemployment insurance administrative 
hearings (TR at 95). These typically entail two hearings per week, with hearings 
extending occasionally to four hearings per week if circumstances required it (TR at 97-
6 
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99). Mr. Blauer did not object to these assignments, as they were occasional in nature, 
and were shared by another attorney with Mr. Blauer's same job title (TR at 480-484) -
he was desirous of being helpful team player, and, at that time, those duties caused him 
no physical injury or discomfort (TR at 487). Mr. Blauer was never asked to hold 
administrative hearings foil time prior to September of 2003, however (TR at 100). 
6. During the course of his employment with DWS, Mr. Blauer had annual 
perfomiance reviews (TR at 138). Prior to 2003, all of Mr. Blauer's performance reviews 
rated him between "successful" and "highly successful" (TR at 138-148; Grievant 
Exhs. 10-14). The annual performance appraisals occasionally made suggestions 
concerning areas in which Mr. Blauer might improve performance; Mr. Blauer responded 
to these accordingly (Grievant Exhs. 10-13). In his performance appraisal for the period 
July 1, 2000, through June 30, 2001, for instance, Mr. Blauer's supervisor, Virginia 
Smith, noted concerns about Mr. Blauer falling asleep in meetings (TR at 149-150; 
Grievant Exh. 13 at 2). Mr. Blauer was later diagnosed with sleep apnea (TR at 150-151) 
- a condition which, if left untreated, contributes to sleepiness as well as reduced 
performance (TR at 311-313 and Grievant Exh. 22). He thereafter sought treatment, and 
commenced sleeping with the breathing assistance of a prescribed CPAP machine in 
February of 2003, which addressed the problem (TR at 150-151, 300-301 and Grievant 
Exhs. 23-25). Also, in performance appraisals prior to 2003, Mr. Blauer was apprised of 
concerns regarding frequent visits by Administrative Representative Tom Cantrell 
(Grievant Exh. 13 at 2). Mr. Blauer had been meeting with Mr. Cantrell periodically in 
response to a recommendation of a prior supervisor, Alan Zabell, that those 
7 
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administrative representatives who represent claimants in DWS hearings receive 
"mentoring" (TR at 178-180); in response to his 2001 performance appraisal, however, 
Mr. Blauer discontinued his mentoring activities with Mr. Cantrell (TR at 180-181). In 
certain performance appraisals, Mr. Blauer was censured for failing to meet federally-
mandated "red letter" dates for the issuance of decisions on the few ALJ hearings which 
he held during that time period (TR at 157; Grievant Exh. 12 at 2). In response to this 
observation, Mr. Blauer established that, in fact, decisions on the few administrative 
hearings which he conducted were timely submitted to typists, but not always transcribed 
by the "red letter" deadline (TR at 157, 269-270; Grievant Exh. 12 at 2-3, 17). 
7. During his time as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III to DWS, Mr. Blauer 
worked in concert with between three and four other attorneys sharing that title, their 
duties and responsibilities fluctuating as job demands evolved (TR at 159-173). During 
that time period, Mr. Blauer picked up the following additional responsibilities: (a) 
bankruptcy counsel (TR at 165-166); (b) acting director for DWS adjudications (TR at 
166); (c) contract review (TR at 169); (d) contract officer (id.); (e) contributions and 
garnishments (which included authorized use of signature stamp on garnishment 
documents - see paragraphs 51-52, below) (TR at 169-170); (f) subplans (TR at 172); (g) 
prosecution board (id.); and (h) legislative drafting in connection with unemployment 
insurance tax (TR at 175-176). During this time period, Mr. Blauer's workload was 
increasing significantly (TR at 174-177). From documents produced by DWS itself, it 
was demonstrated at the hearing that, from 2001 to 2002, Board cases handled by DWS's 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III spiked from 585 to 819 (TR at 234-236; Grievant Exh. 
8 
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19). Between 1998 and 2002, moreover, lower authority hearings jumped from 5,451 per 
year to 10,641 per year (TR at 235-236; Grievant Exh. 19). Between 2000 and 2002, 
Workforce Appeals Board cases (which accounted for 50% of Mr. Blauer's 
responsibilities under his 1998 position description questionnaire - see Grievant Exh. 5) 
jumped 69% (TR at 283; Grievant Exh. 20). 
8. Tani Downing took over as director of the Division of Adjudication for 
DWS in January of 2002 (TR at 761). By that time, Mr. Blauer's job description, as set 
out in his position description questionnaire of 1998, had become outdated due to the 
addition of other responsibilities as set out above (TR at 183-184). Nevertheless, Ms. 
Downing did not rework Mr. Blauer's position description questionnaire, or give him a 
revised performance plan/evaluation until July 18, 2003 (TR at 185-186, 513; Grievant 
Exh. 33). 
9. Ms. Downing's first performance appraisal for Mr. Blauer was given to him 
on June 21, 2002 (TR at 187-188; Grievant Exh. 14), which rated him at 60 points - the 
highest numerical designator for "successful," and one point lower than necessary to 
achieve "highly successful" (Grievant Exh. 14 at 1). Nevertheless, Ms. Downing 
observed that Mr. Blauer was difficult to find during working hours; that his percentages 
of meeting "red letter" dates on hearing decisions was below target in two areas; that his 
proofreading needed to improve, etc. (Grievant Exh. 14 at 2). In addition, Ms. Downing 
observed that "it does not appear that you are carrying the workload that your co-
attorneys are carrying and we will evaluate all the attorneys' work to try to make each 
workload more equitable" (Grievant Exh. 14 at 2). 
9 
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10. Mr. Blauer responded to his June 2002 performance appraisal in writing 
(TR at 193 and Grievant Exh. 15), pointing out - and describing in detail - that his 
workload had been significantly increased since formulation of his position description 
questionnaire in 1998 (Grievant Exh. 5); that his workload assignment for the Workforce 
Appeals Board had remained constant; that certain red letter dates had been difficult or 
impossible to meet, as the dates had been either prior to or on the date of the hearing; that 
his duties frequently took him away from his office, but that he attempted to account for 
his whereabouts during business hours; and that he denied and resented the claim that he 
was not carrying his fair share of the workload (TR at 193-199 and Grievant Exh. 15)1. 
11. Mr. Blauer received no reply from Ms. Downing to his written response 
(TR at 199). Mr. Blauer, however, showed his June 2002 performance appraisal to 
Workforce Appeals Board Chairman Becky Thomas, who was surprised and offended 
that he had not been rated "highly successful" (TR at 199-200). 
12. During March of 2003, Ms. Downing assigned Mr. Blauer to conduct ten 
administrative hearings per week - more than double what he had performed previously 
(TR at 219 and 246; Grievant Exh. 17 at 2). This change increased pain due to a sciatic 
nerve condition in his back, rendering the performance impossible (TR at 246). In 
1
 In fact - and from documents produced by DWS itself- it was demonstrated at the 
hearing that, from 2001 to 2002, Board cases handled by DWS's Legal/Enforcement 
Counsel III spiked from 585 to 819 (TR at 234-236; Grievant Exh. 19). Between 1998 
and 2002, moreover, lower authority hearings jumped from 5,451 per year to 10,641 per 
year (TR at 235-236; Grievant Exh. 19). Between 2000 and 2002, Workforce Appeals 
Board cases (which accounted for 50% of Mr. Blauer's responsibilities under his 1998 
position description questionnaire - see Grievant Exh. 5) jumped 69% (TR at 283; 
Grievant Exh. 20). 
970401.2 
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addition, his performance suffered due to sleep apnea and coronary heart disease (TR at 
299-302 and Grievant Exh. 21). His assignment was thereafter reduced to eight hearings 
per week - still too much for his back condition (Id.). 
13. On June 27, 2003, Ms. Downing presented Mr. Blauer with his 
performance appraisal for the period between July 1, 2002, and June 30, 2003 (TR at 
2002-2003; Grievant Exh. 16). Mr. Blauer was rated at 39 points - 2 points below that 
necessary to achieve a "successful" classification (TR at 202 and 204; Grievant Exh. 16 
a t l ) . 
14. Prior to receiving the 2003 performance appraisal, Mr. Blauer had not had 
input from Ms. Downing regarding any performance deficiencies - for some time period, 
he had met with her on a weekly basis, but these meetings had tapered off, and had never 
resulted in any indication that his performance was substandard in any way (TR at 209-
210). 
15. Mr. Blauer had obtained, from his attending physician, Dr. Dennis R. 
Peterson, MD, a letter dated June 4, 2003, concerning a coronary artery disease condition, 
and the sleep apnea syndrome discussed above, to present to Ms. Downing during his 
performance appraisal in June of 2003, with the intent of discussing workload assignment 
in light thereof (TR at 299-302 and Grievant Exh. 21). Ms. Downing, however, declined 
to look at the letter, announcing that "this is an ADA issue, and needs to go to the ADA 
coordinator" (TR at 302,1. 2-3). Ms. Downing then presented Mr. Blauer with the 
information contained in the 2003 appraisal, permitted him to read it, and mark whether 
he agreed or disagreed; there was no other discussion (TR at 231-232). 
11 
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16. Mr. Blauer thereafter prepared a written response to the 2003 appraisal, in 
which he challenged the various charges in the appraisal, including the following: (a) 
that, as of 2003, he was handling nearly triple the Board caseload over 1998 figures, 
according to DWS records; (b) that he had taken on an additional 221 cases for the Board 
over the prior year, his case load having increased from 222 to 443 in one year alone; 
(c) that charges in the 2003 performance appraisal concerning "cut and paste" were both 
inaccurate and inappropriate, as the adoption of language from briefs in a memorandum 
decision was a standard - and welcome - practice in the judiciary; (d) that the imposition 
of ten (or eight) administrative hearings per week constituted a "sudden, dramatic 
increase of one-half an ALJ workload"; (e) that he was not missing the "red letter" dates 
indicated in the 2003 performance appraisal due to delays in typing, hearing 
continuances, and other factors; and (f) that "I have never received from you a current 
performance plan where I may timely know of your expectations of me" (TR at 219 and 
Grievant Exh. 17). 
17. Mr. Blauer also obtained additional letters from his physician, Dr. Dennis 
Peterson, MD, which further detailed his condition (TR at 312-313, 322; Grievant 
Exh. 22 and 23). In his letters, Dr. Peterson diagnosed Mr. Blauer with three conditions: 
severe obstructive sleep apnea, left sciatica, and coronary artery disease with angina 
pectoris (Grievant Exh. 22). With respect to the sleep apnea, Dr. Peterson observed the 
following: 
Mr. Blauer experiences significant oxygen deprivation while sleeping. This 
typically induces fatigue, daytime drowsiness, and facile dropping off to 
sleep when sitting, quietly reading, or attending meetings. 
12 
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Id. Concerning the sciatica, Dr. Peterson stated that it caused "lancinating pain down left 
lower extreme extremity to the toes. This is exacerbated by prolong sitting." Id. 
Concerning coronary artery disease with angina pectoris, Dr. Peterson observed that it 
was "induced by stress." Id. Concerning mitigation of these conditions, Dr. Peterson 
stated that the sleep apnea condition "has been improving since implementation of the 
CPAP therapy"; that sciatica had been "responding to strengthening, exercise, 
manipulation, acupuncture and avoidance of prolonged sitting"; and the coronary artery 
disease had been responding to "exercise, medication minimizing cardiac output by 
blocking adrenalin, and avoidance of stress." Id. Dr. Peterson then made the following 
recommendation: 
OSA and sciatica - for years, he has already been accommodated for these 
challenging conditions in the form of receipt of assignments for the 
Workforce Appeals Board which lend themselves to review and preparation 
while being up and mobile...Emphasizing use of 'mobile mentation' should 
continue to prove mutually beneficial by optimizing his output in both 
quality and quantity. Therefore, I recommend that his assignments be 
selected in such a way as to avoid, as much as possible, his functioning in 
the sedentary settings in which his disability has the highest probability of 
degrading the quality of his life and the quantity and quality of his work. It 
seems a natural recommendation arising from an understanding of the 
nature of his problems. 
(Grievant Exh.22 at p. 2)2. Dr. Peterson's recommendations were echoed in a companion 
letter also dated July 26, 2003 (Grievant Exh.23). 
2
 Dr. Peterson's July 26, 2003 letter (Grievant Exh.22) was preceded by a telephone 
conversation between Dr. Peterson and ADA Specialist Chuck Butler (TR at 347), in 
which Mr. Butler accused Dr. Peterson of working on Mr. Blauer's personal behalf, 
which Dr. Peterson strongly denied (TR at 347-348). 
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18. Both of Dr. Peterson's July 26th, 2003 letter were delivered to DWS; 
however, Ms. Downing acknowledged that she did not review them, referring them 
instead to ADA coordinator Chuck Butler (TR at 818). 
19. Ms. Downing replied in writing to Mr. Blauer's July 16, 2003 response to 
the 2003 performance appraisal (TR at 227) (Grievant Exh. 18). In her reply, Ms. 
Downing acknowledged that several of the charges in Mr. Blauer's 2003 performance 
appraisal had been unfounded; nevertheless, she refused to change his rating to 
"successful" "because you have not been able to carry a workload commensurate with the 
other attorneys in the office." (Grievant Exh. 18). 
20. During the next few days, Mr. Blauer experienced stress-related reactions 
leading to believe that he might be having a coronary arrest; accordingly, he sought care 
at the hospital emergency room (TR at 323-325; 632-634). In the wake of this episode, 
Dr. Peterson again wrote to DWS on July 31, 2003 (TR at 323; Grievant Exh. 24), stating 
the following: 
As you know, Lorin suffers Coronary Artery Disease with Angina Pictorus, 
which is induced by stress. Currently he is experiencing severe stress 
brought on apparently by unresolved issues regarding his performance 
appraisal and related grievance/appeals; and his request for 
accommodation, which I am involved in as his primary care physician. It is 
important that Lorin minimize stressful circumstances which increase 
adrenalin-induced cardiac output and create potential catastrophe. In light 
of recent precipitation of chest pain by stresses related to his 
grievance/appeal, I strongly recommend that Lorin be placed on paid 
administrative leave until the grievance and related issues are satisfactorily 
resolved. 
Exh. 24. 
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21. On August 15, 2003, Mr. Blauer, through his representative, Tom Cantrell, 
contacted DWS in writing concerning the pending appeal of the 2003 performance 
appraisal (TR at 499-500; Grievant Exh. 31). In his letter, Mr. Cantrell stated the 
following: 
JoAnn feels that accommodation for Lorin's disabilities or issues regarding 
his current job assignments should not be discussed. That is up to you, of 
course, but please be aware that a requested resolution of Lorin's grievance 
regarding his performance appraisal is also the main accommodation we are 
requesting for his health issues, and would likely resolve the controversy 
regarding his job assignments; that is that Lorin have a proper, accurate, 
and timely job description; a performance plan that reflects his job 
description; and a proper performance appraisal - with the attending proper 
and timely discussions - as required by DHRM Rule. To resolve that issue 
may well resolve all issues. 
(Grievant Exh. 31). 
22. On August 20, 2003, Mr. Blauer and his representative, Tom Cantrell, met 
with Ms. Downing and JoAnn Campbell (then Human Resource Specialist with the 
Department of Human Resource Management - TR at 902) to discuss options (TR at 
245-246; 287-291). At that time, Mr. Blauer's grievance of the 2003 appraisal had not yet 
been resolved (TR at 246). 
23. During the meeting, Ms. Downing mentioned for the first time the prospect 
of assigning Mr. Blauer to full-time ALJ duties, carrying 20 cases per week, with no other 
duties (TR at 290-291). While the imposition of full-time ALJ duties on Mr. Blauer was 
thus discussed at that time as an appropriate "corrective action" (Grievant Exh. 16 at 2), it 
was made clear that it was not being imposed at that time (TR at 641, lines 12-23). 
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24. During the August 20, 2003 meeting, Mr. Blauer challenged Ms. Downing's 
statement that he was not carrying his fair share of the workload, asking what she 
believed his fair share should be; Ms. Downing's response was, "What do you think your 
fair share is?" (TR at 288-289). Mr. Blauer's representative, Tom Cantrell, pointed out to 
Ms. Downing that Mr. Blauer did not know what the other attorneys were doing, that only 
Ms. Downing did and was asking her what his fair share was. Ms. Downing still refused 
to tell him what his "fair share" was (TR at 289-290)3. In a follow up conversation with 
JoAnn Campbell immediately following the August 20, 2003 meeting, Mr. Blauer made 
clear that the sciatic nerve condition precluded holding ALJ hearings full time (TR at 
294-295). Ms. Campbell told Mr. Blauer that corrective action was not "all that bad", 
and that Ms. Downing "just wants you to be an ALJ until you retire" (TR at 293-294). 
25. Following the meeting of August 20, 2003, Mr. Blauer submitted to DWS 
written alternative proposals for workload allocation (TR at 508-509; Grievant Exh. 32). 
3
 While Ms. Downing apparently had no idea what Mr. Blauer's actual workload was at 
the time of the August 20, 2003 meeting, it is recently emerged that, during the summer 
of 2003, Ms. Downing requested and received percentage figures concerning changes in 
workload at DWS between 2000 and 2002, which were itemized in a memorandum 
dated July 23, 2003, never shared with Mr. Blauer (TR at 280-283; Grievant Exh. 20). 
The legal memorandum gives percentage increases in various types of legal work done 
within DWS for time period in question; however, back up information, and actual case 
load information, is not presented. (Grievant Exh. 20). Comparison of the 69% 
increase in Workforce Appeals Board cases reflected on Grievant Exh. 20 with the 
actual numbers of such cases reflected on Grievant Exh. 19, however, demonstrates a 
significant increase in Mr. Blauer's workload during that period, of which Mr. Blauer 
himself was handling 46% (TR at 453).The 195% increase in unemployment 
information release work reflected on Grievant Exh. 20 (as assigned exclusively to Mr. 
Blauer) further demonstrates the increase in workload, although he was able to shift the 
major portion of it to paralegal assistants (TR at 458; Grievant Exh. 20). 
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The suggestion, however, were rejected by DWS (TR at 542, 544) - by e-mail dated 
August 27, 2003, Tani Downing declined Mr. Blauer's proposals for workload 
accommodation, observing that she was "under no obligation to try to negotiate Lorin's 
future workload or extend the time period for the grievance" (TR at 645, 646; Agency 
Exh.5). 
26. By letter ruling dated September 5, DWS Executive Director Raylene 
Ireland issued a Level 4 Grievance Response (TR at 456; Grievant Exh. 39). In her 
September 5, 2003 letter ruling - and despite Mr. Blauer's repudiation of all charges 
addressed therein (see above) - Ms. Ireland reprimanded Mr. Blauer for the following: (a) 
falling asleep in meetings; (b) not carrying the workload of other attorneys; and (c) not 
meeting other, unspecified "performance standards" (Grievant Exh. 39). Ms. Ireland 
included the following comments in her letter ruling: 
While I agree that many of the required standards are not quantified nor do 
they have quality standards, I also believe that most highly educated 
professionals know what is expected without having everything spelled out 
in detail. 
(Grievant Exh. 39; emphasis added). Nevertheless (and for reasons unstated), Ms. 
Ireland reversed Ms. Downing's "unsuccessful" rating in Mr. Blauer's 2003 appraisal, 
and afforded him a "successful" rating (Grievant Exh. 39). His appeal having been 
granted, Mr. Blauer did not pursue his first grievance further (TR at 549). 
27. On the same day that Ms. Ireland's letter issues, Chuck Butler, DWS's ADA 
Coordinator declined Mr. Blauer's request for reasonable accommodation by letter dated 
September 5, 2003 (TR at 661-662; Agency Exh.6). While his letter failed to take into 
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account Dr. Peterson's expressed concerns, Mr. Butler relayed Dr. Peterson's letters 
(Grievant Exhs. 21-24) to supervisor, Tani Downing, to be taken into account in future 
job assignments, and recommended that he be accommodated (TR at 683, 789). Mr. 
Butler's letter afforded Petitioner no appeal rights (Agency Exh. 6). 
28. On September 9, 2003 - four days following Executive Director Ireland's 
favorable disposition of his first grievance - Mr. Blauer received from Ms. Downing, a 
memorandum entitled "Change of Assignment" (TR at 545; Grievant Exh. 38). The 
September 9, 2003 memorandum commenced with the following: 
Effective today you will be assigned to conduct UI hearings full-time with 
no change in job title or pay rate... Starting with the next hearing passout, 
you will receive 14 hearings to conduct. Thereafter, your weekly passout 
will be increased until, by the week of October 6, you are conducting a full 
load of hearings equal to the amount of the other staff holding hearings. 
(Grievant Exh. 30 at p. 1). Ms. Downing dismissed all information submitted to DWS 
and Chuck Butler by Mr. Blauer and Dr. Peterson with the following observation: 
In Chuck Butler's response to your ADA accommodation request, he 
indicates that 'after reviewing the information provided by your physicians, 
and consulting with the ADA coordinator for the State of Utah, I have 
determined that your limitations do not rise to a level requiring a ADA 
accommodation . . . and I must deny your request. . . your physicians have 
recommend [sic] that you be given an assignment that does not require you 
to sit for longer than an hour at a time without being able to move around . . 
(Grievant Exh. 38 at 1). None of the submittals by Dr. Peterson on Mr. Blauer's behalf 
contained any of the recommendations quoted above - see Grievant Exhs. 21-24. 
29. The September 9, 2003 change of assignment repeated the charge of 
"falling asleep in meetings" (though this had been resolved by Mr. Blauer's adoption of 
the C-PAP machine in February of 2003 - TR at 151-152, 553-554), and that he was "not 
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carrying the load of the other attorneys" (although neither Ms. Downing nor anyone else 
could quantify or substantiate this charge, beyond the use of a percentage sheet without 
backup, which told none of the actual story of relative workloads among 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel at DWS - TR at 447-457; Grievant Exh. 20). In addition, 
the September 9, 2003 memorandum again references federally-mandated criteria on 
timeliness (even though Ms. Downing had retracted her charges in connection with this 
claim in her reply to Mr. Blauer's memorandum concerning his 2003 appraisal - see 
Grievant Exh. 18). Grievant Exh. 3 8 at 2. 
30. The September 9,2003 memorandum, however, also asserted charges never 
before confronted by Mr. Blauer. Specifically: (a) Mr. Blauer was using a signature 
stamp "in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" (Grievant Exh. 38 at 
2); (b) the Chair of the Board of Review [Becky Thomas] "has felt that she has had to 
make the same editing corrections on your decisions over the years and that you have not 
taken the initiative to learn from them and eliminate the errors from subsequent 
decisions" (Id.); and (c) "You have been authorizing access to wage data over the years 
without strict compliance with Subsection 35A-4-312(6)" {Id). Concerning Ms. 
Downing's charge that Mr. Blauer had violated Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by 
permitting his signature stamp to be used on "thousands of documents", the practice was 
limited to the issuance of garnishments - a long-standing practice at DWS (TR at 557-
558) . Concerning Ms. Downing's charge that Mr. Blauer had violated Utah Code Ann. § 
35A-4-31(6), both Mr. Blauer and Mr. John Levanger (then Internal Audit Manager and 
Disclosure Officer for DWS) testified that they conferred regularly concerning the release 
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of the information covered by that section and assured compliance therewith (TR at 63-
64; 558-559). Concerning Ms. Downing's charge that Mr. Blauer's work needed to be 
rewritten, the only edits which have been brought to Mr. Blauer's attention had been 
matters of style, not substance (TR at 559-560); Workforce Appeals Board Chairman 
Becky Thomas had, in fact, been highly complimentary of Mr. Blauer's work output (TR 
at 200-201). 
31. By written notice dated September 12, 2003, Mr. Blauer (through his 
representative, Tom Cantrell) appealed his change of assignment (TR at 562-563; 
Grievant Exh. 40). His appeal stated the following: 
You are already aware that Lorin's known disabilities (whether ADA 
qualifying or not) may encumber the successful accomplishment of the 
specific combination of duties you've assigned him. His doctors have 
already made it clear to the Department that this combination of duties will 
exacerbate his physiological problems. We have made alternative 
proposals and suggestions which you have rejected with little or no 
discussion or negotiation. Even the Department's ADA Coordinator 
suggested that you consider his doctor's request in making his job 
assignments, yet you seem to disregard them. < 
32. By the time of his appeal, Mr. Blauer had also made clear to DWS that he 
could not function in a full-time administration law judge capacity due to his disabilities : 
i Q. Where you given any alternative by your doctor that would enable you 
to become a full-time ALJ? 
A. No. 
Q. Whynot? i 
A. Because I could not see how I could get out and walk, like you testified 
here, while holding hearings. I couldn't take notes, I couldn't control the 
telephone, the recorder deal with all the documents and be pacing around 
the room. It just made no sense. 
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(TR at 563,1. 22, through 564,1. 19). 
33. Upon receiving the September 9, 2003 Change of Assignment 
memorandum, Mr. Blauer (as indicated in the above-quoted testimony) consulted with his 
attending physician concerning options, and received the following response: 
Dr. Peterson made the statement, he says, I tell him what the limitations are 
and they seem to use it as a blueprint to destroy the man. He effectively 
said that in his letters to the Department. He said, I'm ordering him off the 
job until these issues are resolved and that seems to be in the hands of the 
Department, not Lorin, or words to that effect. 
(TR at 565,1. 25 through 566,1. 7). By application dated October 14, 2003, therefore, 
Mr. Blauer sought medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, with 
supporting documentation from Dr. Peterson (TR at 330-333; Grievant Exh. 25). In his 
letter supporting the FLMA application of October 14, 2003, Dr. Peterson stated the 
following: 
The Patient is intolerant of prolong sitting. It causes progressively severe 
and distracting pain in the back radiating down the left leg. My recent clear 
recommendation to department [sic] was to avoid this. To my astonishment 
that recommendation seems to have been used as a blueprint to create 
situation in which he cannot successfully function. Hence, his workplace 
has been transformed into one which is physically punishing . . . I have 
instructed him to avoid such a situation. 
(Grievant Exh. 25 at 2). Concerning Mr. Blauer's ongoing Coronary Artery Disease, 
Dr. Peterson observed the following: 
This individual is status post-coronary stent placement. He is at risk of 
exacerbation of this condition caused by stress. Currently, his work 
environment has become exceptionally stressful. 
34. Dr. Peterson also asserted complications arising from generalized anxiety 
disorder. (Grievant Exh. 25 at 2). 
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35. By letter ruling dated September 15, 2003, Executive Director Raylene 
Ireland declined Mr. Blauer's grievance of the September 9, 2003 reassignment (TR at 
677; Agency Exh. 8). In her letter ruling, Ms. Ireland dismissed Dr. Peterson's letters 
(which she admitted never to have read - TR at 860) (Agency Exh. 8 at 1). By e-mail 
dated September 16, 2003, Mr. Blauer appealed Ms. Ireland's September 15, 2003 letter 
ruling (TR at 679; Agency Exh. 9). 
36. On October 14, 2003 (following a hearing - TR at 577; Grievant Exh. 44). 
Ms. Ireland announced her decision to uphold Ms. Downing's September 9, 2003 
reassignment. Ms. Ireland dismissed completely the concerns voiced by Mr. Blauer's 
attending physician: 
In assigning these duties, Tani considered the original recommendations of 
your physicians even though your medical problems were determined not to 
meet the guidelines for an ADA accommodation. According to Chuck 
Butler, ADA Coordinator, these recommendations included "the ability to 
move around and to have an assignment wherein you have a clear 
understanding the expectations, what comprises a fall 40-hour workload for 
an experienced attorney, allows you to adequately organize and plan your 
work and provide you timely supervision, instructions and training. 
(Grievant Exh. 44 at 2). (Again, not one of these representations had been contained in 
any of the submittals by Dr. Peterson - Grievant Exhs. 22-25.) 
37. Mr. Blauer continued to attempt to return to work with DWS while still 
complying with medical directives concerning the duties which he could and could not 
fulfill. By letter dated November 6, 2003, his physician attempted to notify DWS Human 
Resources Director Kevin Beutler concerning restrictions imposed by Mr. Blauer's 
disabilities (TR at 362; Grievant Exh. 26): 
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In order to accommodate his sciatica, Lorin should do no more than two 
hearings a week (or similar limitation of duties that require him to sit or 
stand for extended periods of time); but he must take an ambulatory break 
every 40 minutes at minimum. By "ambulatory" I mean leaving his desk 
and walking about - not just standing at his desk or moving a few feet in 
either direction. . . . in order to accommodate his coronary condition and 
other medical issues that can be exacerbated by undue stress, Lorin should 
be insulated from the current management style of Tani Downing. 
I have repeatedly stated that Lorin can perform his traditional - or similar -
duties with these accommodations. He can work out of his home as he has 
done in the past to accommodate his sciatica and his other health issues. I 
recommend that he be placed on FMLA sick leave, not because he couldn't 
work, but to protect his health because of the letters from the Department 
revealing that they were forcing him to perform a combination of duties 
that I specifically advised against under conditions that were unnecessarily 
stressful. 
(Grievant Exh. 26; emphasis added) 
38. By letter dated June 4, 2004, Mr. Blauer again attempted to return to work 
under conditions that would accommodate his disabilities. He was declined by letter of 
June 18, 2004 from Tani Downing (TR at 383; Grievant Exh. 28), in which she dismissed 
Mr. Blauer's disability circumstances with the assumption that his attending physician 
was unaware of accommodations which had been offered (Grievant Exh. 28); Dr. 
Peterson testified, however, that he was aware of what had been offered, and stated that it 
was insufficient (TR at 384-387). 
39. Mr. Blauer was never given to understand that the reassignment effectuated 
by the September 9, 2003 memorandum was other than permanent - no subsequent 
written or verbal communication suggest as much (TR at 682-683; Grievant Exh. 28). 
40. DWS presented its case in chief at the hearing on December 7, 2009. The 
bulk of DWS's evidence attempted to establish that Mr. Blauer's disabilities could not be 
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accommodated through reassignment; when Mr. Blauer attempted, on redirect, to address 
this charge, however, he was precluded from testifying as to what could have been done 
by DWS to accommodate his disabilities (TR at 931-933). 
B. Marshaling of Evidence 
As noted in the Argument below, Petitioner Blauer takes the position that all issues 
before this Court are mistakes of law, and not dependent on a reversal of any finding of 
fact by CSRB or its hearing officer. Nevertheless, the following marshaling of evidence 
is offered in connection with the Agency ruling. 
Violation of Utah Administrative Code R. 477-15-2 and 3. 
Neither the hearing officer nor CSRB found that Petitioner Blauer had failed to 
demonstrate discrimination under R. 477-15-2 and 3 - indeed, Hearing Officer James H. 
Beadles concluded that "the evidence shows that DWS denied Petitioner's request for an 
accommodation due to an alleged disability" (Appendix at Attachment 3, p. 7), but 
declining to rule on jurisdictional grounds (Id.). In its Decision, Order and Final Agency 
Action (Appendix at Attachment 4), CSRB does not dispute this statement, nor substitute 
any finding of its own stead thereof, making clear instead that its ruling is one of law 
i 
(Attachment 4 at p. 28). 
Nevertheless, in the interest of completeness, Petitioner offers the following 
evidence which might have sustained a finding that Petitioner was not the victim of a \ 
refusal to accommodate disability by DWS: 
1. Dr. Peterson wasn't familiar with the legal definition of the term "essential 
i 
functions," using the term in his correspondence as a lay person (TR at 411, 433). 
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2. Dr. Peterson prepared Petitioner's FMLA request form (Exhibit G25) from 
conversations with Petitioner (TR at 421-425). 
3. Dr. Peterson did not know that 25% of administrative law hearings are 
canceled (TR at 436, 797). Dr. Peterson did not know that administrative law hearings 
often take less than one hour, and that Petitioner could move around during such hearings 
(TR at 436-437). 
4. Petitioner "may have" conducted 10-20 hearing per week at some point in 
1999-2000, although he did not believe this to be the case (TR at 607-608). 
5. Hospital records of Petitioner's emergency room visit on July 22, 2003 
(Agency Exh. 3) state that Petitioner reported increasing discomfort over a period of days 
(TR at 633); Petitioner did not recall discussing work problems with the attending 
physicians (TR at 634). 
6. Petitioner was not assigned to hold 20 hearings per week until September 9, 
2003, after the August 20, 2003 meeting with his supervisor; it was not called a corrective 
action (TR at 642-643). 
7. In an email dated August 21, 2003 to supervisor Tani Downing, Petitioner's 
representative, Tom Cantrell, stated that Petitioner was "not enthused" to assume the 
duties of an administrative law judge (TR at 644, Agency Exh. 4). 
8. In her letter ruling on Petitioner's first grievance, issued September 5, 2003 
(Grievant Exh. 39), Raylene Ireland correctly noted that Petitioner had not sought ADA 
accommodation prior to receiving his 2003 performance evaluation (TR at 654). 
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9. By letter dated September 5, 2003, ADA Director, Chuck Butler, declined 
Petitioner's ADA accommodation request (Agency Exh. 6, TR at 662-663). 
10. Respondent DWS arranged for a standup desk for Petitioner (TR at 664). 
11. On September 9, 2003, Tani Downing issued a reassignment memo, in 
which she reiterated many charges against Petitioner's job performance (Grievant 
Exh. 38, TR at 668-670). 
12. As an ALJ, Petitioner knew that he would be able to schedule his own 
cases, and would be aware of weekly expectations (TR at 670); also, that other aspects of 
such position would be predictable (TR at 671-672). 
13. Petitioner never performed 20 hearings per week after his September 9, 
2003 reassignment - he was first off sick, and then applied for leave under the Family 
Medical Leave Act (TR at 672-674). 
14. By email dated September 12, 2003, Petitioner, through his representative, 
Tom Cantrell, appealed his September 9, 2003 reassignment (Grievant Exh. 40, TR at , 
674-675). 
15. By letter of response dated September 15, 2003 (Agency Exh. 8), Executive 
i 
Director Raylene Ireland, declined Petitioner's request for accommodation, claiming that, 
to her understanding, the directives of Petitioner's physician had been met (TR at 677). 
16. Petitioner admitted that his first grievance (which had included the fact that ( 
he had no performance plan in place) was not appealed after he received a successful 
rating thereon by Executive Director Raylene Ireland's September 5, 2003 ruling 
i 
(Grievant Exh. 39)(TR at 656-657). 
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17. Tani Downing did not remember whether, in response to the March 2003 
assignment to conduct additional administrative law hearings, Petitioner raised any health 
issues; she remembers only that he believed he was being assigned too many hearings(. 
(TRat781). 
18. After delivering Petitioner's June, 2003 performance appraisal, Tani 
Downing tried to place him with the UI Department; they stated, however, that they 
preferred Mr. Bunker (TR at 787). 
19. According to Ms. Downing, Appeals Board Chair, Becky Thomas, stated 
that, if Petitioner were assigned to work with her department, she would hire her own 
counsel (TR at 787-788). 
20. In her decision concerning Petitioner's request for accommodation after his 
September 9, 2003 reassignment, Tani Downing did not review Dr. Peterson's letters, but 
only Mr. Butler's accommodation refusal letters of September 5, 2003 (Agency 
Exhibit 6) (TR at 789). 
21. Respondents commissioned an ergonomic work station review (Agency 
Exh. 10) (TR at 680, 789-790). 
22. Following hearing of Petitioner's grievance, Executive Director Ireland 
issued a letter ruling dated October 14, 2003, in which the grievance was denied 
(Grievant Exh. 44, TR at 690). 
23. According to testimony of supervisor Tani Downing, it was imperative for 
her to be able to modify staff assignments to meet the needs of the department and the 
public (TR at 762). 
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24. Administrative law hearings can be done by telephone, and while moving 
around (TR at 764, 797-798). 
25. A 16-page affidavit signed by Tani Downing in the Third District Court 
action referenced above (Agency Exh. 25) was received into evidence (TR at 773). It 
describes numerous reassignments within DWS, and complaints against Petitioner as 
described in her September 9, 2003 letter (Grievant Exh. 38). 
26. In the summer of 2003, Tani Downing claimed to have found evidence that 
Petitioner did non-DWS work (TR at 788). 
27. According to Ms. Downing, Petitioner's September 9, 2003 reassignment 
(Grievant Exh. 18) was not a corrective action plan (TR at 782). 
28. According to Ms. Downing's testimony, she rejected Petitioner's job 
reallocation proposal of August 20, 2003 (Grievant Exh. 32) because it would have 
involved sitting too long (TR at 794). Ms. Downing likewise rejected Petitioner's 
proposal concerning appeals board sub plan review work (Grievant Exh. 32) as it lacked 
objective criteria (TR at 795). 
29. According to Ms. Downing, she never intended to assign Petitioner to 
conduct administrative law hearings full time as a permanent position (TR at 796). 
30. According to Ms. Downing, Tiffany Vincent's hire (documented in 
Grievant Exh. 42) having been planned prior thereto, and was only awaiting fiscal 
approval (TR at 799-800). It was not intended to replace Petitioner. (Id.) 
31. According to Ms. Downing, she intended no retaliation against Petitioner 
(TR at 801); nor was Petitioner subjected to hostility or harassment (TR at 802). 
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32. According to Ms. Downing, she did not bring other employees into 
meetings with Petitioner in order to intimidate him (Id.). 
33. According to Executive Director Raylene Ireland, her September 5, 2003 
letter (Grievant Exh. 39) properly referred Petitioner to Chuck Butler as a proper source 
for ADA accommodations (TR at 839). 
34. Ms. Ireland testified that she was unaware of any retaliation against, 
harassment of, Petitioner (TR at 845). 
35. H.R. Specialist Jo Ann Campbell testified that she met in August of 2003 
with Petitioner, Mr. Cantrell and Tani Downing to discuss job options (TR at 903). 
According to Ms. Campbell, no decisions were made in that meeting (TR at 904). 
36. Ms. Campbell did not tell Mr. Blauer that his reassignment to conduct 
administrative law hearings full time was a permanent transfer (Id.). 
37. Ms. Campbell testified that she knew of no harassment or retaliation against 
Petitioner (TR at 905). 
Violation of Utah Administrative Code R477-10-1 (Failure to Define Job 
Performance Perameters) 
38. Performance plans were given to Petitioner for fiscal year 1995 - 1996 
(Grievant Exh. 37); fiscal year 1999-2000 (Agency Exh. 2); fiscal year 2000-2001 
(Grievant Exh. 34); and fiscal year 2003-2004 (Grievant Exh. 33). 
39. Petitioner recognized that his job descriptions would not remain the same at 
perpetuity (TR at 600-601). He recognized that his position description questionnaire 
(Grievant Exh. 5) did not guarantee this (Id.). 
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40. Petitioner acknowledged different performance plans, but stated that he had 
no other position description questionnaire (TR at 603). 
41. Petitioner's performance plan for 1999-2000 (Agency Exh. 2) correctly 
noted that core duties included conducting informal hearings (TR at 605-606). 
42. Petitioner's performance plan for 2000-2001 had the same provision 
(Grievant Exh. 34; TR at 608). 
43. Virginia Smith's performance appraisal for 2000-2001 (Grievant Exh. 13) 
talked about Petitioner falling asleep in meetings, closing his door and meeting with Tom 
Cantrell(TR at 612-613). 
44. During fiscal year 2001 -2002, Petitioner did not realize that he had no 
performance plan in place, and didn't complain with respect thereto (TR at 614). 
Petitioner also did not complain when no performance plan was in place for fiscal year 
2002-2003 (TR at 617-618). 
45. Responding to his performance evaluation for fiscal year 2001-2002 
(Grievant Exh. 14), Petitioner stated that he would do analysis of his position and submit 
it for review, but did not do so (TR at 617). 
46. In the 2001-2003 range, the work load increased for all DWS attorneys (TR 
at 618-619). 
47. For a brief period, Petitioner had weekly meetings with Tani Downing, after 
which she discontinued those meetings (TR at 622). 
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48. Petitioner's performance plan for fiscal year 2003-2004 (Grievant Exh. 33) 
was similar in many respects to his performance plan for fiscal year 1999-2000, other 
than differences cited in the record (TR at 626-627). 
49. According to Tani Downing, the duties of legal counsel expressly included 
the conducting of administrative hearings (TR at 763-764). 
50. According to Ms. Downing, the position description questionnaire 
(Grievant Exh. 5) is a recruiting tool, not a guarantee of duties (TR at 785). 
51. According to Ms. Downing, had Petitioner complained about not having a 
performance plan in place for 2001-2003, he would have received one (TR at 786). 
52. According to Ms. Downing, Petitioner's 2003-2004 performance plan was 
functionally identical to his performance plan for 2000-2001 (Id.). 
Finding That Letters Critical of Petitioner's Job Performance Constituted "Written 
Reprimands" Under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l) 
53. According to Ms. Downing, Petitioner's June 30, 2003 performance 
appraisal (Grievant Exh. 16) was not intended as a written reprimand (TR at 808). 
54. According to Ms. Downing, her reassignment of September 9, 2003 
(Grievant Exh. 38) was not a written reprimand (Id.). 
55. According to Executive Director Raylene Ireland, her September 5 ruling 
on Petitioner's first grievance (Grievant Exh. 39) was no a written reprimand (TR at 845). 
56. According to Ms. Ireland, her ruling on Petitioner's second grievance 
(Grievant Exh. 44) was not a written reprimand (TR at 846). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
CSRB improperly concluded - for the third time, and despite repeated judicial 
rulings to the contrary - that CSRB had no jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's claim that 
DWS had violated the provisions of Utah Administrative Rule 477-15-2 and 3, 
precluding discrimination, harassment or retaliation in the workplace. This Court's 
decision and order of March 13, 2008 (Appendix at Attachment 9) made clear that, under 
the law of the case, CSRB was clothed with jurisdiction to hear all claims before it, and 
was to decide them on their merits. 
Based on the overwhelming weight of evidence before CSRB, the determination 
should have been (and, in fact, was made) that Petitioner Blauer was the victim of DWS' 
violations of R. 477-15-2 and 3, and relief should have been fashioned accordingly. 
At the very least, Petitioner should have been granted the opportunity to present 
rebuttal evidence disproving DWS' asserted (but unproven) claim that it had no available 
positions which would have accommodated Petitioner's disability. 
Despite its express admissions, DWS was improperly held not to have violated 
Utah Administrative Code R. 477-10-1, et seq. by failing to define proper job parameters 
for Petitioner Blauer. By undisputed evidence, he had no valid performance plan in place 
during the very period in which he was accused of performance deficiencies - yet, even 
after successfully challenging an "unsuccessful" job rating in the summer of 2003, he was 
moved to a position impossible of performance due to disability, the excuse being 
continued claims of performance deficiencies unmeasured against any objective standard. 
970401.2 
32 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CSRB improperly disallowed Petitioner's final remanded claim, that he was the 
subject of "written reprimands" the substance of which he challenged. Without legal 
authority or basis, the hearing officer held, in advance of hearing, that no writing 
criticizing Petitioner's performance constituted a "written reprimand" under governing 
law. All applicable standards, however, establish that, at the very least, the September 9, 
2003 reassignment memo (Grievant's Exhibit 38) constituted a "written reprimand," and 
that DWS should have born the burden of justifying its content before CSRB. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: CSRB IMPROPERLY DECLINED JURISDICTION OVER 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS OF WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION 
A, CSRB Improperly Disregarded This Court's Mandate Concerning the 
Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Petitioner's Claims of Workplace Rule 
Violations 
CSRB Hearing Officer James Beadles' Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Decision and Order (Appendix at Attachment 3), sustained by CSRB's Decision, Order 
and Final Agency Action (Appendix at Attachment 4) mark the third time that CSRB has 
claimed to lack jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's charges of workplace rule violation based 
on Utah Administrative Code R. 477-15-2 and R. 477-15-3, which preclude 
discrimination, harassment or retaliation on the basis of disability against Utah State 
employees, despite repeated directives to the contrary from every level of the Utah State 
judiciary. The position was first stated in CSRB's order of November 12, 2003 
(Appendix at Attachment 5) and reversed by the Third District Court in the 2004 action 
(Appendix at Attachments 6 and 7); second, by CSRB's Order of December 6, 2006 
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(Appendix at Attachment 8), reversed by this Court in 2008 (Appendix at Attachment 9) 
and by the Utah Supreme Court on petition for certiorari (Appendix at Attachments 10 
and 11). The message from the courts has been clear: CSRB does have jurisdiction to 
hear Petitioner's claim and must hear and adjudicate them on their merits. This Court's 
last pronouncement in this regard expressly directed CSRB to hear all issues remanded 
from the District Court, and decide them on their merits (Appendix at Attachment 9). 
Therein, this Court wrote that the doctrine of law of the case barred CSRB from declining 
jurisdiction over Petitioner's harassment and retaliation claim: 
Based on [the] language in the [Trial Court's] Order, we conclude that the 
District Court determined that Blauer's claims had been raised in such a 
way that there were no jurisdictional deficiencies at the Agency or District 
Court level. Thus, the District Court's Order of Remand was an order to 
consider Blauer's claims on the merits. The DWS and the CSRB did not 
challenge the District Court's conclusions regarding jurisdiction through an 
appeal to this Court. As a result, the District Court's conclusions became 
the law of the case, and the CSRB was bound by the District Court's legal 
conclusions and mandates. The CSRB therefore erred by considering 
jurisdictional issues that already been decided by the District Court. 
Accordingly, we reversed the CSRB's dismissal of Blauer's six claims on 
jurisdictional grounds and remand the case to the CSRB for a hearing on 
the merits. 
(Attachment 9, p. 3). In so ruling, the Court relied on the case of Jensen v. IHC 
Hospitals, Inc., 2003 Utah 51, 83 2d 1076, which stated the following: 
The "law of the case" doctrine specifies that when a legal 'decision [is] 
made on an issue during one stage of the case,' that decision 'is binding in 
successive stages of the same litigation.' Particularly when an appellate 
court makes a pronouncement on a legal issue, '[t]he lower court must not 
depart from the mandate .. .' This is true even if the lower court 'believe[s] 
that the issue could have been better decided in another fashion.' 2003 
Utah 51 at \ 67. 
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Hearing Officer Beadles' belief that the jurisdictional issue could (or should) have 
been decided in such a way to preclude him from hearing Petitioner's claims under 
R. 477-15-2 and 3 long ago ceased to be a governing factor. This matter was remanded 
by this Court with a specific mandate: to hear all six of Petitioner's grievances on their 
merits. CSRB has repeatedly attempted to divest itself of jurisdiction to hear this claim. 
It has been told three times that it may not do so. As such, Mr. Beadles ruling placed 
CSRB in open and express defiance in this Court's mandate; CSRB's affirmance of that 
ruling necessitates the relief petitioned for here. 
CSRB's decision (Attachment 4) attempts to avoid the clear import of this Court's 
mandate by reaching all the way back to the District Court's Memorandum Decision of 
August 16, 2004 (Attachment 6), parsing the wording of the ruling, and suggesting that it 
did not entirely dispose of jurisdictional questions. In so reasoning, though, CSRB 
ignores completely the District Court's subsequent declaration (Attachment 7), this 
Court's Ruling of March 13, 2008 (Attachment 9), and the Supreme Court's denial of 
certiorari (Attachment 11). CSRB, in other words, places itself directly at odds with, and 
in rebellion against, this Court's express finding that "we conclude that the District Court 
determined that Blauer's claims had been raised in such a way that there were no 
jurisdictional deficiencies at the Agency or District Court level" (emphasis added). This 
Court's meaning is clear and inescapable. CSRB, though, is apparently intent upon 
substituting its own judgment, and that of its hearing officer, for the Court's directive. 
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B. The Hearing Officer's Finding of Discrimination is Supported by Substantial 
Evidence in the Record; Any Contrary Finding - Even if Made - Would Have 
Been Without Substantial Support in the Record. 
DWS's conduct toward Mr. Blauer on September 9, 2003 was governed by Utah 
Administrative Code R. 477-15-1, et seq, as it read at that time.4 R 477-15-1 provided 
the following: 
It is the State of Utah's policy to . . . provide all employees a working 
environment that is free from unlawful harassment based on race, religion, 
national origin, color, sex, age, disability, or protective activity under anti-
discrimination statute. . . 
R 477-15-2 provided a broad definition of unlawful harassment based upon disability: 
(1) Unlawful harassment means discriminatory treatment based on race, 
religion, national origin, color, sex, age, protective activity or disability. . . 
(2) Unlawful harassment includes the following subtypes: 
(a) behavior or conduct in violation of R. 477-15-2(1) that is unwelcome, 
pervasive, demeaning, ridiculing, derisive, or coercive, and results in a 
hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment. 
(b) behavior or conduct in violation of R. 477-15-2(1) that results in an 
tangible employment action being taken against the harassed employee. 
R. 477-15-3, as it read in 2003, dealt with the topic of retaliation; 
(1) No person may retaliate against any employee who opposes a practice 
forbidden under this policy, or has filed a charge, testified, assisted or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under 
the policy or has otherwise engaged in protected activity. 
(2) Any act of retaliation toward the complainant, witnesses or other 
involved in the investigation shall be subject to corrective action or 
disciplinary action. Prohibited actions include: . . . 
4
 R 477-15-1, et seq, has since been revised; those revisions, however, cannot be 
retroactively applied to defeat Mr. Blauer's vested rights at the time of his reassignment 
- Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Investment Company, 956 2d 257 (Utah 1998). 
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(c) creation of or the continued existence of a hostile work environment; 
(g) discriminatory treatment. 
The prohibitions set out in the foregoing regulatory framework are more than 
broad enough to encompass DWS's conduct toward Mr. Blauer as set out in the evidence 
described above. Mr. Blauer5 s own testimony, buttressed by that of his attending 
physician, Dr. Dennis Peterson, and documentation introduced into the record, 
established that Mr. Blauer5 s well-established work patterns (which permitted movement, 
work from home, use of a treadmill, reviewing tapes while in motion, etc.) were 
deliberately disrupted by decisions from Tani Downing, who became Mr. Blauer5s 
supervisor in early 2002. In March of 2003, Ms. Downing elected to assign Mr. Blauer to 
conduct 10 administrative unemployment insurance hearings per week in lieu of his prior 
duties. In response, Mr. Blauer approached his attending physician, seeking a letter 
explaining the problems imposed by Ms. Downing5s decision. When he attempted to 
present these to Ms. Downing at his June, 2003 performance appraisal meeting, however, 
she refused to even review the information, deferring him to Chuck Butler, DWS5s ADA 
coordinator. Mr. Blauer caused his physician, Dr. Peterson, to interface directly with Mr. 
Butler, furnishing both verbal and written information concerning Mr. Blauer5 s 
disabilities, and explaining that Ms. Downing5s reassignment could not accommodate 
them. Mr. Blauer5s conditions worsened over the Summer of 2003 (due both to the 
imposition of the adjusted work schedule and the stress imposed by the 2003 
performance appraisal, and his pending appeal therefrom - see below), culminating in a 
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visit to the emergency room at the end of July with symptoms of coronary arrest. At this 
point, Mr. Blauer's physician notified DWS that Mr. Blauer's conditions needed to be 
accommodated, or that he needed to be removed from the work environment entirely. 
It was against this backdrop that, on September 9, 2003, Ms. Downing made the 
deliberate decision to reassign Mr. Blauer to perform administrative hearings full-time -
15 per week to begin with, 20 per week thereafter (the standard workload for an 
administrative law judge). Mr. Blauer, his administrative representative, Tom Cantrell, 
and Dr. Peterson and (later) Mr. Blauer's legal counsel all attempted to explain to DWS 
that the reassignment flew directly in the face of documented medical evidence 
concerning Mr. Blauer's disabilities. But DWS would hear none of it: Mr. Blauer would 
come to work as a full-time ALJ, or not at all. His prior duties, which he had 
performed - according to express documentation maintained by DWS itself- in a 
successful manner for over 23 years were to be stripped from him, and he was to be 
saddled with tasks which he was physically and physiologically incapable of performing 
due to disability. His physician sponsored his application for leave under the Family 
Medical Leave Act, based on the very situation created by Ms. Downing's September 9, 
2003 reassignment. 
DWS offered not a shred of medical evidence to refute any of the foregoing - no 
other treating or examining physician, no independent medical exam, not even treatise { 
evidence on Petitioner's conditions. Yet DWS has steadfastly maintained that, in shifting 
Mr. Blauer from responsibilities which he successfully carried out since the 1980's, to 
responsibilities which documented medical evidence established that he could not 
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perform, it had done nothing wrong. DWS's protestations of justification (to the extent 
even relevant, given the breath of the regulatory framework as set out above) are 
transparent and unavailing. 
Ms. Downing attempted to construct a scenario under which full-time 
administrative hearing were the only thing to which Mr. Blauer could possibly be 
assigned. She protested, moreover, that Mr. Blauer's reassignment to the sedentary life 
of full-time ALJ was actually consistent with his physician's stated limitations. Both 
claims are equally preposterous. Mr. Blauer had successfully performed his traditional 
mix of duties (which had initially included those assignments provided by his 1998 
position description questionnaire, and had expanded to include additional duties 
thereafter) in a successful manner - year after year, performance evaluations establish 
this fact. To the extent that performance deficiencies were raised in prior performance 
appraisals, they were either shown to be incorrect, or dealt with in constructive fashion. 
Suggestions of falling asleep in meetings (dealt with by sleep apnea treatment in early 
2003), use of a signature stamp (consistent with long-standing department policy), 
production of inferior work product (directly refuted by Workforce Appeals Board 
Chairman Becky Thomas), missing of "red letter" deadlines (conclusively demonstrated 
to be a function of scheduling and typing delays) and the like, were all shown to be red 
herrings. As for the claim that his "reassignment" was consistent with directives of Mr. 
Blauer's physician, one need only read the letters from Dr. Peterson introduced into 
evidence to see that his concerns were not met in the least by DWS' actions. 
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This left DWS with the vague and unqualified suggestion that Mr. Blauer was 
"not carrying his share of the workload". When first faced with this suggestion, Mr. 
Blauer asked sensibly enough what his share of the workload should be; Ms. Downing's 
only response was to turn the question back on Mr. Blauer, asking him what he thought it 
should be. At the same time, however, she issued an assignment to departmental 
employee Connie Dumas to assemble figures concerning workload growth and 
percentages between 2000 and 2002. The result did nothing to support Ms. Downing's 
contentions; to the contrary, it demonstrated that area over which Mr. Blauer had primary 
or exclusive responsibility had indeed exploded during the time period, while areas over 
which other Legal/Enforcement Counsel III attorneys had primary responsibility may or 
may not have grown commensurately. 
Simple logic also undermines the "justification" argument apparently urged by 
DWS in support of its discrimination against Mr. Blauer. If his writing was indeed 
substandard, why place him in the position of a full-time ALJ issuing more written 
opinions than ever? If he had trouble meeting "red-letter" deadlines, why saddle him 
with 20 cases per week? If he was indeed "not pulling his share of the workload", why 
press him into a standard workload for an administrative law judge when documented 
medical evidence established that the type of sedentary working conditions incident to 
such a position would aggravate existing physical conditions, and actually impair or 
prevent adequate performance of the required workload? DWS's professed justifications 
do not stand up to even the most casual scrutiny. 
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While the simple fact of discrimination based on disability is established by the 
foregoing, and is sufficient to establish both harassment and retaliation under the 
regulatory framework cited above, Ms. Downing's actual motives are also inescapably 
established by the evidence. The reassignment of Mr. Blauer to conduct administrative 
hearings full-time was contemplated, at least as of August 20,2003, as a "corrective 
action" for Mr. Blauer's having failed to achieve a successful rating in his 2003 
performance appraisal. Effective September 5, 2003, Mr. Blauer succeeded in reversing 
Ms. Downing on this point. Yet four days later, Ms. Downing imposed the very 
"corrective action" previously contemplated (although not imposed) as the result of the 
revoked "unsuccessful" rating - despite been put on notice that Mr. Blauer was precluded 
by disability from performing the task which she was assigning him. At the same time, 
Mr. Blauer was barred from his workplace for the first time if out on sick leave, and his 
legal representative cautioned directly not to be on premises as he had in the past. 
C. Petitioner's Claim is Not Barred by Chuck Butler's Letter of September 5, 
2003 
Both DWS and CSRB have made much of the fact that, by letter dated 
September 25, 2003 (Agency Exh. 6) ADA coordinator, Chuck Butler, denied Petitioner 
Blauer's request (made prior to that date) for reasonable accommodation, and that 
Mr. Blauer took no appeal from that decision. Such reliance is clearly misplaced, for 
several reasons. 
First and foremost, Supervisor Downing's September 9, 2003 "Reassignment" 
Memorandum (Grievant Exh. 38) constituted a separate and distinct act of discrimination 
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(albeit based on the same disabilities which had been addressed to Mr. Butler). The act 
of discrimination complained of here did not even occur until four days after Mr. Butler's < 
letter. 
Second, the legal status of, and appeal rights attending, Mr. Butler's decision have 
< 
never been made clear in this proceeding. According to arguments made by DWS to the 
Third District Court in 2006, Mr. Butler's position should not even exist-state employees 
have no rights under the ADA. Certainly, neither DWS nor CSRB has pointed to any 
statute or regulation which clothed Mr. Butler's office with the right to adjudicate and 
determine claims arising under R477-15-1, et. seq. As such, Mr. Butler's September 5, 
2003 letter is a legal nullity regardless of its content. 
Third, it is clear from the record that Petitioner Blauer was unaware of 
Mr. Butler's office or authority until informed thereof by his superiors (see Statement of 
Facts at ^ f 19, above), and was not notified that he had any appeal rights from 
Mr. Butler's September 5, 2003 decision. The letter itself contains no notification that if 
any such appeal rights. This is a significant omission, given that, by definition, 
Mr. Butler's determination of Petitioner's disability claim constituted an "adjudicative 
function" under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (see V-l Oil Company v. 
Department of Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Utah 1997)). Whether 
characterized as the product of a formal or informal adjudicative proceeding under the 
UAPA, Mr. Butler's decision should, by law, have been accompanied by express notice 
of Petitioner's appeal rights-see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-203(i)(iii); Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63G-4-208(l)(e)-(g). 
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Finally, Mr. Blauer's five-day appeal period under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401, 
et seq., had not even run when, on September 9, 2003, Mr. Butler's determination was 
superseded by Ms. Downing's September 9, 2003 Memorandum of Reassignment 
(Grievant Exh. 38), from which Petitioner did pursue an appeal. 
Mr. Blauer's claim that DWS violated Utah Administrative Code R. 477-15-2 and 
3 by subjecting him to discriminatory treatment, by imposing a tangible employment 
action against him in light of his disability, and by creating hostile work environment, 
was overwhelmingly established by the evidence. 
POINT II: THE HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED 
PETITIONER'S REBUTTAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATION OPTIONS OPEN TO 
DWS. 
As noted above, evidence presented at the hearing of this matter overwhelmingly 
established discrimination against Petitioner based on disability. DWS attempted, in its 
case in chief, to offer justification through the testimony of supervisor Tani Downing, 
suggesting (though no concrete proof was offered) that Petitioner's disabilities could not 
be accommodated within the department. While Petitioner did present evidence that his 
representative, Tom Cantrell, had actually proposed alternate job assignments, which had 
been turned down without reasonable explanation by Ms. Downing {see Statement of 
Facts at ^ f 26, above), Petitioner was denied outright the opportunity to retake the stand on 
rebuttal and outline available job options which would have accommodated his own, as 
well as his attending physician's, concerns. Petitioner's representative repeatedly 
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proffered the nature of the evidence be brought forward, but the hearing officer declined, 
ruling the evidence irrelevant and argumentative. See TR at 931-933. < 
The hearing officer's ruling in this regard may be deemed harmless error, given 
DWS' lack of probative evidence that it had no alternative options for Petitioner in the 
fall of 2003, yet declined Petitioner's proposals in that regard. See Statement of Facts at 
Tf 26, above. The proffered evidence, however, was directly probative of DWS' failure to 
honor its obligations under R. 477-15-1 through R. 477-15-3. To that extent, it was not 
irrelevant, nor was it argumentative. 
POINT III: THE HEARING OFFICER IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT 
DWS HAD NOT VIOLATED UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE 
CODE R. 477-10-1, et seq. BY FAILING TO DEFINE 
PROPER JOB PARAMETERS FOR PETITIONER 
At pages 6-7 of his Findings, Conclusions, Decision and Order (Appendix at 
Attachment 3), Hearing Officer Beadles concluded that, because Mr. Blauer (for some 
unspecified period of time) met weekly with his Supervisor, Tani Downing, he therefore 
received verbal feedback concerning his performance; further, that through the issuance 
of annual performance appraisals, DWS gave Mr. Blauer written feedback concerning his 
performance. This, concluded the hearing officer, satisfied the requirements of Utah 
Administrative Code R. 477-10-1, et seq. On the basis of this alone, the hearing officer 
concluded that DWS had not violated R. 477-10-1, et seq. in connection with Mr. 
Blauer's performance, and dismissed Mr. Blauer's grievance in this regard. CSRB's final 
order (Appendix at Attachment 4) echoed the hearing officer's assessment, recognizing 
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that, "while admittedly not in exact compliance with [sic] personnel rule" (Order at p. 
24), DWS satisfied the "substantive provisions" of the rule (Id.). 
Again, CSRB needs to look to Utah Administrative Code R. 477-10-1 as it read in 
2003. As enacted at that time, R. 477-10-1 imposed upon DWS the following 
responsibilities: 
Agency management shall develop an employee performance management 
system consistent with these rules and subject to approval by the executive 
director, DHRM . . . 
An acceptable performance management system shall satisfy the following 
criteria: 
(a) performance standards and expectations for each employee shall be 
specifically written in a performance plan by August 30 of each fiscal year. 
(b) managers or supervisors provide employee with regular verbal and 
written feedback based on the standards of performance and conduct 
outlined in the performance plan . . . 
(Emphasis added). R. 477-10-2 (2003) then provided the following: 
When an employee's performance does not meet established standards due 
to failure to maintain skills, incompetency, or inefficiency, agency 
management shall take appropriate, documented, and clearly labeled 
corrective action . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
The hearing officer's findings that Mr. Blauer received both written and verbal 
feedback concerning his performance does not resolve the problem. It is undisputed that, 
for a number of years prior to 2001, Mr. Blauer had been furnished and annual 
performance plan/evaluation. It is also undisputed, however, that no such performance 
plan or evaluation was in place in 2002-2003 (see Statement of Facts at paragraph 6, 
above). The only official information issued by DWS (or, for that matter, DHRM) was 
45 
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the overall job description for Legal/Enforcement Counsel 3 (Grievant Exh. 6), and Mr. 
Blauer's specific position description questionnaire from 1998 (Grievant Exh. 5). The 
former was far too vague and general to satisfy the requirements of R. 477-10-1; the latter 
was, by the overwhelming weight of evidence, hopelessly outdated by 2003. 
Yet Mr. Blauer was taken to task, in his 2003 performance appraisal, for 
performance deficiencies ranging from specific (and rebutted) claims of job performance 
deficiency to amorphous claims that he was "not carrying [his] share of the workload", 
etc. Based on these vague observations - none of them having any basis in a 
performance plan then in effect - Mr. Blauer was rated "unsuccessful", and targeted for 
"corrective action". When, on September 5, 2003, Director Raylene Ireland reversed 
Ms. Downing5s "unsuccessful" rating (thereby obviating the need for the "corrective 
action" previously contemplated by his supervisor), Ms. Tani Downing nonetheless 
implemented the substance of the contemplated corrective action, reassigning Mr. Blauer 
to become a full-time ALJ (in the face of medical evidence that he could not perform in 
that position - see above), and citing as justification the same performance issues 
supporting her overturned 2003 performance appraisal. 
In short, Mr. Blauer finds himself where he is today not only due to 
discrimination, but because his supervisor took adverse job action against him based 
upon undefined and unsupported claims of deficient job performance, with no job 
performance plan in place against which he could measure that performance. 
POINT IV: THE HEARING OFFICE ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT TANI DOWNING'S SEPTEMBER 9, 2003 "NOTICE 
970401.2 
46 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OF REASSIGNMENT" CONSTITUTED A GRIEVEABLE 
"WRITTEN REPRIMAND" UNDER GOVERNING LAW 
The final issue remanded by the Utah Appellate Court for determination on its 
merits was whether one or more of the written declarations in Mr. Blauer's personnel file 
constituted "written reprimands", grieveable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67- 19a-
202(l)(a). In motions before the hearing officer prior to the hearing, Mr. Blauer raised 
the question concerning who bore the burden of proof on this issue. In response, the 
hearing officer raised sue sponte the question whether the documents which were the 
subject of Mr. Blauer's motion were "written reprimands" within the meaning of the 
statute at all. The hearing officer issued an order on September 30, 2009 (Appendix at 
Attachment 1) which, although titled only aOrder Regarding Allocation of Burden of 
Proof concluded that, as a matter of law, none of the foregoing documents constituted a 
"written reprimand" under governing law. He cited no Utah statutory or case law in 
support of his position (relying only on language and a 1981 decision out of New York, 
dealing with a written performance evaluation of a school teacher). He simply reasoned 
that the term "written reprimand" could not logically be extended to the documents in 
question. It is submitted that, at least with respect to the September 9, 2003 "change of 
assignment" memorandum (Grievant Exh. 38), the hearing officer committed legal error 
in reaching the conclusions he did. CSRB, in its final Order (Appendix at Attachment 4) 
affirmed the hearing officer without adding any substantive rationale. 
The term "written reprimand" as used at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(a), and 
at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(a) is not defined in the statute; neither does any 
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reported Utah decision offer any definition. Accordingly, the words used must be given 
their common, ordinary and literal meaning -Parks v. Utah Transit Authority, 2002 Utah 
55, 53 3d 473; State v. Martinez, 52 3d 1276 (Utah 2002); Boulder Mountain Lodge, Inc. 
v. Town of Boulder, 983 2d 570 (Utah 1999). 
As the hearing officer himself acknowledges, "all the documents are written and, 
in a broad, dictionary sense, they are 'reprimands'." (Appendix at Attachment 1, p. 1.) 
As such, in the absence of any expressed or implied intent by the Utah Legislature 
confining the terms used beyond their ordinary and common meaning, the documents 
must be deemed "written reprimands", the correctness of which was successfully 
challenged by Mr. Blauer at the hearing. They were reprimands, they were in writing, 
and they were shown to be wrong. DWS had the burden of their justification. 
The hearing officer attempted to rely on the fact that three of the documents were 
in fact responses to communication from Mr. Blauer, and should therefore not be 
construed as "written reprimands". Even if this distinction is held valid, however, it 
cannot apply to Grievant Exh. 38: the September 9, 2003 "Change of Assignment 
Memorandum". That document was unsolicited by Mr. Blauer, was a direct assault on 
his competency and expertise as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III for DWS, and was 
intended and offered as an explanation for the imposition of what Ms. Downing herself 
had previously characterized as a "corrective action" (even though the reason for that 
"corrective action" had been revoked by the Department Director). Nothing in the 
hearing officer's rational can explain away the nature and character of that document as a 
"written reprimand" under any reasonable reading of the term. 
48 
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In the case of Gordonv. Horsley, 86 Cal. A 336, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910 (Ct. of A, 
First Dist, Div. 3, Calif. 2001), the Grievant and Appellant, a San Mateo County Deputy 
Sherriff, commenced an administrative grievance procedure against the Sherriff s office 
issuance of a letter to the Grievant, stating that "as the Sherriff, it is my responsibility to 
manage and monitor the sworn officers in my department.. . although you were 
reinstated with full pay and benefits of a Deputy Sherriff, I have grave concerns that you 
have demonstrated poor judgment and decision making ability both on and off duty. 
Therefore, you will not be issued a duty firearm. In addition, you are prohibited from 
carrying a concealed firearm and from exercising Peace Officer duties during your off 
duties hours." The California Court of Appeals held that the foregoing language clearly 
constituted the letter a "written reprimand", referring to the Webster's definition of 
"reprimand" as "a severe or formal reproof5, which last term is further defined as 
"criticism for a fault" - 86 Cal. App. 4th at 348. 
The September 9, 2003 memorandum of reassignment is similar to (although more 
sweeping than) the letter in the Gordon decision. It recognizes that Mr. Blauer had been 
exonerated from prior charges of "unsuccessful" performance; nevertheless, the 
memorandum goes on for pages criticizing Mr. Blauer's work for reasons which, as 
demonstrated at length at the hearing, were either false, overstated or previously 
retracted. There is simply no basis for concluding that it did not constitute a "written 
reprimand" under governing law. D WS should have been put to the task of either 
establishing it or withdrawing it. 
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CONCLUSION 
Lorin Blauer observes the same thing that he has been observing since this matter 
began in 2003: at some point, at some level, the Utah Department of Workforce Services 
needs to be answerable on the merits for the action for which it took against him. He has 
attempted to be heard on this issue time and again, before Federal and State courts, 
administrative agencies, etc. Finally, Mr. Blauer had a hearing on the merits - only to be 
told that, based on jurisdictional questions long since decided in his favor, and on legal 
questions improperly applied, he was once again turned away empty-handed. 
It is long past time for this to end. This Court should reverse CSRB's rulings in 
this matter, and order Mr. Blauer compensated with back pay and benefits, retroactive to 
September 9, 2003. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 2011. 
JONES WALDO HQE6ROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By:±: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
LORINBLAUER, 
Grievant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
Agency. 
ORDER REGARDING 
ALLOCATION OF BURDEN 
OFPROOF 
Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408 
Hearing Officer: James H. Beadles 
Grievant alleges that the following documents constitute "written reprimands" as that term 
is used in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2) and that, therefore, the Department bears the burden of 
proof in establishing that they were filed appropriately.1 
1. A memorandum from Tani Downing to Grievant dated July 25,2003, with the subject 
line, "Response to Grievance." 
2. Correspondence to Grievant from Raylene Ireland, dated September 5,2003, with the 
subject line, "Level Four Grievance Response." 
3. A memorandum entitled "Change of Assignment," dated September 9,2003. 
4. A letter from Raylene Ireland to Grievant, dated October 14, 2003, regarding the 
assignment of various duties and a hearing held on the issue on September 26, 2003. 
The Hearing Officer is persuaded that none of the documents identified constitute a "written 
reprimand" in the sense meant by the legislature. Obviously, all the documents are written and, in 
a broad, dictionary sense, they are "reprimands." However, to equate all such documents with a 
"written reprimand" under Subsection 67-19a-406(2) would transform all letters and performance 
evaluations containing a critical comment into a disciplinary document subject to due process. 
Further, all the items listed in Subsection 67-19a-406(2) are actions initiated by a department. 
Except for the Change of Assignment memorandum of September 9,2009, all the documents that 
Grievant challenges are responses to Grievant rather than pro-active actions of the Department. It 
Grievant suggests that there may be other documents deserving to be called "written 
reprimands." However, he specifically challenged these items in his Clarification. 
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makes sense that, if the government is the original instigator of an action, it should bear the burden 
of proving that the action was taken in accordance with law. In none of them did the Department 
act in an affirmative, pro-active fashion to use them as separate, independent methods of discipline. 
Indeed, as the Department points out, the second document of the three, i.e., the September 5,2003 
Ireland memorandum, was a victory for Mr. Blauer, overturning his direct supervisor's performance 
rating.2 
It appears that what Grievant actually requests is that all critical comments be subject to 
review by the Career Service Review Board. This cannot have been what the legislature intended 
when it established the merit protection system. In a claim similar to Grievant's, the Court of 
Appeals of New York concluded that a performance evaluation of an educator was not subject to that 
state's stringent due process demands because, while the evaluation was clearly critical of the 
teacher's performance, it was not a reprimand as that jurisdiction's laws defined the term. 
While the language of the administrators' letters may appear to some to be in 
the nature of a "reprimand" within the literal meaning of the word, it falls far short 
of the sort of formal reprimand contemplated by the statute. Although the sharply 
critical content of the letters is unmistakable, the purpose of such communications 
- to call to the teacher's attention a relatively minor breach of school policy and to 
encourage compliance with that policy in the future - is also clear. The purpose is to 
warn, and hopefully to instruct - not to punish. 
Holtv. Bd ofEduc. Of Webutuck Central School Dist, 52 N.Y.2nd 625, 634 (N.Y. 1981). 
As that court also stated, the protection afforded by New York's teacher tenure system should 
not be interpreted as "insulating tenured teachers from all written critical comment from their 
supervisors." Id. Similarly here, Utah's system of merit protection affords employees protection 
from arbitrary and illegally imposed discipline, but it does not require an employer to refrain from 
discussing an employee's performance, however critical that discussion may turn. 
— - -
?AlthoTrgh"^he~Change"ioi^ssrgnm'entTnemo was issued^by~the~Department and not a 
response to Grievant, the Utah Court of Appeals has aheady upheld the Department's Change of 
Assignment. Blauer v. Dept. of Workforce Services, 2005 UT App 488. Given the appellate court's 
approval of the Department's substantive action, it would be inappropriate for the CSRB's Hearing 
Officer to try to undo that action by reviewing it as an improper written reprimand. Whether viewed 
as a written reprimand or a simple re-allocation of duties, the Utah Court of Appeals has already 
ruled that the September 9, 2003 Change of Assignment memo did not violate Grievant's rights. 
Blauer v. Utah Dep 't of Workforce Svcs, Case No. 28 CSRB/H.0.408 
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Consequently, the critical letters referred to by Grievant do not appear to constitute written 
reprimands as that term is defined by Utah law. Therefore, the Department does not bear the burden 
of proof regarding them. Consistent with the appellate court decision establishing the six (6) issues 
remaining to be heard, however, the Hearing Officer will hear any additional evidence or argument 
that Grievant may wish to introduce regarding its claim that the communications are "written 
reprimands" subject to CSRB jurisdiction. 
DATED this 30th day of September 2009. 
WW* 
femes H. Beadles 
CSRB Presiding/Hearing Officer 
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''Lorin Blauer 
Grievant 
ljblauer@msn.com 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
LORINBLAUER, 
Grievant, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
Agency. 
ORDER REGARDING 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF BURDEN OF PROOF 
Case No. 28 CSRB/H.0.408 
Hearing Officer: James H. Beadles 
In a filing made on November 9,2009, nine days before the hearing is scheduled to begin in 
this matter, Grievant requests the Hearing Officer to change his mind regarding which party should 
bear the burden of proof on Issue No. 6 of the six-item list of issues to be reviewed at the hearing 
- "Critical letters from DWS representatives remaining in Grievant's personnel file constitute "written 
reprimands," grievable to CSRB pursuant to UCA § 67-19a-302(l)." The purported legal grounds 
for the requested switch is the alleged existence of "newly discovered evidence." 
Grievant claims that this "new" evidence consists of e-mails between his non-attorney 
Tom Cantrell and Tani Downing and his attorney representative, Vince Rampton and John Levanger. 
(Blauer Affidavit at 1). By no reasonable definition of the term does this qualify as "newly 
discovered." Not only did Grievant have access to the information all times, as he admitted running 
across it while organizing documents for the hearing, but they consist of documents from his legal 
(and apparently, non-legal) representatives. If those documents had such important significance, it 
was their duty to call them to his prompt attention and to the Hearing Officer's. 
Regardless, the Hearing Officer has reviewed Grievant's request, including the purportedly 
newly-remembered documents and concludes that there is no reason to amend the September 30 
order regarding allocation of the burden of proof. Consequently, the request is denied. 
DATED this 16th day of November 2009. 
4. n jfames H. Beadles 
/CSRB Presiding/Hearing Officer 
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Paralegal 
Office of the Attorney General 
BBLAKE@utah.gov 
Lorin Blauer 
Grievant 
ljblauer@msn.com 
Tom Cantrell 
Utah Legal Advocates 
tom@tomcantrell.com 
Philip S. Lott 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
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Human Resources Specialist 
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Claudia Jones - Lorin Blauer v. Utah Department of Workforce Services — Order 
Regarding Motion for Reconsideration of Burden of Proof 
From: Claudia Jones 
To: Blake, Brian; Cantrell, Tom; ljblauer@msn.com; Lott, Philip; RAMPTON', VINCE; Wakefield, 
Jennifer 
Date: Monday, November 16, 2009 12:51 PM 
Subject: Lorin Blauer v. Utah Department of Workforce Services - Order Regarding Motion for 
Reconsideration of Burden of Proof 
Attachments: Blauer, Lorin 16 Oct 2009 Order.pdf; Blauer, Lorin mcl0.pdf; Claudia Jones.vcf 
Security: Confidential 
Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408 
Attached are the "Order Regarding Motion for Reconsideration of Burden of Proof and "Certificate of Service" in 
this matter. These copies are the only ones you will receive unless you request a hard copy by return email. 
Dear Messrs. Blauer, Cantrell and Rampton: Please reply to this email to confirm that you have 
received these documents. 
Thank you 
Claudia L. Jones 
Career Service Review Board 
1120 State Office Building 
P.O. Box 141561 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1561 
cjones@utah.gov 
801-538-3048 
This electronic transmission may contain confidential and privileged information. This message is intended only 
for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is exempt from 
disclosure under applicable federal or state law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or 
the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified 
that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received 
this communication in error, please notify us immediately by telephone and destroy the original message 
received by you. 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
LORIN BLAUER, 
Grievant, 
v« 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
Agency. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408 
Hearing Officer: James H. Beadles 
Over the course of four days, November 18, 19, 23, and December 7, 2009, the parties 
presented testimony and exhibits regarding six issues relevant to Lorin Blauer' s (Mr. Blauer) present 
grievance with the Utah Department of Workforce Services (DWS). Mr. Blauer was present with 
his representative, Tom Cantrell. DWS was represented by Philip Lott, Assistant Utah Attorney 
General and Jennifer Wakefield as the Management Representative. Tracy A Covington, a certified 
court reporter with CitiCourt, made a verbatim record of the proceedings. She also swore in the 
witnesses, who included Mr. Blauer, Dennis R. Peterson, M.D., TaniPackDowning,Raylene Ireland, 
and Joanne Campbell. 
In documents provided to the Hearing Officer before the evidentiary hearing and via exhibits 
introduced during the hearing, it became clear that various administrative and judicial personnel have 
wrestled with Mr. Blauer's case. Not only did DWS executives review Mr. Blauer5 s case, but the 
Career Service ReviewBoard (CSRB), Third District Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals have also 
examined various aspects of the incidents surrounding the relevant events. The six issues remaining 
after slightly more than six years are the result of the Utah Court of Appeals' 2008 decision that his 
claims should be given an evidentiary hearing. Blauer v. Dep 't ofWorkforce Services, 2008 UT App 
-84J 
1
 In argument before the Hearing Officer, Mr. Blauer implied that the Utah Court of Appeals' 2008 
decision regarding the six issues is a directive to the CSRB to rule in his favor. This is an over-
reading of the opinion. The appellate court decision was aimed squarely at a jurisdictional decision 
of the CSRB and made no intimations as to the appropriate substantive result. The court remanded 
the case to the CSRB merely for a "hearing on the merits." Mr. Blauer had such a hearing. 
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It appears both parties agree that, due to the unique posture of this case, these six issues serve 
as the functional equivalent of written grievances. Consequently, rather than base the presentation 
of evidence and argument on the original grievances, the evidentiary hearing flowed from that court-
established recitation of issues. Both parties developed their arguments along the same hnes and 
these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision & Order will be similarly structured. 
AUTHORITY 
UtahCodeAnn. § 67-19a-406 provides the CSRB statutory authority to hear grievances from 
career service employees. That statutory authority is more fully developed by administrative rule. 
Specifically, the CSRB Administrator is delegated the power to appoint a hearing officer to take 
testimony and accept documentary evidence regarding the factual issues. From that evidentiary 
record, the law charges the appointed hearing officer with the duty to issue Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, BURDEN OF PROOF, 
AND SCOPE OFREVIEW 
By virtue of the 2008 appellate court remand decision, the sole issues in this matter are as 
follows: 
1. DWS representatives failed to properly define job performance parameters, in violation 
of Utah Admin. Code R477-10-1, et seq.y 
2. DWS assigned job tasks to Grievant falling outside his job description, in violation of Utah 
Admin. Code R-477-3-2, 3; 
3. DWS engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against, Grievant in connection 
with his grievances, in violation of Utah Admin. Code R-477-15-2, 3; 
4. DWS failed to properly maintain personnel records concerning Grievant's performance, 
and refused access to alleged documentation supposedly reflecting negatively on his job 
performance (which they claimed to be in his personnel file) in violation of Utah Admin. Code 
R-477-2-5; 
5. DWS denied Grievant administrative leave, in violation of Utah Admin. Code R-477'-7 -7; 
6. Critical letters from DWS representatives remaining in Grievant' s personnel file constitute 
"written reprimands," grievable to CSRB pursuant to UtahCodeAnn. § 67-19a-302(l). 
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Before the evidentiary hearing began, both parties filed memoranda providing their beliefs 
regarding which party would bear the burden of proof on each issue. The only contested issue, 
however, was No. 6. Mr. Blauer argued that statements in various letters from DWS employers 
constituted "written reprimands," which, under state law, are considered discipline and, thus, would 
require a showing of substantial evidence by DWS. After reviewing the parties' writings on the 
matter, however, the Hearing Officer ruled that the documents alleged to be written reprimands did 
not, in fact, meet that definition. Therefore, Mr. Blauer, not DWS, had the burden of proof on all 
issues. 
Due to the complexity and long-term existence of this case in various incarnations, it is also 
appropriate to set out what this particular hearing is not about and what it will not review. First, the 
CSRB is not a super appellate court and will neither review, evaluate, nor attempt to overturn the 
actions of any court. Second, this Hearing Officer will not revisit any previous decision of the CSRB 
or any previous decision of DWS that is not part of the six listed issues. 
Consequently, the CSRB lacks the power to conclude that DWS's change of assignment was 
wrongful. The Utah Court of Appeals akeady has ruled that DWS was within its authority to take 
this action. Blauer v. Dep 't of Workforce Services, 2005 UT App 488 % 34. For that reason, Issue 
No. 2, ("DWS assigned job tasks to Grievant falling outside his job description, in violation of Utah 
Administrative Code R-477-3-2 and 3") is no longer subject to review. Indeed, the intermediate 
appellate court specifically concluded that "there was no change in job or position, but rather a 
reallocationby DWS ofBlauer!s then existing job responsibilities." Id at^34. Res judicata compels 
this conclusion. There is no substantive difference in the issues listed in Issue No. 2 and the relevant 
Blauer opinion. At most, they are rewordings of the same complaint, i.e., that DWS directed Mr. 
Blauer to perform more of one kind of work than he had previously performed. The parties are the 
same; the issue was squarely presented, and decided, in the appellate court opinion; and there is a final 
judgment on the merits. Youren v. Tintic School District, 2004 UT App 33 j^ 2. 
S i i ^ady^he -^ 
factual findings or legal conclusions made as a result of this hearing. DWS terminated Mr. Blauer 
for failing to return to work after one year of being on disability. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
affirmed that termination {Blauer v. Dep yt of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 280 § 13) and the 
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CSRB lacks the constitutional or statutory authority to overturn that affirmance.2 Mr. Blauer 
attempts to ignore that appellate court precedent by instead making a claim based on logic, i.e., that 
he should be reinstated because DWS's purportedly wrongful conduct started a chain of causation 
that ultimately led to his being required to take long-term disability and also led to his ultimately being 
terminated for not returning within a year. 
Mr. Blauer's argument fails for both logical and legal reasons in a way that may best by 
illustrated through an examination of the legal doctrine of proximate causation. As a broad general 
principle, individuals are responsible only for the actions they directly cause or for which they could 
be said to be the "proximate cause," which is "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening or superseding cause), produces the injury and without which 
the result would not have occurred." Crestwood Cove Apartments Business Trust v. Turner\ 2007 
UT48§31 . 
Integral to the idea of causation is the idea of an intervening or superseding cause. Once a 
chain of causation begins with one event, the responsibility and liability of the person initiating the 
chain continues unless broken by an intervening or superseding cause, which actually is the proximate 
cause of the injury. The fact pattern before the Utah Supreme Court in a 1996 decision nicely 
illustrates the meaning and effect of a superseding cause. The high court, mBarisanine v. Bodell, 927 
P.2d 675,676 (Utah 1996), had before it a claim that reckless driving, rather than a gunshot, was the 
actual, proximate cause of a death. In short, two cars were racing each other on the freeway at high 
speed, passing each other back and forth and generally exhibiting all the signs of road rage. In 
response to an obscene gesture from the plaintiffs father, the defendant pulled out a gun and shot 
him. Id. The court concluded that the gunshot was a superseding cause. 
Similarly in this case, even assuming (for purposes of argument only) that DWS' s purportedly 
wrongful acts caused Mr. Blauer to take long-term disability in the first place, those acts did not 
cause Mr. Blauer to fail to return after a year. It was Mr. Blauer's failure to provide a release to 
2
 The Hearing Officer recognizes that the appellate court's decision was based on Mr. Blauer's { 
failure to file a timely notice of appeal rather than on a substantive rejection of his argument. 
Nevertheless, a decision based on jurisdictional matters is as conclusive and binding as any other. 
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return to work that caused him to fail to return to work and led directly to Ms termination.3 Because 
the termination was the result of a separate, independent event, reversing the termination as a 
potential remedy for the issues resulting from the events relevant to this matter is neither logical nor 
appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Blauer began working for the Department of Employment Security, the predecessor 
agency to DWS, in December 1980. At the time of the events giving rise to the relevant six issues, 
he was a career service employee, entitled to use the CSRB process. 
2. Throughout his tenure with DWS, Mr. Blauer's supervisors provided him with various 
performance plans.4 He received them on the following dates and for the following periods: 
A. June 5, 1996 for the period June 1, 1995 to May 31, 1996 (Grievant's Ex. 37); 
B. September 9, 1999, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2000 (Agency's Ex. 2); 
C. December 29,2000, for the fiscal year ending June 30,2001 (Grievant's Ex. 34); 
and 
D. July 18, 2003, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2004 (Grievant's Ex. 33). 
3. Mr. Blauer also received various documents entitled "DWS Performance Appraisal," the 
latest being given to him on June 21, 2002 (Grievant Ex. 14). Ms. Downing issued this appraisal. 
4. After Ms. Downing instmcted Mr. Blauer to file for an accommodation with ChuckButler, 
DWS's ADA Coordinator, Mr. Blauer did so. Mr. Butler denied the request on September 5,2003. 
(Agency Ex. 7). It does not appear that Mr. Blauer appealed this decision to any other level of the 
Department or other entity. 
5. After obtaining an opinion from the Utah Attorney General's Office, DWS Executive 
Director, Raylene Ireland, denied Mr. Blauer's request for administrative leave, which was requested 
for medical reasons, on September 26,2003. (Agency Ex. 12). Mr. Blauer had made his request in 
3
 During the hearing, Mr. Blauer claimed that DWS' s requirement that he provide a medical release 
was improper. However, the CSRB has already reviewed that claim and found it wanting (Blauer 
v. DWS, Case No. 9 CSRB 83, at 9-15). That issue is not legitimately a part of this hearing. 
4
 These forms were entitled "performance plan/evaluation" and contained space for the review to be 
provided. 
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a voice mail message to Tom Patterson, the DWS employee who supervised Administrative Law 
Judges. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & DISCUSSION 
1. Mr. Blauer has complied with all time and filing requirements pertinent to the filing of the 
instant grievance and his grievance is properly before the Hearing Officer. 
2. The CSRB' s authority is narrow and well defined by statute and rule. The Hearing Officer 
may not conduct general inquiries into DWS's operations, staffing, or general policies. The hearing 
is limited to the discrete factual and legal issues of the grievance. Utah Admin. Code R137-l-21(2). 
3. Mr. Blauer bears the burden of proof on all six issues because they do not involve a 
dismissal, demotion, suspension, written reprimand, reduction hi force, or dispute concerning 
abandonment of position. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2) (stating that agency bears burden only 
on these issues, while a grievant bears burden on all the rest).5 
4. In order to successfully carry his burden, Mr. Blauer must show that DWS violated 
applicable statutes or administrative rules. 
5. Regarding Issue No. 1, "DWS representatives failed to properly define job performance 
parameters, in violation of Utah Admin. Code R477-10-1, etseq" Mr. Blauer7 s proffered evidence, 
which showed that he did not receive annual performance plans for every year of his employment, 
does not establish a violation of the cited administrative rule. The current rule, Utah Admin. Code 
R477-10-l(2) requires an agency to provide a performance evaluation every fiscal year. In fact, 
Mr. Blauer did receive annual performance evaluations. However, the rule does not require that the 
agency give an employee a peiformance/j/a/t every fiscal year. The rule also states that an employing 
agency should give its employees regular written and verbal feedback. At the hearing, Mr. Blauer 
stated that, for a period of time, he was meeting with his supervisor, Ms. Downing, on a weekly basis. 
These meetings surely included verbal feedback, which was also given at the regular performance 
evaluation meetings. There is no question from the evidence collected at the hearing that Mr. Blauer 
5
 The Hearing Officer previously entered an order allocating the burden of proof on all issues to 
Mr. Blauer. 
001S71 
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received regular written feedback during his annual performance evaluations and was able to provide 
comments on his evaluations, as required by the administrative rule.6 
6. As discussed above, some of Mr. Blauer's claims were previously resolved adversely to 
him by the Utah Court of Appeals. Such is the case with Issue No. 2, "DWS assigned job tasks to 
Grievant falling outside his job description, in violation of Utah Admin. Code R-477-3-2 and 3." 
Relitigation of DWS's authority to assign ALJ job duties to Mr. Blauer is prohibited by res judicata. 
Tintic School District, 2004 UT App 33 If 2. 
7. Perhaps the heart of Mr. Blauer5 s claims is that DWS violated personnel rules relating to 
Utah Admin. Code R477-15. That provision spells out the State's general prohibition on 
discrimination and workplace harassment. The evidence shows that DWS denied Mr. Blauer's 
request for an accommodation due to an alleged disability. Mr. Blauer did not appeal this decision 
to any higher level. However, even though the bulk of Mr. Blauer's evidence and comments relate 
to this issue, the CSRB is without jurisdiction to hear it. 
This conclusion is compelled by two parts of the law. First, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-32 
provides a specific remedy for employees who claim to be the victim of discriminatory treatment. 
That remedy is to (1) file a claim with the Executive Director of the agency; and (2) assuming a denial 
6
 Though Mr. Blauer did not introduce the 2002/2003 version of Utah Admin. Code R477-10 or 
claim its applicability, the Hearing Officer understands that the older version arguably required a 
written performance plan by August 30 of every fiscal year. The evidence adduced at hearing 
indicates that Mr. Blauer did not receive a performance plan for fiscal year 2003 on or before August 
30, 2002. However, even assuming that this violated the administrative rule, Mr. Blauer ultimately 
suffered no harm as Executive Director Ireland gave him a successful performance evaluation for 
fiscal year 2002-2003. Had the Executive Director not changed his performance evaluation from 
unsuccessful to successful, the Hearing Officer might have been compelled to grant such a change. 
Nevertheless, since that relief has already been ordered, no further remedy is available and the claim 
is moot. Burkett v. Schwendiman, 113 P.2d 42,44 (Utah 1989) (concluding that a case is moot when 
the requested relief can no longer affect the rights of the litigants). 
Additionally—tie-^ssue21-as-remanded^y^he-appeHate^ 
parameters were not appropriately defined. The claim is not specifically focused on the agency's 
failure to provide a performance plan. Even though a performance plan may have been missing, the 
Hearing Officer is not necessarily ready to assume that Mr. Blauer5 s job performance "parameters" 
were inappropriately defined. Mr. Blauer admitted during his hearing that, for at least a portion of 
the time during the fiscal year at issue, he met on a weekly basis to discuss his job performance. This 
probably constituted more intensive discussion of the job performance "parameters" than would a 
mere written, annual plan. 
Blauer v. Workforce Services, Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408 ft 01 5 7 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at that step, file a complaint to the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 35A-5-107. Importantly, that statute, in Subsection (15) says that the procedures in Title 
3 5 A, Chapter 5 are the "exclusive remedy" for discrimination actions. By affirmatively making the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (UADA) the "exclusive" remedy in Subsection 35A-5-107(15) and 
incorporating it into the State's Personnel Management Act in Section 67-19-32, the legislature 
clearly stripped the CSRB of any jurisdiction over claims concerning discrimination.7 
Second, the CSRB's administrative rules recognize that UADA, not the Personnel 
Management Act or the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, is the appropriate remedy for alleged 
discrimination. Utah Admin. Code R137-1-5. This rule is not an attempt by the CSRB to limit its 
own jurisdiction, but merely a reflection of the legislature's decision to do so. Consequently, the 
CSRB is without authority to review Mr. Blauer5s claims of discrimination, including retaliation. 
8. Mr. Blauer presented no evidence relevant to Issue No. 4, "DWS failed to properly 
maintain personnel records concerning Grievanfs performance, and refused access to alleged 
documentation supposedly reflecting negatively on his job performance (which they claimed to be in 
his personnel file) in violation of Utah Admin. Code R-477-2-5." Since Mr. Blauer had the burden 
of proof on this issue and failed to provide any proof regarding it, the Hearing Officer is obligated 
to reject his claim.8 
9. Mr. Blauer presented insufficient evidence relevant to Issue No. 5, regarding a purported 
violation of the Utah Administrative Code's provision on administrative leave. Utah Admin. Code 
R477-7-7 provides several situations in which an agency may give administrative leave. Leave for 
medical reasons is not included in that long list, though there is a catch-all provision that allows an 
agency to provide leave "consistent with agency policy." Utah Admin. Code R477-7-7(l)(a)(iv). 
Mr. Blauer provided no evidence that DWS had agency policy that would have allowed or required 
7
 Subsection 35A-5-107(15) also makes UADA the exclusive remedy for retaliation as well as 
disability, gender, etc. \ 
8
 Additionally, Utah Admin. Code R477-2-5 lists several categories of documents that the personnel 
file is to include. Mr. Blauer presented no evidence that his personnel file lacked any of these 
documents or that DWS refused to provide him access to it. Before and during the hearing, 
Mr. Blauer referred to a document, ultimately admitted as Grievanfs Ex. 20, which he believes I 
siiouid have been provided to him earlier. Nevertheless, Grievanfs Ex. 20 is not the type of 
document that R477-2-5 states should be maintained in the personnel record. 
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Executive Director Ireland to grant him administrative leave under those circumstances. The only 
evidence presented was from Executive Director Ireland, which showed that she knew of no actual 
agency policy on the matter and that she relied on an informal opinion of the Attorney General's 
Office to reach her decision not to grant administrative leave. Mr. Blauer failed to meet his burden 
of proof on this issue. More fundamentally, since the grant of administrative leave for medical 
reasons is entirely discretionary under the rules, it is not a mandate and cannot constitute a grievable 
event. Lopez v. Career Seiyice Review Bd, 834 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah App. 1992) ("[ajbsent a 
statutory mandate that an employee receive a certain benefit, the employee may not demand it as a 
right. Since there was no mandate requiring the Commission to allow Lopez to job share, Lopez has 
failed to identify any personnel rule that was violated by the Commission's refusal to allow him to job 
share."). 
10. Issue No. 6 concerns a claim that other letters in Mr. Blauer3s personnel file constitute 
written reprimands and are grievable to the CSRB. This claim fails for two reasons. First, Mr. Blauer 
never introduced his personnel file; therefore, the Hearing Officer does not know what documents 
are included within it. Additionally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the "critical letters" to which 
Mr. Blauer appeared to refer in a prehearing motion filed on August 10, 2009, are not written 
reprimands. The Hearing Officer issued an order relevant to this issue on September 30, 2009, in 
which the purported letters, at least those to which the Hearing Officer was made aware, were 
determined not to be "written reprimands." Though this Order was issued to settle the question of 
burden of proof, it is relevant here as well because Mr. Blauer presented no evidence to justify 
changing the Hearing Officer5 s September 3 0 decision. Consequently, Mr. Blauer had the burden of 
proof and failed to meet it. 
DECISION & ORDER 
Mr. Blauer has failed to meet his evidentiary burden of proof on Issues No. 4, 5, and 6. 
Regarding Issue No. 1, even if the purported claim can be read so narrowly as to only refer to the 
mere providing of a performance plaSTtheHearing Officer may agree that the agency was improperly 
dilatory. However, Mr. Blauer suffered no harm from the failure and any claim for relief due to the 
omission is moot. More importantly, the evidence adduced at the hearing leads the Hearing Officer 
to conclude that his job performance parameters were properly defined via his meetings with his 
supervisor. 
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Regarding Issue No. 2, the Utah Court of Appeals has already determined that DWS did not 
assign Mr. Blauer j ob duties outside his job description. Under the doctrine of res iudicata. the CSKls 
is barred from rehtigating the issue. The CSRB can provide no relief to Mr. Biauer for Issue No. 3 
because the CSRB has no jurisdiction over claims of discrimination, given the legislature's direction 
to State career service employees to use the "exclusive remedy" offered by UADA. 
Consequently, Mr. Blauer's claims are denied in their entirety. 
It is so ORDERED this 7th day of January 2010. 
Lii4f&<^'7 
0ames H. Beadles 
Hearing Officer 
varcef Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
Any request for reconsideration must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board withiB.fe; 
working days upon receipt of this decision. Utah Admim Code R137-l-21(12)(b)* 
APPEAL 
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board 
within ten working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code Ann, §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i). ] 
( 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
LORINBLAUER, 
Grievant and Appellant, : DECISION, ORDER AND 
: FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
AppealNo.lOCSRBlOO 
Agency and Respondent : Case No. 10 CSRB100 (Step 6) 
On Tuesday, October 5,2010, the Career Service Review Board (Board/CSRB) completed 
its final review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties followed by an 
executive session.1 The following board members were present and heard oral argument at the 
hearing and then deliberated in an executive session: Kevin C. Timken, Chairman; Joan M. Gallegos 
R.N., C.S.W.; and Teresa Aramaki, Board Members. At this hearing, Lorin Blauer (Appellant/ Mr. 
Blauer) was present and represented by Vincent C. Rampton (Mr. Rampton), Attorney at Law, who 
presented oral argument on Appellant's behalf.2 Assistant Utah Attorney General, Philip S. Lott 
represented the Utah Department of Workforce Services (Department/DWS) and presented oral 
argument on the Department5 s behalf. Accompanying Mr. Lott as the Department's Representative 
was Jennifer Wakefield, Human Resource Specialist 
!As explained more fully below, this case is before the CSRB pursuant to an Order of 
Remand from the Utah Court of Appeals dated March 13,2008. 
2The Board notes that at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing in this matter, Mr. Blauer was 
represented by Tom Cantrell (Mr. Cantrell), Employee Advocate. The Board further notes that 
throughout the numerous administrative and judicial proceedings in this matter, Mr. Blauer has been Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tr. EI at 608; Tr. IV at 761; Ex. G-16; Grievant's Brief ^12 at 13; Respondent Agency's Step 6 
Appellant Brief (Respondent Brief) f 13 at 5) This unsuccessful performance appraisal covered the 
period between July 1,2002 and June 30,2003, -and was -dated June 27,2003, (Tr, I at 202; Ex, G-
16) 
On July 16,2003, Appellant submitted a writtenresponse or grievance (Appraisal Grievance) 
challenging this unsuccessful performance evaluation. (Tr. Iat219; Ex. G-17; Grievant's Brief ^ f26 
at 15) A central concern raised by Appellant in this Appraisal Grievance was that the Department 
had failed to provide Appellant with a current performance plan identifying the Department's 
performance expectations of him. Appellant's Appraisal Grievance was directed to Div. Dir. 
Downing at Step 3 of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures. (Id) 
In partial response to this Appraisal Grievance, Appellant was given a performance plan 
governing the Department's performance expectations of Appellant for the upcoming year of 2003-
2004. (Tr. IEat 626; Ex. G-33; Agency Brief Tfl5 at 5-6) ITiis 2003-2004 performance plan was 
presented to Appellant by Div. Dir. Downing on July 18,2003. (Id.) 
However, despite finding some of the bases upon which she gave Appellant an "unsuccessful 
rating" unfounded, on July 25,2003,.Div. Dir. Downing nonetheless formally denied Appellant's 
Appraisal Grievance. (Ex. G-18) In denying Appellant's Appraisal Grievance, Div. Dir. Downing 
concluded that: "Despite this correction to your performance evaluation, I still would consider your 
overall performance to be unsuccessful " (Id.) 
Thereafter, Appellant advanced his Appraisal Grievance to the Department's Executive 
Director Raylene Ireland (Exec. Dir. Ireland) for consideration at Step 4 of the State Employees' 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures. (Tr. IV at 837-838) After holding a hearing on Appellant's 
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Appraisal Grievance, Exec. Dir Ireland reversed Div. Dir. Downing's 2003 performance appraisal 
by elevating Appellant's 2003 performance from "unsuccessful" to "successful." (Tr. IH at 549; Ex. 
G-39; Grievant's Brief f45-49 at 22) A critical factor relied upon by Exec. Dir. Ireland in granting 
Appellant's Appraisal Grievance and changing his performance appraisal to "successful" was that 
Appellant had not been provided a performance plan for 2003. Specifically, addressing her reversal 
of Div. Dir. Downing performance appraisal, Exec. Dir. Ireland stated in part: 
P]nthe grievance, and in the meeting, you indicated that you were not 
fairly rated because you were not aware of any performance 
problems. You further indicate that you are working under a 
performance plan that was put in place some years ago and does not 
accurately reflect your current assignments, nor does it give you the 
guidance you need to know the expectations. 
[B]ecause of this dispute regarding perceptions of performance 
standards... I will give you the benefit of doubt and will change the 
review to the lowest score for "successful." 
(id.) 
Exec. Dir. Ireland's final decision resolving Appellant's Appraisal Grievance was issued on 
September 5,2003. (Id.) Because his Appraisal Grievance had been granted and he had received 
.a new performance plan, Appellant did not advance this Appraisal Grievance any further in the 
State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. (Tr. Ill at 549,656-657; Exs. G-33,G-39; Grievant's Brief 
f46at22) 
After filing his Appraisal Grievance, Appellant engaged in discussions with the Department 
regarding various health concerns he was experiencing. (Tr. II at 294-295,312-314,322, 347; Tr. 
m at 508-509, 542-543, 662; Exs. A-6, G-22, G-23, G-31, G-32) These discussions occurred 
throughout the summer of 2003 and included recommendations from Appellant as to ways he felt 
the Department could better accommodate his health concerns and also help him continue as a 
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successful employee. (Id.) On September 5, 2003, Appellant was informed by Mr. Chuck Butter 
(Mr. Butter), the Department's ADA Coordinator, that his request for ADA accommodations had 
been reviewed and denied. (Ex. A-6) In denying Appellant's request Mr. Butler stated: 
After reviewing the information provided by your physicians, and 
consulting with the ADA Coordinator for the State of Utah, I have 
determined that our limitations do not rise to a level requiring and 
ADAaccommodationas defined by and covered underthe Americans 
with Disability Act 
Therefore, I must deny your request for accommodation. 
(id.) 
On September 9,2003, shortly after Appellant's Appraisal Grievance was granted and his 
performance rating elevated to successful, Appellant received a memorandum from Div. Dir. 
Downing entitled "Change of Assignment" (Tr, HI at 545; Ex, G-38; Grievant's Brief [^48 .at 23) 
In this memorandum Appellant was informed that, effective immediately, he would be assigned to 
conduct UI hearings "full-time with no change in job title or pay rate." (Ex. G-3 8)3 This change of 
assignment was at least partially designed to adjust Appellant's performance expectations with 
medical issues raised by Appellant. (Tr. IV at 789-792, 796-799; Exs. G-38, G- 44) 
On September 12,2003, Appellant filed a grievance (Demotion Grievance) regarding this 
"change of assignment." (Tr. HI at 562-563; Ex. G-40) In this Demotion Grievance Appellant 
essentially argued that the Department's reassignment of his duties constituted a "demotion" for 
which the Department lacked just cause. (Id.) Specifically, Appellant asserted: 
Lorin appeals your reassigning him to the duties of a full time 
Administrative Law Judge. You have assigned him lesser duties that 
3I | is clear from the language of Ex. G-38 that "UI" is acronym for '"Unemployment 
Insurance" hearings. 
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are not in Ms job description and which do no utilize Ms Mghest skill 
levels. Your reassignment is not accommodating; it is disciplinary. 
It is a demotion . . . for cause. 
(Ex. G-40)4 (Emphasis Added) 
On September 26, 2003, Exec, Dir. Ireland conducted a department level hearing on 
Appellant's Demotion Grievance. (Tr. IV at 847; Ex. G-44) Followmg tMs hearing with Exec. Dir. 
Ireland, Appellant went on approved leave and never returned to work for the Department. (Tr. HI 
at 672-673; Step 6 Decision and Final Agency Action, Case. No. 9 CSRB 83 at 9) 
Thereafter, on October 14, 2003, Exec. Dir. Ireland issued her Step 4 Decision (Final 
Decision) denying Appellant's Demotion Grievance. (Ex. G-44) Specifically addressing Appellant's 
claims that the department's reassignment of Ms duties constituted a demotion, Ex. Dir. Ireland 
concluded: 
You have claimed that this assignment is a demotion. However, I 
disagree. You retain your title as Legal Counsel and you maintain the 
same pay and pay range. It is not a demotion. Rather Taoi [Division 
Director Downing] has assigned you duties that are very specific, 
allow for regular feedback, and help ensure that you maintain a full 
workload.. 
(Id.) Thereafter, on October 15,2003, Appellant timely filed-anappeal of Exec. Dir, Ireland's Final 
Decision with the CSRB. Ultimately, tMs Demotion Grievance is the foundation for the issues 
presented in tMs Decision and Final Agency Action. 
n. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CSRB AND UTAH COURTS. 
As set forth above, on October 15, 2003, Appellant filed an appeal with the CSRB 
challenging the Department's Final Decision upholding Ms change of assignments. On October 27, 
4TMs grievance was submitted to Div. Dir. Dowmng through Mr. Cantrell. 
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2003, Appellant filed an Amendment to Appeal of Agency's Decision to the Career Service Review 
Board with the CSRB. 
On November 12? 2003, the Administrator for the CSRB, Robert W. Thompson, 
(Administrator) conducted an administrative review of the file in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a~403. As aresult of this administrative review, the Administrator determined that the CSRB 
lacked jurisdiction to review or decide Appellant's claims and therefore dismissed his appeal before 
theCSRB. Regarding Appellant's claims thatthe Department's "changeofassignments" constituted 
a demotion, the Administrator concluded in An Administrative Review Of The File Pursuant To 
Subsection 67~19a-403(2)(b)(ii), And Final Agency Action By Informal Adjudicative Proceeding 
(Informal Jurisdiction Decision) that: 
[D]HRM Rule authorizes management to assign, modify, or remove 
an employee's duties, task, responsibilities under specified 
circumstances. As long as the department does not reduce 
employees'immediate salary or salary range in the process of making 
these modifications or assignments no demotion has in fact occurred 
under DHRM rales. 
(Id. at 4) 
On December 2,2003, Appellant, through Mr. Rampton, filed aRequestfor Reconsideration 
of the Administrative Review and Final Agency Action By Informal Adjudicative Proceeding 
(Request for Reconsideration). In this Request for Reconsideration, Appellant asked the 
Administrator to reconsider his jurisdiction decision that Mr. Blauer's job reassignment did not 
constitute a demotion. In addition, Appellant asserted for the first time that certain departmental 
actions made concomitant with his "change of assignment" violated personnel rales. Specifically, 
Appellant argued that the Department violated personnel rules by failing to properly define his job 
performance parameters; assigning Appellanttasks outside his job description; engaging in unlawful 
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harassment and retaliation; failing to maintain proper personnel records; and disciplining Appellant 
without due process by leaving "critical" comments fiomDiv. Dir. Downing and Exec. Dir. Ireland 
in Appellant's personnel file.5 
On December 22, 2003, the Administrator issued a decision on Grievanf s Request for 
Reconsideration affirming his prior decision regarding demotion. The Administrator also denied 
Grievanf s personnel rule violation claims believing these claims to be beyond the scope of 
Appellant's original grievance and essentially ancillary to the issues previously addressed. (Decision 
on Grievanf s Motion for Reconsideration at 3f 
In January 2004, Mr. Blauer appealed the Administrator's Informal Jurisdictional Decision 
to the district court pursuant to Utah Code § 63-46b-15. In this district court petition, Appellant 
asked for a trial de novo regarding Ms alleged demotion and for a determination regarding the 
alleged personnel rule violation claims raised for the first time in his Request for Reconsideration. 
In response to this petition, the Department filed & Motion to Dismiss, essentially arguing that 
by not raising allegations of personnel rule violations until the filing of his Request for 
Reconsideration or at the earliest, prior to Step 5 of the State's Grievance Procedures, Appellant had 
administratively waived those claims and was thus jurisdictional^ bairedfiompursuingthose claims 
before the CSRB.7 Appellant then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with the district court 
5Importantly, these newly raised claims of personnel rule violations ultimately became the 
sole and exclusive issues presented atthe Step 5 evidentiary hearing inthis matter. (Grievanf s Brief 
at Ex. 2 ,3; Finding of Facts of Conclusion of Law, Decision and Order at 2) 
6This Decision on Grievanf s Motion for Reconsideration is part of the file maintained and 
controlled by the CSRB. 
^While Appellant initially raisedhis claimregarding violation of Administrative Leave Policy 
at Step 5 of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures, the Department nonetheless argued this 
claim was waived as well as because Appellant filed no antecedent grievance at Steps 2 ,3 , or 4 of 
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which was followed by a cross-motion for Summary Judgment from the Department. 
On August 16, 2004, Third District Court Judge Leslie Lewis (Judge Lewis) issued a 
Memorandum Decision finding as a matter of lawthat Appellant had not been demoted. (Grievanf s 
Brief at Ex. 2) However, in this same Memorandum Decision Judge Lewis left open the issue of 
.alleged rale violations related to the Utah Personnel Management Act and remanded those issues to 
the CSRB for consideration. (Id) Regarding the alleged personnel rale violation claims, Judge 
Lewis specifically held: 
P]t appears that the only remaining issue is CSRB's refusal to 
consider the plaintiffs remaining grievances based upon alleged 
violations of the personnel rules. The Court concludes that the 
plaintiff, in his request for Reconsideration before the CSRB, 
preserved all of his remaining allegations concerning the defendant's 
violations of the Personnel Management Act. In other words, the 
Court declines to follow the defendant's reasoning that these 
grounds for grieving were not raised administratively and are 
therefore deemed waived or that this Court has not jurisdiction to 
consider them. 
Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgement seeks a renewed opportunity to have the CSRB consider 
his grievance related to the alleged violations of the Personnel 
Management Act, the Court grants the same and remands the matter 
back to the CSRB. 
1 
(Id) (Emphasis added) 
OnNovember 3 0,2004, Judge Lewis issued an Order reflecting her Memorandum Decision. 
(Ex. A-14)8 While this November 30, 2004, Order dismissed Appellant's demotion claim, it 
the grievance procedures before finally raising this claim with the CSRB at Step 5. 
8The Board notes that this Order was signed by Judge Lewis on November 30, 2004. 
However, it is date stamped as filed on December 8,2004. For clarity, the Board will refer to the 
order's signature date. 
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On November 10,2005, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision affirming the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department. In its decision, the Utah Court of 
Appeals ruled that in reappropriating Appellant's job responsibilities from part-time to full-time 
adjudicator, the Department did nothing more than extend one of Appellant's core job functions. 
Based upon these factors, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that because Appellant was not 
demoted as a matter of law, the trial court correctly granted the Department's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 128 P. 3d 1204 (Utah App. 2005) 
(Blauerl)) 
On April 26,2006, Appellant requested the CSRB to set a hearing "on all issues raised in the 
above matter, and remaining for hearing pursuant to the Order of Judge Leslie Lewis in Blauer v. 
Department of Workforce Services (Civil No. 040900221) dated November 30,2004."10 After a 
series of attempts, a prehearing/scheduling conference was finally held on June 21,2006. At this 
prehearing conference, issues to be adjudicated were set and dates for the exchange of documents 
and motions were established. 
On September 29, 2006, the Department filed Agency's Motion to Dismiss (Motion to 
Dismiss) with the CSRB. In this Motion to Dismiss, the Department argued Appellant's personnel 
rule violation claims must be dismissed either because they were never grieved at the Department 
level as required by statute or because the claims had been resolved in ancillary proceedings. 
(Motion to Dismiss at 13-17) 
Specifically, the Department argued that the CSRB had no jurisdiction to review or to 
consider Appellant's claims relating to administrative leave, improper maintenance of personnel 
10
 Again, this request is part of the administrative file maintained and controlled by the CSRB. 
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records, unlawful harassment, or discipline without due process because Appellant never filed 
antecedent or timely grievances regarding these claims at the Department level. Essentially, the 
Department argued that by not raising these claims until he filed his Request for Reconsideration or 
at least by Step 5 of the grievance procedures, Appellant had administratively waived his right to 
have these personnel rule violation claims considered at the CSRB. Addressing these four rule 
violation claims, the Department summarized in its Motion to Dismiss that these allegations: "are 
contained in neither Mr. Blauer's first grievance [Appraisal Grievance], nor his second grievance 
[Demotion Grievance]. Mr. Blauer pursued no antecedent, timely grievance of these allegations. 
The CSRB has no jurisdiction to consider these allegations." (Id) 
Regarding Appellant's personnel rule violation claim that the Department failed to define 
Appellant's j ob parameters, the Department argued such claims were resolved when the Department 
granted Appellant's Appraisal Grievance and provided him with a current performance plan. (Id. at 
3-4,9) Regarding Appellant's remaining claim that personnel rules were violated when Department 
assigned Appellant to do adjudications full-time, the Department argued that this claim was 
conclusively resolved in Blauer I wherein the Utah Court of Appeals held that the reapportionment 
of Appellant's job responsibilities were appropriate and did nothing more than extend his core job 
ftmctions. (Id. At 9,14) 
On December 6, 2009, Hearing Officer Katherine Fox (Hearing Officer Fox) entered a 
Decision on Agency's Motion to Dismiss (Decision) granting the Department's Motion to Dismiss. 
In granting the Department's Motion to Dismiss, Hearing Officer Fox agreed with the Department 
that Appellant's failure to file antecedent grievances regarding personnel rule violations prevented 
the CSRB from reviewing or considering most of Appellant's personnel rule violation claims. 
001955 
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Specifically addressing Appellant's failure to grieve these issues at the Department level, Hearing 
Officer Fox concluded that: [t]he CSRB has no jurisdiction to go back and somehow hear claims not 
raised with the proper entity more than three and one-half years ago (Decision at 7)11 
Hearing Officer Fox also agreed with the Department that Appellant's claim that the 
Department violated personnel rule by failing to define job parameters was resolved in Appellant's 
Appraisal Grievance. Addressing this claim in her Decision, Hearing Officer Fox concluded that: 
Grievant raised his claims relating to job performance parameters 
(issue 1) in his first grievance [Appraisal Grievance] and naturally, 
did not appeal the Step 4 decision in his favor. The CSRB lacks 
jurisdiction to hear a grievance that was previously resolved in 
Grievant's favor. In essence, this claim does not exist anymore. 
{Id. at 6) 
Finally, Hearing Officer Fox also agreed that Appellant's claim regarding assigned tasks was 
resolved by the Utah Court of Appeals in Blauer I. Specifically referencing Blauer I, which held 
"PTjhe CSRB did not err in declining jurisdiction over Blauer's grievance," Hearing Officer Fox 
concluded that res adjudicata prevented her from further litigating Appellant's job reassignment 
claim. (Id. At 7) 
InDecember 2006, Appellant filed a Petition for Review of Administrative Agency Decision 
with the Utah Court of Appeals.12 On March 13,2008, the Utah Court of Appeals, in an unpublished 
opinion, reversed Hearing Officer Fox's decision and remanded the case to the "CSRB for a hearing 
nImportantly, neither the Department's Motion to Dismiss nor Hearing Officer Fox's 
Decision rely on Utah Code Ann. § 35A-5-107(15) which makes the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act 
(UADA) the exclusive remedy in discrimination actions. Jurisdictional concerns under Utah Code 
Ann. § 3 5 A-5-107 were first raised by Hearing Officer James H. Beadles in a subsequent proceeding 
at the CSRB. 
12This matter was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals because Hearing Officer Fox 
determined her decision to be aformal adjudicative decision pursuant to CSRB Rule R137-l-17(5). 
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on the merits." (Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 2008 UT App 84,85) Specifically, the Court 
of Appeals concluded that District Court Judge Lewis' finding that Appellant had not 
jurisdictionally waived his personnel rule violation grievances by failing to raise them prior to Step 
5 of the state's grievance procedures was the "law of the case." (Id) Therefore, the CSRB "erred" 
by considering jurisdictional issues that had already been decided by the district court. (Id.) 
(Emphasis added) 
After this decision was issued, Appellant sought to have his personnel rule violation claims 
heard by the Third District Court rather than the CSRB. At a hearing held on April 29,2009, Third 
District Court Judge John Paul Kennedy (Judge Kennedy), ruled that it would not disregard the Utah 
Court of Appeals' remand decision by hearing Appellant's personnel rule violation claims. Based 
upon this ruling, onMay 6,2009, theDepartment Sled Agency *s Request for Prehearing Conference 
with the CSRB. 
After the filing of some preliminary motions, an initial Prehearing Conference (PHC) on the 
Court of Appeals' Remand Order was held before Hearing Officer James H. Beadles (Hearing 
Officer Beadles). At this PHC dates were settled regarding various issues, including dates for the 
parties to file a "list of issues" to be decided at any Step 5 evidentiary hearing in this matter. 
On August 10,2009, Appellant complied with Hearing Officer Beadles' order by filing a 
Memorandum - List of Issues and a Motion for Recusal and Request for Appointment of Fair and 
Independent Hearing Officer and Request for Oral Argument On August 24,2009, the Department 
filed Agency's Memorandum in Opposition to Grievant's Motion for Recusal and Agency's 
Memorandum in Response to Grievant's Memorandum-List of Issues. On September 14, 2009, 
Hearing Officer Beadles entered his Order Regarding Motion for Recusal and Issues to Be Heard, 
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wherein Hearing Officer Beadles noted .agreement between the parties that the issues to be -decided 
at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing were limited to the six specific issues set forth in Judge Lewis' 
District Court Decision. Hearing Officer Beadles left for further briefing the singular issue of burden 
of proof in Appellant's disciplinary due process allegation. Finally, Hearing Officer Beadles refused 
to recuse himself noting no actual bias or conflict with his appointment. 
On September 30,2009, Hearing Officer Beadles entered his Order Regarding Allocation 
of Burden of Proof. This order followed briefing by the parties. In this order, Hearing Officer 
Beadles decided not just questions regarding burden of proof, but also whether the alleged "critical" 
comments in Appellant's personnel file fiom Div. Dir. Downing and Exec. Dir. Ireland, in fact, even 
constituted disciplinary written reprimands. 
Addressing the later issue, Hearing Officer Beadles concluded that "none of the documents 
identified" by Appellant constituted grievable "written reprimands" in a sense contemplated by the 
legislature. Essentially, Hearing Officer Beadles concluded that to equate critical comments in 
Appellant's performance appraisals or in answers to grievances he initiated to discipline would have 
a negative effect of transforming "all letters and performance evaluations containing critical 
comment into a disciplinary document subject to due process." 
Specifically, addressing this issue in his order Hearing Officer Beadles stated: 
P]tems listed in §§ 67-19(a)-406(2) are actions initiated by a 
Department. Except for the change of assignment memorandum of 
September 9, 2009, all the documents that Grievant challenges are 
responses to Grievant rather than proactive actions by the 
Department. It makes sense that, if the government is the original 
instigator of an action it should bear the burden of proof proving that 
the action was taken with in accordance to law. 
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Indeed, as the Department points out, the second document of the 
three I e., the September 5,2003, Ireland memorandum, was a victory 
for Mr. Blauer, overturning his direct supervisor's performance 
rating. 
(Id at 1-2) 
In making this determination, Hearing Officer Beadles still left open the opportunity for the 
Appellantto present evidence at the evidentiary hearing that the "critical comments" in his personnel 
file constituted "written reprimands subject to CSRB jurisdiction." (Id.) Further addressing this 
issue, Hearing Officer Beadles concluded that "consistent with the Appellant Court's Decision... 
the hearing officer will hear any additional evidence or argument that Grievant may wish to 
introduce regarding its claim that the communications are 'written reprimands' subject to CSRB 
jurisdiction." (Id at 3)13 
On November 18,19,23 and December 7,2009, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held before 
Hearing Officer Beadles. At the hearing, Appellant was represented by Mr. Cantrell. The 
Department was represented by Assistant Utah Attorney General Philip Lott (Mr. Lott). Human 
Resource Speciahst Jennifer Wakefield (Ms. Wakefield), assisted Mr. Lott as the department's 
management representative. Tracy A. Covington, a certified court reporter with Citi Court, made 
a verbatim record of the proceeding and administered oaths to the witnesses. 
Based on court established recitation of the issues, prior ruling by Hearing Officer Beadles, ! 
and agreement of the parities, Appellant bore the burden of establishing personnel rule violations by 
the Department and the burden of going forward at the evidentiary hearing. {Utah Code Ann. § 67-
19(a)-406(2)) Specific issues adjudicated at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing were limited solely to 
13OnNovember 9,2009, Appellant filed Grievant's Motion to Reconsider Hearing Officer's • < 
Categorization of Issue Number Six. On November 16,2009, Hearing Officer Beadles denied this 
request. 
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whether the Department violated personnel rules by: 
(1) Failing to define job performance parameters hi 
violation of Utah Administrative Code R477-10-1, et 
seq.; 
(2) Assigningjobtaskto Appellant falling outside his job 
description, in violation of Utah Administrative Code 
R477-3-2(3); 
(3) Engaging inunlawful harassment of, and inretaliation 
against, Appellant in connection with his grievances, 
in violation of Utah Administrative Code R477-15-2-
3; 
(4) Failing to properly maintain personal records 
concerning Grievant's performance, and refusing 
access to alleged documentation supposedly reflecting 
negatively on his. j ob performance (which Appellant 
claim to be in his personnel file) in violation of Utah 
Administrative Code R477-2-5; 
(5) Denying Grievant Administrative leave in violation of 
Utah Administrative Code R477-7-7; and 
(6) Placing critical letters in Grievant's personnel file 
-constituting "written reprimands" grievable to the 
CSRB pursuant to 17ft* Code Ann. § 67-19(a> 
302(1).14 
At the evidentiary hearing in this matter, Hearing Officer Beadles received evidence related 
to the several allegations made by AppeEant. This evidence included testimony given and 
documents received concerning the Department's alleged violations of personnel rules. 
Specifically, evidence was received at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing relating to Appellant's 
i_ 
allegation that the Department failed to properly define job performance parameters. This evidence 
14For clarity and to be consistent with Hearing Officer Beadles' Finding of Fact, Conclusion 
of Law, Decision and Order, the six separate personnel rule violations numbered 1 through 6 above 
will sometimes be referred to as Issuel, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 to correspond with Appellant's specific 
Personnel Rule Violation claim. 
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included testimony and documents outlining efforts made by the Department to apprise Appellant 
of its performance expectations and the actions it took to define job performance parameters for 
Appellant (S^TrJa t lOl- lOS^l^^r . f f la teOS^ie^S^Tr . IVatTT^Exs .G- 14,G~15,G-16, 
G-17, G-33, G-39) 
Evidence was also received regarding the Department's decision to require that Appellant 
conduct UI hearings "full-time with no change in job title or pay rate." (Ex. G-38) Evidence 
regarding this claim was not limited to documentary and testimonial evidence but included prior 
court decisions addressing this claim, holding limpidly that it was within the Department's 
discretionary powers to assign him UI hearings full-time. {See Tr. IV at 789-794, 841; Exs. A-20, 
G-38,G-40,G-44) 
Extensive testimony and numerous exhibits were also received regarding Appellant's claim 
that the Department violated personnel rules relating to unlawful harassment and retaliation. This 
evidence included testimony from Appellant and his physician regarding information available to 
the Department concerning Appellant's medical concerns and the Department's actions in response 
to that information. (Tr. H at 294-295,312-314,322,347; Tr. HI at 508-509, 542-543, 662; 
Exs. A-6, G-22, G-23, G-31, G-32) 
Finally, evidence was received regarding the Department's denial of Appellant's request for .. J 
administrative leave and Appellant's claim that "critical" comments in his personnel file from 
Exec. Dir. Ireland and Div. Dir. Downing constituted "written reprimands" for which Appellant 
i 
received no due process. (Tr. IV at 842-845; Exs. G-18, G-38, G-39, G-44)15 
15Regarding Issue #4, Appellant's claim that the Department failed to properly maintain 
personnel records concerning his performance, at the evidentiary_hearing Appellant provided no \ 
proof or evidence regarding this claim. Because Appellant had the burden of proof to establish this 
claim the hearing officer denied Appellant's personnel rule violation claim that the Department 
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At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Hearing Officer Beadles entered his Step 5 
Finding of Fact Conclusion of Law, Decision and Order (Step 5 Decision). In the Step 5 Decision, 
Hearing -Officer Beadles outlined the .evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing and -concluded 
that Appellant's several claims of personnel rule violation by the Department were not supported by 
the evidence presented at the Step 5 hearing and therefore dismissed Appellant's claims "in their 
entirety." (Step 5 Decisionat 10) Specifically addressing each claimpresented by Appellant, Hearing 
Officer Beadles concluded: 
Mr. Blauer . . . failed to meet his evidentiary burden of proof on 
Issues No. 4, 5, and 6. Regarding Issue No. 1 . . . if the purported 
claim can be read so narrowly as to only refer to the mere providing 
of a performance plan, the Hearing Officer may agree that the agency 
was improperly dilatory. However, Mr. Blauer suffered no harm 
from the failure and any claim for relief due to the omission is moot. 
More importantly, the .evidence adduced at the hearing leads the 
Hearing Officerto conclude that his job performance parameters were 
properly defined via his meetings with his supervisor. 
Regarding Issue No. 2, the Utah Court of Appeals has already 
determined that DWS did not assign Mr. Blauer job duties outside his 
job description. Under the doctrine of res judicata, the CSRB is 
barred from relitigating the issue. The CSRB can provide no relief to 
Mr. Blauer for Issue No. 3 becausethe CSRB has no jurisdiction over 
claims of discrimination, given the legislature's direction to State 
career service employees to use the "exclusive remedy" offered by 
UADA. 
(Id.) Based upon these findings, Hearing Officer Beadles denied all claims of personnel rule 
violation by the Department and affirmatively denied Mr. Blauer's appeal. 
felled to maintain proper personnel records. (Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, Decision and 
•3rder at 8) This determination was not appealed to the Board and is therefore not before the Board 
for consideration. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
X ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In his appeal to the Board, Appellant carefully narrows the issues to be considered on appeal 
by not challenging several dispositive determinations made by Hearing Officer Beadles in his Step 
5 Decision. Specifically, Appellant does not appeal Hearing Officer Beadles' determination that the 
Department violated department policy by assigning him j ob tasks "outside his j ob description." {See 
Grievant's Brief at % 1 through 3 at 2 - 3) Nor does Appellant challenge Hearing Officer Beadles5 
decision dismissing Appellant's personnel rule violation claim that the Department failed to properly 
maintain personnel records regarding Appellant or that the Department inappropriately denied 
Appellant administrative leave. (Id.) These issues are therefore resolved. 
Instead, Appellant specifically limits his appeal to the three remaining determinations made 
by Hearing Officer Beadles. First, Appellant argues that Hearing Officer Beadles erred in concluding 
that, while the Department had in fact denied Appellant's request for accommodation, the CSRB 
lacked jurisdiction to review or consider this decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35A-5-107(15) 
which grants the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (UADA) exclusive remedy over claims of 
discrimination. Essentially, Appellant argues Hearing Officer Beadles erred in this determination 
because Utah Administrative Code R477-15-2-3 provides Appellant with a separate and distinct 
basis for claims of harassment or discrimination. (Id at 38-39) 
Second, Appellant argues Hearing Officer Beadles erred in factually finding the Department 
had appropriately defined job performance parameters for Appellant. (Id. at 42 - 43) Appellant also 
challenges Hearing Officer Beadles' alternative conclusion on this claim that, even assuming the 
Department's action in this regard violated personnel rules requiring defined performance 
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parameters, such violation was renderedmoot when Appellantprevailed onhis Appraisal Grievance. 
( H a t 3) 
Finally, Appellant challenges Hearing Officer Beadles5 finding that personnel rules were not 
violated when the Department placed "critical" comments on documents contained in Appellant's 
personnel file. Specifically, Appellant challenged Hearing Officer Beadles' finding that such 
comments are simply not "written reprimands" to which due process attaches. (Id at 46) Appellant 
also challenges Hearing Officer Beadles' conclusion that Appellant failed to adequately place these 
comments before him at the evidentiary hearing. (Id. At 45 - 48) 
As required by statute, it is the Board's responsibility to review and decide appeals from Step 
5 decisions. To the extent required by law, the Board will now review and analyze the facts and 
issues presented by the parties on Appeal and address the dispositive issues necessary to decide this 
matter. 
n . THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review Appellant's appeal under UtahAdministrative Code, Rl 3 7-1 -22(4)(a) - (c), which 
reads as follows: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational 
according to the substantial evidence standard. When the board 
determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are 
not reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as 
a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct the factual 
findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings. 
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of 
the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected 
the factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a 
whole, the board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing 
officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes 
in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being 
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granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing 
officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the 
CSRB hearing officer,,,. is reasonable .and rational based upon the 
ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes determined according to the above provisions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact 
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer 
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the hearing officer's 
decision is reasonable and rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts together with 
. the correct apphcation of relevant State policies, rules, and statutes which were considered by our 
Hearing Officer. 
BOARD'S REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I R E \ ^ W O F T B E H E A R ^ 
CLAIM THAT THE DEPARTMENT VIOLATED PERSONNEL RULES BY FALLING TO 
PROPERLY DEFINE HIS PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS. 
1 
As stated above, the hearing officer heard testimony and received documents in the instant 
case relating to Appellant's claim that the Department violated personnel rule by failing to properly 
define Appellant's job performance parameters as required by Utah Administrative CoJeR477-10-l. i 
(Tr. I at 202,219; Tr. ffl. at 608,626,656; Tr. IV at 777; Exs. G-14, G-15, G-16, G-17, G-33, G-39) 
After carefully considering this evidence, Hearing Officer Beadles entered his Step 5 Decision 
specifically finding the Department had in fact properly defined Appellant's job performance 
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parameters by meeting with him on a near weekly basis to review current performance and discuss 
the Department's performance expectations of Appellant. (Step 5 Decision at 6 - 7) 
Considering the totality of the evidence presented on this issue, Hearing Officer Beadles 
found that Appellant's job performance parameters were properly defined by the Department "via 
his meetings with his supervisor." (Id.) Based upon this finding, Hearing Officer Beadles held the 
Department had substantively complied with the provisions of Utah Administrative Code 
R477-10-L After reaching these detenninations, Hearing Officer Beadles denied Appellant's claim 
that the Department had failed to properly define job performance parameters as required by 
personnel rule. {Id) 
Alternatively, Hearing Officer Beadles also held that Appellant's claim regarding the failure 
of the Department to define his performance parameters was resolved when the Department granted 
Appellant's Appraisal Grievance and provided him with a current performance plan. (Id.) 
Addressing this issue in his Step 5 Decision, Hearing Officer Beadles' found: 
"[E]ven assuming that this violated the administrative rule, 
Mr. Blauer ultimately suffered no harm as Executive Director Ireland 
gave him a successful performance evaluation for fiscal year 2002-
2003. Had the Executive Director not changed his performance 
evaluation from unsuccessful to successful, the Hearing Officer might 
have been compelled to grant such a change. Nevertheless, since that 
relief has abeady been ordered, no further remedy is available and the 
claim is moot. Citing Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42,44 (Utah 
1989) (concluding that a case is moot when the requested relief can 
no longer affect the rights of the litigants)." 
(Id At 7 nn6) 
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, including the sworn testimony 
of the witnesses and documents submitted into evidence, this Board finds Hearing Officer Beadles' 
decision regarding this issue to be reasonable, rational and supportive by substantial evidence. In 
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reaching this decision, the Board first notes that the Department's failure to provide Appellant with 
a performance plan governing the period between July 1, 2002 and June 30, 2003, was a central 
concern raised in Appellant's Appraisal Grievance. (Tr. I at 219; Exs. G-17, G-39) 
Essentially, Appellant argued in his Appraisal Grievance that a central reason his 
performance was determined to be unsatisfactory was because he had not been provided with a 
"current performance plan" and thus did not fully understand the Department's performance 
expectations of him. (Ex. G-17) Based largely on the Department's failure to provide Appellant with 
a performance plan for 2003, Exec. Dir. Ireland granted Appellant's Appraisal Grievance and 
elevated his 2003 performance appraisal from unsuccessful to successful. (Tr. HI at 549; Ex. G-39) 
Indeed, at the evidentiary hearing itself, Appellant testified that his concerns regarding the 
Department's failure to define his job performance parameters was largely resolved when Exec. Dir. 
Ireland amended his performance appraisal and provided Appellant with a new performance plan. 
(Tr. IHat 656 to-657) 
Based upon the evidence drawn out at the evidentiary hearing, we uphold Hearing Officer 
Beadles' determination that the substantive portion of this claim was resolved when the Department 
granted Appellant's Appraisal Grievance and provided him with a current performance plan. For 
this reason, Hearing Officer Beadles' ruling on this claim is upheld. 
We also uphold Hearing Officer Beadles' conclusionthat while not providing Appellant with 
an actual performance plan, the Department nonetheless substantively complied with this rule by 
meeting with Appellant on a near weekly basis to review his current work and discuss fixture job 
performance expectations with Appellant While admittedly not in exact compliance withpersonnel 
rule, the Board finds the measures taken by the Department to define Appellant's performance 
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expectations satisfied the substantive provisions of Utah Administrative Code R477-10-1 and thus 
upholds Hearing Officer Beadles' decision regarding this claim. 
n REVIEW OF THE OFFICER'S DETERMINATION REGARDING 
APPELLANT'S UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT CLAIM. 
In his Step 5 Decision, Hearing Officer Beadles correctly notes that "Perhaps the heart of Mr. 
Blauer' s claims is that D WS violated personnel rules relating to Utah Admin. Code R477-15." (Step 
5 Decision-at 7) Further addressing this issue, Hearing Officer Beadles notes that this administrative 
rule spells out the State's General prohibition on discrimination and workplace harassment. After 
addressing this rule Hearing Officer Beadles concludes: 
That provision {Utah Admin Code R477-15) spells out the State's 
general prohibition on discrimination and workplace harassment. The 
evidence shows that DWS denied Mr. Blauer's request for an 
accommodation due to an alleged disability. Mr. Blauer did not 
appeal this decision to any higher level. However, even though the 
bulk of Mr. Blauer's evidence and comments relate to this issue, the 
CSRB is without jurisdiction to hear it. 
(id.) 
Supporting this jurisdictional conclusion, Hearing Officer Beadles first cites to Utah Code 
Ann. § .67-19-32 of the Utah Personnel Act which directs employees who claim to be victim of 
discriminatory treatment to first file a claim with their executive director; and second, assuming a 
denial by the executive director, file a complaint with the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35A-5-107. (Id at 7 - 8) 
A second basis on which Hearing Officer Beadles determined the CSRB was without 
jurisdictiontohear Appellant'sliarassment claims was Utah Admin. Code R137-1-5 that specifically 
states the CSRB and its hearing officers have no jurisdiction over "unlawful harassment'' claims. 
(Id) Based upon these conclusions, Hearing Officer Beadles ruled that "[Tjhe CSRB can provide 
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no relief to Mr. Blauer for Issue No. 3 because the CSRB has no jurisdiction over claims of 
discrimination " (Id. at 10) 
On appeal to this Board, Appellant challenges the hearing officer's decision regarding this 
claim on two primary grounds. First, Appellant asserts that Hearing Officer Beadles5 conclusion 
regarding jurisdiction contravene prior court determinations that the CSRB has jurisdiction over this 
matter. Specifically addressing this issue in his brief Appellant states: 
The most astounding aspect of the hearing officer's determination 
concerning jurisdiction over Mr. Blauer's claim under R. 477-15-2 
and 3, though, is his recitation of jurisdictional issues which have 
gone before trial courts and appellate courts in this matter on no fewer 
than three occasions: first, before the Third District Court in the 2004 
action on motions for summary judgement; second, before the Court 
of Appeals in 2008; and finally, before Hie Utah Supreme Court on 
unsuccessful petition for writ of certiorari. The message from the 
courts has been clear: CSRB does have jurisdiction to hear Mr. 
Blauer's claim and must hear and adjudicate them on their merits. 
Hearing Officer Beadles' belief that the jurisdictional issue could (or 
should) have been decided in such a way to preclude him from 
hearing Mr. Blauer5 s claims under R. 477-15-2 and 3 long ago ceased 
to be a governing (or pertinent) factor. This matter was remanded 
from the Court of Appeals with a specific mandate: To hear all six of 
Mr. Blauer's grievances on their merits. CSRB has repeatedly 
attempted to divestitself of jurisdiction to hear this claim. It has been 
told three times that it may not do so. As such, Mr. Beadles ruling 
places CSRB in open and express defiance in the Court of Appeals 
mandate." 
(Appellant's Brief at 40 - 41) 
Second, Appellant argues that Hearing Officer Beadles further erred in deciding this issue 
by failing to understand that Appellant's discrimination claim is substantively based upon violation 
of state personnel rule, not upon violation of State or Federal Statutes guarding against unlawful 
harassment or discrimination. 
:
.' * 
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Specifically addressing this argument in his brief, Appellant states: 
Mr. Blauer has invoked the express language of Utah Administrative 
Code R. 477-15- 2 and 3 (2003) as having been violated by DWS. 
Had that regulatory provision not been in place, Mr. Blauer would 
certainly still have had rights under the Utah Antidiscrimination Act; 
the enactment of R. 477-15- 2 and 3, however, created a separate and 
discrete basis for claiming harassment and retaliation. It is on the 
language of that regulatory provision and work place regulation - not 
the Utah Antidiscrimination Act alone - that Mr. Blauer came before 
the hearing officer. 
(Mat 38) 
After carefully reviewing and considering Appellant's arguments on this claim, we are 
upholding Hearing Officer Beadles' decision denying this claim. In reaching this decision we first 
examined the personnel rule alleged to have been violated by the Department. This personnel rule 
sets forth the policy of the State of Utah to provide employees with a working environment free from 
discrimination and unlawful harassment. It then defines generally what actions constitute unlawful 
harassment and sets forth a complaint procedure for employees to follow. Finally, this personnel rule 
sets forth the investigative measures required of the Department after a complaint has been 
registered. 
Importantly, this rule is limited in scope and provides no separate right of remedy for 
employees outside the statutory framework of Utah Code Ann. § 35A-5-107, Instead, this rule 
merely outlines prohibited employment conduct regarding harassment or discrimination and creates 
a basis to discipline employees who fail to comport their conduct consistent with the parameters set 
forth in Utah Code Admin. R477-15. 
Based upon the facts elicited at the evidentiary hearing in this matter and our examination 
of the relevant personnel policy at issue in this claim, we find Appellant failed to establish the 
Lorin Blauer v. UtahDept Of Workforce Services, Case No. 10CSRB 100 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Department violated state personnel rules governing unlawful harassment, discrimination or 
retaliation. This determination is made under a correctness standard which allows the Board to 
review the hearing officer's conclusions under a correctness standard and with little deference to 
legal determinations. 
Regarding Hearing Officer Beadles' jurisdictional determinations, the Board acknowledges 
that prior decisions of the CSRB regarding jurisdiction have been overturned with affirmative 
remands for the CSRB to hear Appellant's personnel rule violation grievances on their merits. 
However, the CSRB's prior jurisdictional determinations were not related to Utah Code Ann. $35A-
5-107(15) which provides that the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act is the "exclusive" remedy for 
discrimination claims. Instead, the CSRB's prior jurisdictional decisions were based substantively 
on administrative waiver and findings that Appellant had not raised these issues prior to Step 5 of 
the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. 
In essence, the jurisdictional deficiencies raised by Hearing Officer Beadles in his Step 5 
Decision are different than those raised in prior CSRB decisions. Importantly, in Blauer v. Utah 
Department of Workforce Services, 2008 UT App 84, (Blauer IE) the Court of Appeals limited its 
jurisdiction remand to the CSRB by concluding the "CSRB erred by considering jurisdictional issues 
that have already been decided by the district court." (Id.) (Emphasis added). 
Examination of the "district court's" Memorandum Decision and Final Order establish that 
the jurisdictional deficiencies raised by the Department at the district court level related to 
Appellant's failure to grieve personnel rule violation claims prior to advancing those grievances to 
Step 5 of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures. Specifically, in addressing the Department's 
administrative waiver arguments, Judge Lewis stated in her memorandum decision: 
Lorin Blauer v. Utah Dept. Of Workforce Services, Case No. 10 CSRB 100 
"
 L K
 •• ' P a r r ^ O R 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The court concludes that Plaintiff, in his request for reconsideration 
before the CSRB, preserved all his remaining allegations concerning 
the Defendant's violations of the Personnel Management Act. In 
other words, the court declines to follow defendant5 s reasoning that 
these grounds for grieving were not raised administratively and 
therefore deemed waived or that, this court has no jurisdiction to 
consider them. 
(Grievant'sBrief at Ex. 2) (Emphasis added) 
In the instant case, Hearing Officer Beadles' jurisdictional determination regarding 
Appellant's harassment claim was not hased on or connected to any jurisdictional issue that had 
''already been decided by the district court." Instead, Hearing Officer Beadles found that Utah Code 
Ann. § 35A-5-107 provided the exclusive remedy for Appellant to address his unlawful 
discrimination or harassment claim and that his sole remedy lay with the Division of 
Antidiscrimination and Labor pursuant to the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. 
After carefully considering the above factors, we affirm the hearing officer's decision on this 
issue. Though unnecessary because of our above ruling that the Department had not violated 
DHRM R477-15, we nonetheless find the hearing officer's decision regarding jurisdiction to be 
reasonable, rational and a correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes. 
i n , I ^ V I E W O F T H E H E A ^ 
APPELLANT'S PERSONISEL FILE 
On September 30, 2009, prior to the evidentiary hearing in this matter, Hearing Officer 
Beadles issued an Order Regarding Allocation of Proof. In this order, Hearing Officer Beadles held 
that none of the ^critical" letters or comments referenced by Grievant to support his claim of 
discipline constituted "written reprimands" as contemplated by Utah law. (Order Regarding 
Allocation of Proof at 3) In support of this finding, Hearing Officer Beadles noted that: 
[A]ll the items listed in §§ 67-19a-406(2) are actions initiated by the 
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department. Except for the Change of Assignment Memorandum of 
September 9, 2009, all the documents that Grievant challenges are 
responses to Grievantrather than proactive actions of the Department. 
(Id) Hearing Officer Beadle's further reasoned that to equate the referenced comments contained 
in these documents to written reprimands "would transform all letters and performance evaluations 
containing a critical comment into a disciplinary document subject to due process." 
( K a i l ) 
Specifically, referencing his prior Order Regarding Allocation of Proof in his Step 5 
Decision, Hearing Officer Beadles states: 
The hearing officer issued a order relevant to this issue on September 
30,2009, in which the purported letters, at least those to which the 
hearing officer was made aware, were determined not to be 'written 
reprimands.' Though this order was issued to settle the question of 
burden of proof, it is relevant here as well because Mr. Blauer 
presented no evidence to justify changing the hearing officer's 
September 30 decision. 
(Step 5 Decision at 9) 
On appeal to this Board, Appellant argues that Hearing Officer Beadles erred in making these 
determinations, particularly with regards to Div. Dir, Downing's September 9, 2003, "Change of 
Assignment" memorandum. In challenging the hearing officer's determinations regarding this issue 
Appellant argues that the term "written reprimand" is not defined in relevant personnel statues nor 
in any reported Utah decisions. Accordingly, Appellant argues Hearing Officer Beadles erred in 
finding these letters, and more particularly the negative comments cabined in these letters, did not 
constitute "written reprimands" as defined in Utah law. 
After carefully considering Appellant's arguments regarding this issue, we uphold the hearing 
officer's decision that the documents at issue in this matter simply do not constitute "written 
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reprimands" as contemplated by statute. We agree with Hearing Officer Beadles' determination, set 
forth in his Order Regarding Allocations of Burden of Proof, that to equate these documents, and 
more precisely the comments contained therein, with "written reprimands" would transform all 
departmental letters and performance evaluations that contained any "critical comments" into 
disciplinary action subject to due process. This Board is simply unable to find the "critical 
comments" at issue inthis matter constituted writtenreprimands subject to the State's Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures. Therefore, we uphold Hearing Officer Beadles' decision on this claim. 
This decision is buttressed by the fact that none of the referenced letters, or the comments 
set forth therein, necessarily removed privileges from Appellant or imposed restrictions beyond those 
already cabined in Appellant's core j ob functions. This is especially true in light of the fact that the 
Utah Court of Appeals has-already -determined that Div, Dir, Downing's September 9,2003, Cliange 
of Assignment memorandum "did nothing more than extend one of Mr. Blauer's core job functions, 
in response to varying Department needs." (Blauer I at ^  32) 
Based upon these factors, Appellant's claim that "critical" letters or comments remaining in 
his file constituted "written reprimands" is denied. Hearing Officer Beadles' decision regarding this 
issue is upheld. 
DECISION 
The Board has addressed the remaining issues presented in this case and raised by Appellant 
in his appeal to the Board. After thorougjhly reviewing the evidentiary recordand carefully applying 
the relevant policy and rules at issue in this matter the Board sustains the hearing officer's decision 
for the reason set forth herein, and affirmatively denies Mr. Blauer's appeal to this Board. The Board 
finds the hearing officer's decision to be reasonable and rational and supported by substantial 
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evidence. The Board further finds that the hearing officer correctly applied all relevant policies and 
rules in rendering his decision. Based upon the evidence presented at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing 
in this matter, the Board finds that the Department did not violate personnel rules regarding the 
Department's failure to define job parameters, unlawful harassment, or discipline without due 
process and upholds the hearing officer's decision denying Appellant's claims in their entirety. 
DATED this 20th day of December 2010. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Kevin C. Timken, Chair 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Teresa Aramaki, Member 
^77^f^^, 
S ^ ^ S 1 ^ 
Chair 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency 
action by complying with Utah Admin. Code R137~l-22(10), and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-302, Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-11, and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401 and 403, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
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CAREER SERVICE REVIEW OFFICE 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LORIN BLAUER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF"WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, an agency of the State of Utah, 
and UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW 
BOARD, 
Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
DECISION 
Court of Appeals No. 
Agency Case No. 10 CSRB 100 (Step 6) 
Administrative Appeal No. 10 CSRB 100 
Notice is hereby given that Lorin Blauer, Petitioner, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-
4-401 and 403, Utah Admin. Code R137-1-11, and Rule 14(a), Utah Rules of Appellate*, 
Procedure, petitions the Utah Court of Appeals to review the Career Service Review Board's 
Partial Decision on Grievant's Request for Continuance of Prehearing Conference, Motion for 
Recusal and Selection of an Impartial Judge, and Request for Oral Argument, issued July 1,2009 
in this matter (Exhibit 1); tire Career Service Review Board Hearing Officer's Order Regarding 
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Motion for Recusal and Issues to be Heard, issued September 14, 2009 herein (Exhibit 2); the 
Career Service Review Board Hearing Officer's Or.der Regarding Allocation of Burden of Proof, 
issued September 30,2009 herein (Exhibit 3); the Career Service Review Board Hearing 
Officer's Order Motion for Reconsideration of Burden of Proof, issued November 16, 2009 
(Exhibit 4); the Career Service Review Board Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, Decision and Order (Step 5 Decision), issued January 7, 2010 (Exhibit 5); and the Order 
and Decision of the Respondent Utah Career Service Review Board issued in this matter on 
December 20, 2010 (Exhibit 6). 
This petition seeks review of all findings, conclusions, decisions and orders entered by. 
the Career Service Review Board herein. 
Petitioner requests the Court to direct Respondents to prepare and certify to the Court its 
entire record, which shall include all the proceedings and evidence taken in this matter. 
DATED this 30th day of December, 2010. 
JONES, WALDO, H0LBROOK & McDONOUGH 
B v ^ . 
..x^Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 30th day of December, 2010: 
Phillip Lott 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
Robert Thompson, Chairman 
Career Service Review Board A 
State Office Building, Room 1120 // 
SaltLake City, UT 84114 / / 
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F I L E C O P Y 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LORIN BLAUER, 
Grievant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
Agency. 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF 
THE FILE PURSUANT TO 
SUBSECTION 67~19a-403(2)(b)(ii), 
AND 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
BY INFORMAL 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDING 
Case No. J. H. 129 (2003) 
On Wednesday, October 15,2003,Tom Cantrell, UtahLegal Advocates, filed an appeal with 
the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) for and on behalf of Lorin Blauer (Grievant) to have his 
grievance advanced to Step 5 of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures for career service 
employees. Thereafter, onMonday, October 27,2003, Mr. Cantrell filed an "Amendment to Appeal 
of Agency Decision" with the CSRB. 
Grievant is appealing a final decision issued by Raylene G. Ireland, Executive Director, Utah 
Department of Workforce Services (Department), on October 14,2003. Step 5 of these procedures 
allows for an evidentiary hearing before a CSRB hearing officer. However, before a Step 5 hearing 
may occur, the CSRB Administrator is required by law to make a determination of whether the 
CSRB has jurisdiction over the grievance. 
JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW 
Utah Code, §67-19a-403(2)(a) states that: 
(2)(a) When an employee submits a grievance to the administrator under the 
authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator shall determine: 
(i) whether or not the employee is a career service employee and is 
entitled to use the grievance system; 
(ii) whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the grievance; 
(iii) whether or not the employee has been directly harmed; and 
(iv) the issues to be heard. 
(b) In order to make the determinations required by Subsection (2), the -
administrator may: 
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(i) hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may present oral 
arguments, written arguments, or both; or 
(ii) conduct an administrative review of the file 
In connection with this jurisdictional determination, Utah Code, §67-19a-3 02 provides that: 
(1) A career service employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demotions, 
• suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel 
rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, 
reductions in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position to 
all levels of [the] grievance procedure. 
(2)(a) A career service employee may grieve all other matters only to the level 
of his department head, 
(b) The decision of the department head is final and unappealable to the 
board. 
Finally, Utah Code, §67-19a-202(l)(b) further provides that "the boardhas no jurisdiction to review 
or decide any other personnel matters." 
Based upon this statutory requirement, I have conducted an administrative review of the file. 
An administrative review of the file is an informal adjudicative proceeding under Utah Code, 
§63-46b-4 and CSRB rule found at Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-17. Based upon these facts, 
the decision set forth herein is appealable to the district courts that have jurisdiction to review by trial 
de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. {Utah Code, 
§63-46b-15) 
In the instant case, Grievant is appealing Ms. Ireland's final decision to uphold Grievant's 
supervisor's decision to change his job assignments. In his initial appeal dated September 12,2003, 
Grievant asserted through his representative that "Lorin [Grievant] appeals your reassigning him to 
the duties of a full time administrative law judge. You have assigned him lesser duties that are not 
in his job description and which do not use his highest skill levels. Your reassignment... is a 
demotion... ." 
On October 14, 2003, Ms. Ireland issued her written decision denying Mr. Blauer's 
grievance. In this decision, Ms. Ireland specifically stated that: "You have claimed that this 
-- - assignment is-- a. demotion^However^-^^^^ 
maintain the same pay and pay range. It is not a demotion. Rather Tani [Grievant's supervisor] has 
assigned you duties that are very specific, allow for regular feedback, and help ensure that you 
maintain a full workload." 
Lorin Blauer v. UDWS, J. H. 129 (403) (2003) Page 2 
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Through his representative, Mr. Cantrell, Grievant timely appealed Ms Ireland's final 
decision with the CSRB. This appeal was received on Wednesday, October 15, 2003. The appeal 
was then amended on Monday, October 27,2003. 
In his written appeal before the CSRB, Grievant asserts that the modification of his duties 
is not only a demotion, but alternatively, either a constructive suspension or constructive dismissal 
as well. As stated previously, statute requires that the CSRB Administrator make an initial 
determination of whether the CSRB has jurisdiction over the grievance. Based upon this mandate, 
this decision will address the three separate issues raised in Grievant5 s appeal of Ms. Ireland's final 
decision. 
First, I will address Grievant's claims that the reassignment of his duties amounted to a 
demotion. Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) rule R477-l(34) defines 
demotion as: 
An action resulting in a salary reduction on the current salary range or the 
movement of an incumbent from one job or position to another job or position 
having a lower salary range, which may include a reduction in salary. 
Administrative adjustments and reclassifications are not included in the definition 
of a demotion. 
In die instant case, nowhere does Grievant allege that either his salary or his salary range has 
been reduced. Instead, Grievant simply asserts that the changes to his duties and responsibilities 
amount to a demotion because he has been assigned to perform the duties normally associated with 
those of an administrative law judge. 
An administrative review of the file in the instant case establishes that throughout the events 
giving rise to this grievance, Grievant has maintained his position as a legal counselor with the 
Department. Moreover, there has been no reduction in his salary nor his salary range. Grievant has 
simply been assigned differing duties to allow his supervisor to provide "regular feedback" and to 
ensure that Grievant "maintain a full workload." 
DHRM rule R477-3-3 contemplates the very actions the Department took in this case. 
Specifically, this rule provides that: 
Management may assign, modify, or remove any employee task or responsibility in 
order to accomplish reorganization, improve business practices or process, or for 
any other reason deemed appropriate by the department administration. 
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Clearly, DHRM rule authorizes management to assign, modify, or remove an employee's 
duties, tasks or responsibilities under specified circumstances. As long as the Department does not 
reduce the employee5 s immediate salary or salary range in the process of making these modifications 
or assignments, no demotion has in fact occurred under DHRM rules. 
In addition, the facts of this case are distinguishable from Draughon v. Dept. of Financial 
Institutions et al, 975 P.2d 935 (Ut. App. Ct. 1999). In Draughon, the Court held that: 
Human Resources' rules distinguishing between a "demotion" and an "involuntary reassignment/' 
solely on the basis of an immediate loss of pay, are invalid 
Addressing this issue, it should be noted that since the Court's decision in Draughon, DHRM 
has modified its rules so that they no longer make a distinction between a "'demotion' and an 
'involuntary reassignment,' solely on the basis of an immediate loss of pay." (Id.) Indeed, DHRM's 
current rules do not even allow "involuntary reassignments." Moreover, DHRM has modified its 
definition of "demotion" to accord the Court's decision in Draughon. As stated previously, 
DHRM's definition of "demotion" now includes not only an immediate loss of pay, but also 
movement of a career service employee to a position with a lower salary range, even if such an event 
does not encompass a loss of salary. Because Grievant maintains his position, immediate salary and 
salary range in compliance with rule, the Court's decision in Draughon has limited application to 
the facts of this case. 
Finally, the Court in Draughon cited with approval to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary to define demotion as " 1 : to reduce to a lower grade or rank 2: to relegate to a less 
important position." (Id at 941) 
In the instant case, a thorough review of the file establishes that Grievant has not been 
reduced to a lower grade or rank, nor has he been assigned a different, let alone, less important 
position. Grievant continues to hold his position or title as "Legal Counsel" and maintains his same 
pay and pay range. He has simply been assigned duties that management feels would better enable 
them to provide Grievant with regular feed back and ensure that he maintains a full work load. 
Based upon these factors, I do not believe the actions the Department took against Grievant amount 
to a demotion, but instead encompass internal personnel actions over which the CSRB has no 
jurisdiction. 
LorinBlauerv.UDWS,LR. 129 (403) (2003) Page4 
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The second issue raised by Grievant in his appeal to the CSRB is that the actions of the 
Department amount to a "constructive suspension." In support of this position, Grievant essentially 
asserts that the change in his assigned duties exacerbates his "known disabilities" and that he has 
"been forced to take sick leave and FMLA . . ." because he cannot perform newly assigned 
responsibilities "without damage to his health and well being." 
These concerns are clearly outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction of the CSRB. They 
do not involve suspension as that word is normally viewed in the employment context, but instead 
involve matters uniquely and solely cabined under federal or State law, specifically, the Americans 
With Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act. Based upon these factors, the CSRB 
simply lacks jurisdiction to address Grievant's alleged "constructive suspension." 
Finally, Grievant asserts that the actions of the Department also amount to a "constructive 
dismissal." In support of this position, Grievant asserts that if he is required to perform his newly 
assigned duties and responsibilities, he will be forced to resign for health reasons. 
Like Grievant5s "constructive suspension" allegations discussed above, this matter clearly 
falls outside the limited jurisdiction of the CSRB. This determination is based on two primary 
factors. 
First, the CSRB does not have jurisdiction to review internal personnel matters relating to 
j ob assignments or responsibilities. Reasonable accommodations relating to a disability or a serious 
health condition are covered under various federal or state statutes including, but not limited to, the 
Americans With Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act. Pursuant to these laws, federal 
and State courts have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to review claims based upon "reasonable 
accommodation" in the workplace. 
Second, the fact of the matter is, Grievant simply has not yet been dismissed, either actually 
or constructively, from his employment with the Department. Utah Code Ann. §67-19a-401 et seq. 
allows an employee to file a grievance "within twenty working days after the event giving rise to the 
grievance." In Taylorv. State Training School, 775 P.2d 434,439-40 (Ut App. Ct.1989), the Utah 
-Gourt-of^Appeals^^ 
occurs, "not some prior indication tha t . . . action will be taken in the future." (Id.) Until such an 
event or action occurs, there is no grievable event for the CSRB to review. 
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In the instant case, Grievant has not been dismissed. If or when that event actually occurs, 
Grievant may well then file an appeal of the Department's decision with the CSRB. Until then, 
however, there is simply no dismissal over which the CSRB has jurisdiction. 
DECISION 
After thoroughly reviewing the file associated with this grievance, I find that the CSRB does 
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims. Other venues including State and/or federal court 
or agencies may be a more appropriate avenue. 
It is so ORDERED the 12th day of November 2003. 
f^X^ lA^- t 
Robert W. Thompson 
Administrator 
RECONSmERATION 
This administrative review of the file constitutes final agency action under Utah Code, §63-46b-13, Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. A party may request reconsideration by the Administrator of the Career Service 
Review Board within 20 days from the date of issuance (i.e., signature date), by stating specific grounds upon 
which relief is requested. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of an administrative review of the file under §67-19a-403(2)(b)(ii) is reviewable in District 
Court according to Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and 15, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The appealing party 
of this informal adjudication and final agency action may file with either The District Court in which the party 
resides or The Third District Court where the seat of state of Utah government is located. 
( 
! 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORIN BLAUER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 040900221 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on June 24, 
2004, in connection with various pending Motions filed by both 
parties, including the defendant's Motion to Dismiss; the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; the defendant's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment and the defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion. 
At the conclusion of the hearing on these Motions, the Court 
indicated that it would take the matter under advisement to further 
consider the parties' written submissions, the relevant legal 
authority and counsels' oral argument. Being now fully advised, 
the Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Court first turns to the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
Because of the voluminous nature of the parties' respective legal 
arguments, the Court will not restate these arguments herein. 
Rather, the Court will generally indicate that it does not find the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BLAUER V. UTAH DEPT. 
OF WORKFORCE SVCS. PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Motion to Dismiss to be well-taken for the reasons indicated in the 
plaintiff's Opposition Memorandum. Overall, the Court is satisfied 
that it has the jurisdiction to consider this matter and that the 
plaintiff has exhausted his available administrative remedies. 
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
Next, the Court addresses the parties' Motions for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of whether the CSRB should have heard the 
plaintiff's grievance because he met the jurisdictional threshold 
of establishing that he had been demoted. In assessing this 
issue, this Court must, determine as a matter of law whether the 
plaintiff was indeed demoted and whether the Board should now 
proceed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was 
demoted for cause pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18(1). 
Again, without restating the parties' detailed arguments on 
the issue of demotion, the Court concludes that the pivotal inquiry 
in determining whether a demotion occurred in this case must focus 
on the plaintiff's salary, salary range and retirement benefits. 
As the defendant points out, it is undisputed that the plaintiff 
was never formally reclassified and that his salary, salary range 
and retirement benefits were completely unaffected by the change in 
his assignment. The Court concludes that this is determinative-
evidence that the plaintiff was not demoted and that the CSRB was 
correct in reaching the same conclusion. 
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To be clear, in reaching this decision, the Court carefully 
considered the plaintiff's argument that the Court look to such 
factors as the change in his status and that his new 
responsibilities essentially fit the job description for the lower 
paying and apparently less esteemed position of Administrative Law 
Judge - Non Juris Doctorate. While the plaintiff argues this 
position admirably, the fact remains that without a commensurate 
decrease in salary or a lower salary range (or the loss of 
retirement benefits) , the plaintiff cannot be considered demoted. 
The Court rules that this conclusion, which is articulated in 
greater detail in the plaintiff!s moving papers, is supported by 
the definition of demotion (Utah Administrative Code R477~l-i(34)) 
and the remaining legal authorities discussed by the plaintiff. 
Accordingly, the Court rules that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and that the plaintiff was not demoted as a matter of 
law. The defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on this 
point is granted. 
Given the Court's decisions above, it appears that the only 
remaining issue is the CSRB's refusal to consider the plaintiff's 
remaining grievances based upon alleged violations of the personnel 
rules. The Court concludes that the plaintiff, in his Request for 
Reconsideration before the CSRB, preserved all of his remaining 
allegations concerning the defendant's violations of the Personnel 
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Management Act. In other words, the Court declines to follow the 
defendant's reasoning that, these grounds for grieving were not 
raised administratively and are therefore deemed waived or that 
this Court has no jurisdiction to consider them. However, rather 
than determining whether the violations actually occurred, it 
appears from the dialogue with the plaintiff's counsel during oral 
argument, that he would prefer to have these matters transferred 
back to the CSRB for consideration. Accordingly, to the extent 
that the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment seeks a renewed 
opportunity to have the CSRB consider his grievance related to the 
alleged violations of the Personnel Management Act, the Court 
grants the same and remands the matter back to the CSRB. 
It appears that the foregoing addresses all of the issues 
raised in the pending Motions. However, if the parties need 
clarification as to any of the foregoing or if an issue remains 
unaddressed, the Court requests that counsel direct a letter to the 
Court's law clerk, Alexandra C. Doctorman, indicating the same* 
The other side can of course respond to any correspondence directed 
to the Court. 
mniR7n, 
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Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order consistent with, 
but not limited to, this Memorandum Decision and submit the same to 
the Court for review and signature. 
Dated this \\j day of August, 2004. 
LESLIEVA. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this \\^ day of 
August, 2 0 04: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Gabrielle Lee Caruso 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
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GABRIELLE LEE CARUSO (7368) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
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Utah Attorney General Third Judicial District 
Attorneys for Dept. of Workforce Services 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor DEC ' 8 200% 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 By / W f l f t ^ ^ ' 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LORTNBLAUER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
Defendant. 
PROPOSED ORDER IN 
CONFORMANCE WITH THE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED 
AUGUST 16, 2003 
Civil No. 040900221 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
For the reasons set forth in the Court 's Memorandum Decision dated August 16, 2004, 
the Court hereby orders and adjudges: 
1. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. The Court has Jurisdiction to 
consider the matter. 
2. There is no genuine issue of material fact, and as a matter of law, the Defendant 
did not demote the Plaintiff when it assigned him to perform the duties of an administrative law 
judge. The CSRB was correct in reaching this same conclusion.. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs 
>*2UH\ 
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First Claim for Relief is dismissed with prejudice, with the exception that the allegations in 
Paragraph 34 subsections ©) through (j) of the complaint which do are not based upon unlawful 
demotion, and which were also set forth by the Plaintiff in his Motion for Reconsideration 
(previously filed with the CSRB), are remanded to the CSRB for consideration. Those 
allegations are: A) DWS violated Utah Administrative Code R477-10-1, et seq by failing to 
define job performance parameters; B)DWS violated personnel rules by assigning job tasks to 
Grievant falling outside of his job description, in violation of Utah Administrative Code R477-3-
2 and 3; C) DWS representatives engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against 
Grievant in connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities, in violation of Utah 
Administrative Code R477-15-2 and 3; D) DWS representatives violated Utah Administrative 
Code R477-2-5 by failing to maintain proper personnel records concerning Grievant's 
performance, and by refusing access to alleged documentation supposedly reflecting negatively 
on his job performance, and claimed to be in his personnel file; E). DWS violated Utah 
Administrative Code R477-7-7 by denying Grievant administrative leave; and F) Critical letters 
from Ms. Downing and Ms. Ireland, remaining in Grievant's personnel file constitute "written 
reprimands, grievable to CSRB pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 67-19a-302(l). 
3. The Plaintiffs Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for Relief are based upon an 
alleged unlawful demotion and are therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
2 
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DATED this ^ day of November, 2004. 
BY THB€<PURT: 
THE HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS 
* 1 • v i 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
„wd 
I hereby certify that on this cJO day of November, 2004,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PROPOSED ORDER IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE 
MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED AUGUST 16,2003 to be mailed by United States 
mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
cHoiLj Q. JkfouiMH 
h >>;* r - , r 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
LORIN BLAUER, 
Grievant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
Agency. 
DECISION ON 
AGENCY'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 28 CSRB/H.O. 408 
Pursuant to a telephonic Status/Scheduling Conference held on Friday, October 13, 2006, 
conducted by the Hearing Officer assigned to adjudicate this issue, oral argument on the Utah 
Department of Workforce Services' Motion to Dismiss was held on October 24,2006, at the State 
Office Building. Present during the hearing were the Grievant, Lorin Blauer and his administrative 
law representative, Tom Cantrell.l Assistant Utah Attorney General Philip S. Lott appeared on behalf 
of the Agency. Also in attendance were JoAnne Campbell, HR Director of the Utah Department of 
Human Resources, as the Agency's management representative, and Brian Blake, a paralegal in the 
Utah Office of the Attorney General. A certified court reporter made a record of the proceedings. No 
witnesses appeared and no other evidence was received into the record other than that which is 
already on file. 
The sole purpose of this proceeding was to more fully consider the Agency's Motion to 
Dismiss filed on September 29,2006, and the Grievant's Response filed October 10,2006, both of 
which subsequently followed a Third District Court Memorandum Decision dated August 16,2004. 
(Ex. T) As noted by Judge Leslie Lewis in an August 2, 2006 Memorandum Decision, this case 
presents a "convoluted procedural history." (Ex. Y) While it is unnecessary to reiterate the entire 
history preceding the issues at hand, some limited recitation is necessary to provide a meaningful 
context for this decision. All exhibits referred to herein, unless otherwise noted, are appended to the 
Agency's Motion to Dismiss. 
Attorney Vincent C. Rampton, who has represented the Grievant in various permutations of 
this ongoing case, did not attend although notice was duly provided to him. 
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BACKGROUND 
Grievant began working for the Agency as legal counsel in approximately 1980. Over the 
past three and one-half years, Grievant has filed three grievances with the Career Service Review 
Board (CSRB), two State court lawsuits, one federal court lawsuit (which he voluntarily withdrew), 
and two different appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals in connection with his job at the Agency. 
THE FIRST GRIEVANCE - PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS (STEP 4) 
In June of 2003, Grievant received a poor performance evaluation from his supervisor 
Tani Downing (Ms. Downing). He filed a grievance to change the evaluation to "successful" and this 
grievance was initially denied by Ms. Downing. Part of this grievance included Grievant's claims that 
he either did not have a Performance Plan in place or that the one in existence was outdated. He also 
complained that he was being held to unfair performance standards. This latter claim may have been 
connected with Grievant's ongoing preparation of a request for ADA accommodations but it is 
unclear.2 He subsequently appealed Ms. Downing's initial denial of his grievance to the Agency's 
Executive Director Raylene Ireland (Exec. Dir. Ireland). (Ex. G) Sometime thereafter, 
Exec. Dir. Ireland agreed with Grievant's request to upgrade his evaluation and the poor evaluation 
was changed to "successful."?, the grievance was resolved in Grievant's favor. (Ex. J) Grievant was 
also given a new Performance Plan at that time. Finally, he was advised to follow through on any 
ADA accommodation request with the proper department.3 
THE SECOND GRIEVANCE - DEMOTION (STEP 4) 
In September 2003, after his first grievance had been resolved to his satisfaction, Grievant 
filed a second grievance, claiming that he had been demoted when he had been recently reassigned 
to conduct unemployment hearings full-time. First Ms. Downing and then Exec. Dir. Ireland denied 
this grievance after determining that Grievant had not been demoted. 
STEP 5 APPEAL OF THE SECOND GRIEVANCE (DEMOTION) 
In October 2003, Grievant appealed his denied grievance, the alleged demotion, to the CSRB. 
Grievant also appended to this appeal, new claims of "constructive suspension and dismissal," 
2It is unclear, in part, because Grievant expressly wrote at the time, "my concern is not about 
reasonable accommodations as I can - and have been - performing the essential functions of my 
position at a highly successful level." (Ex. G). 
3Grievant did so and the request was denied (Ex. K). 
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characterizing the Agency's actions as "discriminatory and retaliatory." No Step 5 formal 
adjudicative hearing was held. Instead, in November 2003, the CSRB Administrator, under 
applicable rules, issued an Administrative Review of the File Jurisdictional Decision (Jurisdictional 
Decision). The Administrator concluded that Grievant's job reassignment did not constitute a 
demotion as that term is defined under applicable rules and regulations. The Administrator 
determined that Grievant's reassignment of duties was an "internal personnel action" over which the 
CSRB had no jurisdiction. The Administrator addressed the newly appended claims of "constructive 
suspension and dismissal" in the same decision by noting that because these claims were not "ripe" 
(i.e., Grievant had not been terminated, suspended, or left employment), the CSRB had no 
jurisdiction. 
SEPARATE REQUEST TO AGENCY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE 
On or about the same time Grievant filed his Second Grievance in September 2003, he also 
asked the Agency for "administrative leave based on medical considerations." Exec. Dir. Ireland 
informed him that although he was not entitled to take administrative leave on the requested medical 
basis, he could apply for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 
PURPORTED STEP 5 APPEAL OF DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE 
In October 2003, Grievant filed an "appeal" to the CSRB of the Agency's denial of his request 
for administrative leave. A day or two later, he filed an amended version of this "appeal" to the 
CSRB. 
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CSRBf S 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF THE FILE DECISION 
In December of 2003, Grievant filed a request for reconsideration of the jurisdictional 
decision addressing his demotion claims. Grievant asked the CSRB Administrator to reconsider his 
decision that Grievant's job reassignment did not constitute a demotion, and therefore, the CSRB 
had no jurisdiction. He also reiterated his claim - raised in the separate purported "appeal" to the 
CSRB in October 2003 -that he was improperly denied administrative leave. Then, he included the 
addressed claims of "constructive discharge/dismissal4 and discrimination and retaliation" raised in 
4While Grievant in his motion for reconsideration characterized his claim as constructive 
discharge/dismissal, it is clear from a review of the file that he intended to include the claim of 
constructive suspension.
 A 
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the CSRB demotion appeal. Finally, he asserted four other brand new claims which he had not 
previously raised: the Agency's failure to define his job performance parameters, the Agency's 
violation of personnel rules, the Agency's failure to maintain proper personnel records/refusal to 
access personnel records and critical letter constituting "written reprimands." 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
This matter came to the CSRB pursuant to Judge Leslie Lewis' (Judge Lewis) Memorandum 
Decision dated August 16,2004. (Ex. T) While the court concluded that Grievant was not demoted 
as a matter of law, it left open the issue of the various alleged personnel rules violations related to 
the Utah Personnel Management Act such as harassment/retaliation and an improper denial of a 
request for administrative leave. Judge Lewis determined: (1) these allegations were raised and 
preserved by Grievant in his previous Request for Reconsideration before the CSRB; and (2) they 
were not addressed by the CSRB.5 The exact language in Judge Lewis' Memorandum Decision is 
as follows: 
[I]t appears that the only remaining issue is the CSRB's refusal to consider the 
plaintiffs remaining grievances based upon alleged violations of the personnel rules 
(Memorandum Decision, page 3; emphasis added.).... Accordingly, to the extent 
that the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment seeks a renewed opportunity to 
have the CSRB consider his grievance related to the alleged violations of the 
Personnel Management Act, the Court grants the same and remands the matter back 
to the CSRB. (Memorandum Decision, page 4; emphasis added.) 
The only claims as determined by the district court pursuant to Grievant's Request for 
Reconsideration of Administrative Review and Final Agency Action with which the CSRB is 
charged to consider are: 
(1) the Agency violated Utah Admin. Code R477-10-1, et seq. by failing to define 
[Grievant's] job performance parameters; 
(2) the Agency violated personnel rules by assigning job tasks to Grievant falling 
outside his job description, in violation of Utah Admin. Code R477-3-2 and 3; 
5The Administrator did not address the "extraneous" personnel violation claims in his 
Decision on Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration for the following reason: "Because I do not find 
that a demotion in fact occurred, I have limited my discussion... I recognize that Grievant's Request 
for Reconsideration addressed other issues primarily, but not entirely, stemming from the argument 
that a demotion had occurred. Based upon my decision herein however, it is unnecessary to address 
these arguments " (Decision on Grievant's Request for Reconsideration at 3) ,. ,. ^ o > 
r '- OOf.BB'1 
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(3) Agency representatives engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against 
Grievant in connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities, in 
violation of Utah Admin. Code R477-15-2 and 3; 
(4) Agency representatives violated Utah Admin. Code R477-2-5 by failing to maintain 
proper personnel records concerning Grievant's performance, and by refusing access 
to alleged documentation supposedly reflecting negatively on his job performance, 
and claimed to be in his personnel file; 
(5) the Agency violated Utah Admin. Code R477-7-7 by denying Grievant administrative 
leave; and 
(6) critical letters from Ms.Tani Downing and Ms. Raylene Ireland remaining in 
Grievant's personnel file constituted written reprimands, grievable to the CSRB 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l). 
At the outset of this proceeding, Grievant moved to continue oral argument based primarily 
in the "interests of judicial economy." When questioned, Grievant explained that a motion to 
consolidate various proceedings had been filed with the Third Judicial District Court but no decision 
had yet been issued. Mr. Cantrell opined that the motion to consolidate likely would be granted, and 
that oral argument on Grievant's personnel violation claims should be heard after that time. Although 
Grievant did not know when the motion to consolidate had been filed, Mr. Lott opined that it had 
been "a few months ago" and obj ected to Grievant's request for a continuance. The Agency's attorney 
argued that Grievant's motion to consolidate was a "separate issue before the judge relating to § 1983 
AD A/Utah anti-discrimination claims" and disagreed that the motion would be granted "because the 
CSRB lackes jurisdiction over such claims." Because this, case has been winding its way though 
various forums for approximately three and one-half years, and because Grievant's argument 
grounded in the "interests of judicial economy" was speculative, bis motion was denied. 
Grievant's arguments essentially are twofold. First, Judge Lewis' remand order of August 16, 
2004, stating that specified matters relating to alleged violations of personnel rules should be 
=^®*rfkF (e^^ 
full hearing on the merits of these allegations to determine their validity, regardless of when and how 
they were raised in the previous proceedings. Second, Grievant argues that because Judge Lewis 
ordered the CSRB to consider certain claims, it follows that the CSRB must have jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of those claims. 
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I do not agree with Grievant's interpretation of Judge Lewis' choice of language. One need 
not hold a full evidentiary hearing in order to properly assess the merits of Grievant's remaining 
claims. Indeed, in some instances, that process would border on the ridiculous or violate existing 
rules as discussed below. Had Judge Lewis' determined that it was mandatory to hold a foil-blown 
Step 5 hearing (a formal adjudicative proceeding) to consider Grievant's remaining claims, she easily 
could have deliniated that process. The word "consider" is not identical to the word "hearing." The 
term "consider" means to "think about carefully" to "study" or "contemplate" or "give thought in 
order to reach a suitable conclusion." ( Webster fs Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (19 8 8)) As I read 
the court's instructions, what must occur in this matter is that the CSRB address, in some fashion, 
Grievant's remaining claims. 
JURISDICTION 
I agree with the Agency's arguments that the CSRB is without jurisdiction to hear these issues 
in a formal adjudicative proceeding. An analogous situation would be where a trial court had granted 
summary judgment in favor of one party, an appeal was filed and a decision rendered, but then, the 
losing party goes back to the trial court to file a motion to reconsider the summary judgment 
decision, and includes claims not previously presented. Moreover, merely recasting former claims 
- which were already adjudicated - in new window dressing such as "personnel rule violations" does 
not give them new life. 
Like the Agency, I also believe that lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time. (Bradbury 
v. Valencia, 5 P.3d 649,650-1 (Utah 2000)) Grievant raised his claims relating to job performance 
parameters (issue #1 above) in his First Grievance and naturally, did not appeal the Step 4 decision 
in his favor. The CSRB lacks jurisdiction to hear a grievance that was previously resolved in the 
Grievant's favor. In essence, this claim does not exist anymore. 
Grievant raised his claims relating to assigned tasks outside his job description (issue # 2 
above) in his Second Grievance. The CSRB addressed this claim inherently as part of the same 
demotion grievance when it concluded that the tasks Grievant had been given were properly within 
his job. The Utah Court of Appeals in Blauer v. Department ofWorkforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204, 
1211 (Utah App. 2005), ultimately determined that the assigned tasks were properly within 
Grievant's job description. The Utah Court of Apeals in Blauer succintly held "[the] CSRB did not 
Blauer v. Workforce Services. Case No. 28 CSftR/R O dOR 000664 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
err in declining jurisdiction over Blauer's grievance." (Id. at 1204) The CSRB is without jurisdiction 
to hear this claim based on res judicata (issue preclusion). 
Grievant failed to raise his claims of unlawful harassment and retaliation with or without any 
connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities at any time prior to his Request for 
Reconsideration (issue #3 above). The CSRB simply has no jurisdiction over these claims pursuant 
to UtahAdmin. CodeR\37-l-5. Such claims by law must be filed with the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Division, (Id. (See also Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 852 (Utah 2004).) Moreover, these issues 
simply cannot be raised for the first time at the Step 5 level. 
Grievant also failed to raise his claims (issue #4 above) that the Agency failed to [properly] 
maintain his personnel record and refused him access [to certain documentation] prior to filing his 
Request for Reconsideration. It is impossible under existing CSRB rules to "reconsider" an issue of 
this type that was never raised at the Department level. Moreover, Grievant was, in fact, granted 
access to his personnel files. The only "problem" is that the documents he "supposed" were there, 
were not. The CSRB is not obligated to hear claims based on mere supposition after an employee 
has been terminated for unrelated reasons. 
Grievant's additional claim is that he was improperly denied administrative leave (issue #5 
above). He failed to file a Step 4 grievance in connection with this claim and only in his amended 
purported Step 5 appeal did this claim first appear. As stated above, it is impossible under existing 
CSRB rules to "reconsider" an issue of this type that was never raised at the Department level. Thus, 
the CSRB is without jurisdiction to hear this matter. 
Finally, Grievant's remaining claim (issue #6 above) had no antecedent grievance and 
appeared for the first time in his Request for Reconsideration. Grievant asserts that certain of his 
supervisors' documentation and correspondence constituted "written reprimands." Again, it is 
impossible under existing CSRB rules to "reconsider" an issue of this type that was never raised at 
the Agency level. The CSRB has no jurisdiction to go back and somehow hear claims not raised with 
the proper entity more than three and one-half years ago - the time they were required to be filed. 
To the extent the court may require a more detailed analysis, this decision will provide the 
same below. 
ANALYSIS 
Issue #1: The Agency violated Utah Admin. Code R477-10-1, et seq., by failing to define 
[Grievant's] job performance parameters. 
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DHRM R477-10-1 (a) states: "Performance standards and expectations for each employee 
shall be specifically written in a performance plan by August 3 0 of each fiscal year." As noted under 
"Background" above, the Agency fulfilled any duty it had under R477-10-1 to define Grievant's "j ob 
performance parameters/standards" by issuing a new Performance Plan dated July 18,2003 (Ex. H) 
pursuant to the First Grievance. Grievant acknowledges this undisputed fact in his Response to 
Motion to Dismiss wherein he states, beginning on page 10, "It is true that the Grievant's allegation 
of failure to define job performance standards and failure to have a current performance plan were 
raised in what the Agency defines as 'the first grievance' and that a Step 4 decision was issued in 
Grievant's favor." He continues, "It is true that Grievant prevailed on his first grievance and did not 
appeal beyond the Step 4 Decision because there was no apparent reason to." (Grievant's Response 
at 11 .)6 There still is no legitimate basis to revisit this issue and I conclude that the evidence in the 
record reflects that the Agency did not violate R477-10-1. 
Issue #2: The Agency violated personnel rules by assigning job tasks to Grievant falling outside his 
job description, in violation of Utah Administrative Code R477-3-2 and 3. 
DHRM R477-3-2 governs employee job descriptions. Job descriptions are to contain a "job 
title; distinguishing characteristics; a description of tasks commonly associated with most positions 
in the job' a statement of required knowledge, skills and other requirements; FLSA status' and other 
administrative information." R477-3-3 (Assignment of Duties) states that, "Management may assign, 
modify or remove any employee task or responsibility in order to accomplish reorganization, 
improve business practices or process, or for any other reason deemed appropriate by the department 
administration." Although R477-3-2 and 3 were not specifically cited at the time, this issue 
constitutes the subject matter of Grievant's Second Grievance, i.e., he was reassigned to conduct 
unemployment hearings full-time. The CSRB Administrator analyzed this issue, albeit in the form 
of a claim that Grievant was demoted, in his Jurisdictional Decision. He determined that Grievant's 
6Despite his overt recognition that the Agency did issue job performance standards in 
accordance with Utah Admin. Code R477-10-1, Grievant presents the argument that further 
consideration of this issue is somehow required because "[T]o t he extent that the Step 4 Decision 
later contributed to Grievant's injury, though, the CSRB does have jurisdiction to further consider 
these allegations in the context of the current grievance, because the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals have so determined." (Grievant's Response at 11) 
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job reassignment was valid and permissible under applicable rules and regulations in that Grievant's 
job had always included conducting unemployment hearings. Moreover, R477-3-3 expressly allows 
modifications to an employee's job duties. This is exactly what occurred in Grievant's case. 
After the CSRB Administrator had rendered his Jurisdictional Decision, upon Grievant's 
appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals in Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204 
(Utah App. 2005) further considered this issue. Again, although R477-3-2 and 3 were not specifically 
cited, the Court concluded however, that the adjudication of unemployment claims were properly 
within Grievant's core duties that he had previously performed part-time but was now required to 
perform full-time. The Court observed, "Because of Blauer's previous, and not uncommon, 
assignments to adjudications, DWS claims that in reapportioning Blauer's job responsibilities from 
part-time to full-time adjudicator, DWS did nothing more than extend one of Blauer's core job 
functions, in response to varying department needs. We agree and conclude that D WS's assignments 
of Blauer to full-time adjudications, a job function DWS had delegated to Blauer, and other Legal 
Enforcement Counsel IE, in the past, "did not constitute a demotion...." Blauer v. DWS at 1210. 
And, "Here, as discussed above, there was no change in job or position, but rather a reallocation by 
DWS of Blauer's then existing job responsibilities." (Id. at 1210) Moreover, a review of Grievant's 
Performance Plan/Evaluations for the periods July 1,1999 to June 30, 2000 (Ex. D), July 1, 2000 
to June 30, 2001 (Ex. E) and July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, reflects that unemployment hearings 
were a part of Grievant's workload and did not fall outside the DWS Legal Counsel/Administrative 
-» 
Law Judge Performance Plan. (Id.) 
To this day, Grievant has never mentioned any other "j ob task" to which he was assigned and 
which he found objectionable or allegedly violated personnel rules other than conducting 
unemployment hearings. Even then, it was the increased number of unemployment hearings that he 
found objectionable.7 Because Grievant has not designated any other "job task" which presumably 
violated personnel rules other than conducting unemployment hearings, and because that very issue 
7Based on the record submitted to it, the Court of Appeals found that presiding over 
unemployment hearings in a four-year period from 1999-2003 was a j ob function DWS consistently 
assigned to Blauer." (Id. at 1210) For instance, in 2000, DWS assigned Blauer to six to twenty 
hearings a week for 36 weeks and prior to 2003, DWS assigned Blauer to an average of eight 
hearings a week over the course of nineteen weeks." (Id.) 
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has been decided by both the CSRB and the Utah Court of Appeals, this claim has been repeatedly 
and conclusively determined. 
Issue #3: Agency representatives engaged in unlawful harassment of, and retaliation against Grievant 
in connection with his request for accommodation of disabilities, in violation of Utah Administrative 
CodeR477-15-2and3. 
DHRM R477-15-2 governs unlawful harassment. By definition under subsection (1), 
unlawful harassment means, "discriminatory treatment based on race, religion, national origin, color, 
sex, age, protected activity or disability." Harassment can result in a hostile, offensive or intimating 
work environment under this policy under subsection (2)(a). Such behavior can also result in a 
tangible employment action being taken against the harassed employee under subsection (2)(b). 
R477-15-3 prohibits retaliation against an employee, "who has opposed a practice forbidden under 
[this] policy, or has filed a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding or hearing under [this] policy or is otherwise engaged in protected 
activity." Grievant never raised a harassment claim until he filed his Request for Reconsideration 
with the CSRB. 
R477-15 (Unlawful Harassment Policy and Procedure) sets forth the proper complaint and 
investigative procedure for employees who believe they have been aggrieved. Grievant failed to avail 
himself of these proper avenues with his employer at the time he was required to do so. Only now, 
after Grievant has been terminated for job abandonment and has lost his demotion claim, does he 
pursue these issues with the CSRB. The CSRB, however, is expressly prohibited from hearing these 
claims regardless of when they were raised or whether they are raised in conjunction with a disability 
accommodations' request. {See Utah Admin. Code R137-1-5: "Claims alleged to be based upon a 
legally prohibited practice ... including employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, 
pregnancy, childbirth... age... religion, national origin, or disability, are not admissible under these 
grievance procedures. The CSRB and the CSRB hearing officers have no jurisdiction over the 
preceding claims.") 
Issue #4: Agency representatives violated Utah Administrative Code R477-2-5 by failing to maintain 
proper personnel records concerning Grievanfs performance, and by refusing access to alleged 
documentation supposedly reflecting negatively on his job performance, and claimed to be in his 
personnel file. 
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R477-2-5 governs personnel records. The provision mandates what types of records must be 
maintained, as appropriate, and how they should be maintained. Subsection (e) specifically permits 
"copies of any documents affecting the employee's conduct, status or salary. . . ." R477-2-5 also 
provides a mechanism for employees who feel aggrieved by how their personnel files are being 
maintained - subsection (4). Grievant, however, never pursued these procedures during the time he 
worked for the Agency when he was required to do so. Grievant never raised these claims until he 
filed his Request for Reconsideration with the CSRB. 
Moreover, these claims are moot. Grievant was not terminated based on any performance 
assessments or criteria contained in the Agency's records. He was terminated because he abandoned 
his job. Grievant was not "demoted" based on performance assessments or criteria contained in the 
Agency's records. In fact, he was not demoted at all, but merely reassigned to perform duties that 
were aheady in his job description. Grievant was not disciplined in any fashion based on 
performance assessments contained in the Agency records. Indeed, he was never disciplined. The 
record in this matter reveals that Grievant was allowed access to his personnel file. There were no 
documents" supposedly reflecting negatively on his j ob performance" which were relied upon, used 
or required by the Agency in any actions that it undertook. 
Issue #5: The Agency violated Utah Admin. Code R477-7-7 by denying Grievant administrative 
leave. 
Absent a specific and designated basis for mandatory approval of administrative leave in the 
applicable DHRM rules, the granting of administrative leave under R477-7-7 is discretionary and 
then, only if it is consistent with Agency policy ("Administrative leave maybe granted consistent 
with agency policy.") There is nothing in the record that indicates why Grievant believes that the 
Agency allegedly violated R4*7 7-7-7 when it denied his request for "administrative leave related to 
medical reasons." Instead, Grievant appears to believe that because he characterized his request as 
-necessary-for-^medical-reasons,—thaLthe-Agency-was-obligatedto-giv^i1J:QL-hi-m.8 
8Grievant's written submission on this issue is less than enlightening: "It is true that Grievant 
was informed by Director Ireland that his request for administrative leave based on medical 
considerations was denied. The Agency's argument that the rule upon which Grievant relies, R477-7-7, 
is discretionary and is dependent upon 'agency policy' can be heard by the CSRB because the Courts 
have so ruled." (Grievant's Response to Motion to Dismiss at 13.) Actually, Grievant misquotes this 
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There is, however, evidence in the record that the Agency researched Grievant's request and 
could find no provision that mandated approval of Grievant's request. (Ex. Q) The Agency's response 
to Grievant indicated that while annual leave, sick leave or FMLA could be used to support an 
extended absence, Grievant's situation did not require the Agency to grant his request. Bare bone's 
allegations are insufficient to sustain a claim that the Agency violated R477-7-7, particularly in light 
of the fact that whether to grant or deny Grievant administrative leave was within the Agency's 
discretion. 
Issue #6: Critical letters from Ms.Tani Downing and Ms. Raylene Ireland remaining in Grievant's 
personnel file constituted written reprimands, grievable to the CSRB pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S67-19a-302m 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(l) states that certain State employees may grieve written 
reprimands. The "critical letters"9 to which Grievant alludes allegedly constituting written 
reprimands are simply a moot issue in this case regardless of whether they were "grievable" under 
§67-19a-302(1). Grievant was terminated on a basis other than his performance, i.e., job 
abandonment, where any written reprimand, if issued, played no role. In addition, the issue of 
whether Grievant was demoted (where written reprimands conceivably may have been relevant) has 
already been conclusively determined by the Utah Court of Appeals. Thus, whether or not these 
various letters could be considered "written reprimands" - and could have been grieved on that basis 
— is irrelevant. 
provision. The granting of leave under this rule is not dependent on policy but rather, must only be 
consistent with policy. At any rate, it still remains discretionary. The CSRB simply does not have 
jurisdiction over discretionary matters. As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Lopez v. Career 
Service Review Board: 
"[Discretionary personnel powers granted to agencies do not constitute mandates. 
Absent the statutory mandate that an employee receive a certain benefit, the 
employee may not demand it as a r ight. . . Lopez has failed to identify any personnel 
rule that was violated by the Commission's refusal to allow him to job share. 
Jurisdiction therefore was properly denied." 
{Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d 658 (Utah Ct. App.) (1992)) 
9The letters to which Grievant refers are attached to the Agency's Motion to Dismiss as Ex. I, 
Ex. J and other communications from the Agency are all contained in the record. 
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Moreover, a review in the record of the communications between the Agency and Grievant 
reflects that they were not designated as "written reprimands" as required by DHRM rules and thus, 
they could not be used or construed as such in any Agency action. No rule or policy violations were 
noted in these letters and no adverse action thereafter was based on their content. In fact, 
Exec. Dir. Ireland's letter (Ex. J) indicates that she reversed Grievant's Performance Evaluation from 
"unsuccessful" to "successful." The letter from Tani Downing (Ex. I) merely outlines her reasons 
underlying her "unsuccessful" performance evaluation in responding to Grievant's objection, an 
evaluation that was later changed to "successful." 
DECISION 
Based on the foregoing, the Agency's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
It is so ORDERED this 6th day of December 2006. 
&t -^Tft-y/* 
Katherine A. Fox 
CSRB Hearing/Presiding Officer 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals of this final agency action and decision may be obtained 
pursuant to Utah Code §§63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. To obtain judicial review, a 
party must file a petition for judicial review with the Court within 30 days of the date that this order or decision 
is issued (i.e., signature date). 
:
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Lorin Blauer, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
I IT* LI R L E D 
^ H A P P E L U T E COURTS 
MR I 3 2008 
Department of Workforce 
Services, and Career Service 
Review Board, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20061177-CA 
F I L E D 
( M a r c h 1 3 , 2 0 0 8 ) 
2 0 0 8 UT App 84 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Vincent C. Rampton, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner 
Mark L. Shurtleff, J. Clifford Petersen, and Robert 
W. Thompson, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and McHugh. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Lorin Blauer requests judicial review of the Career Service 
Review Board's (the CSRB) decision to grant the Department of 
Workforce Services!s (the DWS) motion to dismiss six claims 
regarding the DWS's alleged personnel rule violations. Blauer. 
contends that the CSRB erred-by dismissing his claims for lack, of 
jurisdiction because the district court had previously determined 
that Blauer had preserved his claims and had remanded the ^ claims 
to the CSRB for consideration on the merits.'. We reverse and 
remand. 
Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, the CSRB was 
precluded from dismissing the remanded claims on jurisdictional 
grounds. 
The "law of the case" doctrine specifies that 
when a legal "decision [is] made on an issue 
during one stage of the case," that decision 
"is binding in successive stages of the same 
litigation." Particularly when an appellate 
court makes a pronouncement on a legal issue, 
"[t]he lower court must not depart from the 
mandate . . . ." This is true even if the 
lower court "believe [s] that the issue could 
have been better decided in another fashion." -
Jensen v. IHCHosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, % 67, 82 P.3d 1076 
(alterations in original) (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 
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When the CSRB initially dismissed Blauer's claims against 
the DWS and denied his request for reconsideration, Blauer 
petitioned the district court for de novo review of the CSRBfs 
action. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(1) (2004) (stating that 
"district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all 
final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative 
proceedings"). On review, the district court concluded that the 
CSRB correctly determined that Blauer had not been demoted and 
affirmed the CSRB!s dismissal of Blauerfs demotion grievance. 
However, the district court rejected the contentions made by the 
DWS and the CSRB that Blauer's grievances based upon alleged 
violations of the^personnel rules were "not raised 
administratively and . \ .. deemed waived or that [the district 
court] ha[d] no jurisdiction to consider them." In fact, the 
district court concluded "that [Blauer], in his Request for 
Reconsideration before the CSRB, preserved all of his remaining 
allegations concerning the defendantf s violations of the 
Personnel Management Act." (Emphasis added.) 
Based on this language injth^ order, we conclude that -the 
district court determined that Blauer's claims-had been raised in 
such a way that there were no jurisdictional deficient at the 
agency or district court level. Thus, the district court's order 
of remand was an order to consider Blauer's claims on the merits. 
The DWS and the CSRB did not challenge the district court' s 
conclusions regarding jurisdiction through an appeal to this 
court. As a result, the district courtfs conclusions became the 
law of the case, and the CSRB was bound by the district courtfs 
legal conclusions and mandates. The CSRB therefore erred by 
considering jurisdictional issues that had.already been decided 
by the district court. 
Accordingly, we reverse the CSRB!s dismissal of Blauer's six 
claims on jurisdictional grounds and remand the case to the CSRB 
for a hearing on the merits. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
amela T. Greenwood, ^v. P  
Presiding Judge 
STfle 
Carolyi£/3. McHugh, Judg 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LORINBLAUER, 1 
PlaintifiTRespondent, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES, an agency of the State of 
Utah, and UTAH CAREER SERVICE 
REVIEW BOARD, 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
Case No. 
(Court of Appeals Case 
No. 20061177) 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Court of Appeals failed to determine whether it had subject 
matter jurisdiction to review Lorin Blauer's employment grievances. 
Instead, it mechanically applied the law of the case doctrine, based on a lower 
court decision, and remanded the claims to the Career Service Review Board 
for a hearing on the merits, despite the undisputed facts that the claims were 
statutorily barred. Was this such a departure from the accepted and usual 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power 
of supervision? 
2. Appellate courts do not issue advisory opinions, which necessarily 
demands that moot questions not be addressed. During the pendency of this 
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Lorin Blauer's 
employment in a separate appeal. This mooted the grievances in the present 
appeal, which are based on alleged violations of personnel rules. Was this an 
error substantial enough to justify this Court's review? 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on March 13, 2008. See 
Addendum A. The Department of Workforce Services (the Department) filed a 
petition for rehearing on April 8, 2008, pursuant to an order of the Court of 
Appeals extending the time to seek rehearing until that date. After ordering a 
response to the petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals denied the 
petition on April 25, 2008. See Addendum B. This Court has jurisdiction to 
review the Court of Appeals7 decision under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102 
(3)(a) and 102(5) (previously numbered as Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) & 
(5) (West Supp. 2006)). 
2 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following determinative provisions are set forth in Addendum C to 
this petition. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202 (West Supp. 2006) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-402 (West 2004) 
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is a petition for judicial review of final agency action of the CSRB. 
CSRB concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over new issues in Blauer's 
employment grievance that were raised for the first time in a request for 
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the law of the 
case precluded CSRB from dismissing the case on jurisdictional grounds. 
2. Course of the Proceedings 
In September 2003, the Department of Workforce Services 
reapportioned Blauer's job duties and assigned him«to conduct 
administrative hearings full time. & 551-53. Blauer grieved his new 
3 
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J 
assignment to the Career Service Review Board (CSRB), claiming the 
assignment was a demotion. R. 554-55. After conducting an administrative 
review of the file, CSRB concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
grievance because no demotion had occurred. R. 20-26, 
Blauer then filed a request for reconsideration, asking the CSRB to 
review six new issues - alleged violations of personnel rule — that he had not 
previously raised in the CSRB proceeding. R. 20-26, 27-149. CSRB declined to 
consider the six new claims, deeming them to be ancillary to the demotion 
grievance. R. 276-82. Blauer then filed a petition for review in the district 
court, and the district court ultimately agreed with the CSRB that no 
demotion occurred.1 R. 582-83. But, the court remanded the new claims of 
alleged personnel rules violations to the CSRB for consideration. R. 583. 
Of the six new claims, one was the subject of an earlier grievance 
within the Department, but had never been appealed to the CSRB. R. 528-33, 
1
 The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court, holding that, 
because Blauer's assignment to conduct hearings full time was not a 
demotion, "CSRB did not err in declining jurisdiction over Blauer's 
grievance." Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 488, f 36,128 
P.3d 1204. While that appeal was pending, Blauer's employment was 
terminated on November 3, 2004, based on his inability to return to work 
after taking one year of medical leave. The Court of Appeals upheld 
Blauer's termination. Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App. 
280,167 R3d 1102. 
4 
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548-49, 642-43, 636. Four of the claims had never been raised in any 
antecedent grievance either within the Department or with the CSRB. The 
final claim had never been raised as an antecedent grievance in its own right, 
but had only been asserted as part of Blauer's demotion grievance. Blauer 
did not contest those procedural facts, and they are undisputed. 
On remand from the district court, the Department moved for dismissal 
of the six new claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the claims 
had not been brought within statutory time limits. R. 465-632. By its decision 
dated December^, 2006, the CSRB concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the remanded claims. R. 659-71. 
3. Disposition Below 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the CSRB to hear 
Blauer's six personnel grievances on the merits. 
Statement of Facts 
Blauer, an attorney for the Department, filed a grievance in July 2003 
over an unsuccessful performance evaluation. R. 528-33. He also complained 
about the Department's failure to define job performance standards and 
5 
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complained that he did not have a current performance plan in place. R. 532; 
642-43. That grievance was appealed to the Department's director, who 
ruled in Blauer's favor and changed the performance evaluation to 
"succeissfuL" R. 548-49. Blauer did not appeal that grievance to the CSRB. R. 
636. 
In September 2003, the Department reapportioned Blauer's job duties 
and assigned him to conduct administrative hearings full time. R. 551-53. 
Blauer grieved his new assignment to the CSRB, claiming the assignment 
was a demotion. R. 554-55. After conducting an administrative review of the 
file, the CSRB concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the grievance 
because no demotion had occurred. R. 20-26. 
Blauer then filed a request for reconsideration, asking the CSRB to 
review six new issues not previously raised in the CSRB proceeding. 
R. 27-149. Five of those claims alleged that the Department violated 
personnel rules. R. 57-62. The other claim requested that the CSRB review 
some purported written reprimands in Blauer's file. R. 62. Specifically, 
Blauer alleged that: 
a. the Department failed to define Blauer's job performance 
parameters (R. 57-58); 
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b. the Department assigned job tasks to Blauer outside his job 
description (R. 29-30); 
c. The Department representatives harassed and retaliated against 
Blauer for his request for accommodation for disabilities (R. 59-60); 
d. The Department failed to properly maintain Blauer's personnel 
records and refused him access to documentation in his personnel file 
(R. 60-61); 
e. The Department improperly denied Blauer administrative leave 
(R. 61); and 
£ The Department placed negative letters in Blauer's personnel file, 
thereby effectively issuing written reprimands against him. R. 62. 
CSRB denied the motion for reconsideration. It declined to consider the 
new claims because it deemed those claims to be ancillary to the demotion 
grievance. R. 276-82. 
Blauer filed a petition for review in the district court, and the district 
court ultimately agreed with the CSRB that no demotion occurred. R. 582-83. 
The court, however, remanded the new claims of alleged violations of 
personnel rules to the CSRB for consideration. R. 583. The remand order did 
not direct the CSRB to hear the claims on the merits: 
7 
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Accordingly, the Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief is dismissed 
with prejudice, with the exception that the allegations in 
Paragraph 34 subsections (c) through (j) of the complaint which 
. . . are not based upon unlawful demotion, and which were also 
set forth by the Plaintiff in his Motion for Reconsideration 
(previously filed with the CSRB), are remanded to the CSRB for 
consideration. 
R. 583 (emphasis added). 
On remand to the CSRB, the Department moved to dismiss the 
remanded issues for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. R. 465-632. The CSRB 
conducted a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties presented memoranda 
and oral argument to a hearing officer. R. 652-58; 659. The Department 
attached documentary evidence to its memorandum. R. 483-632. Blauer 
referred to that evidence in his response but did not submit documentary 
evidence of his own, although nothing in the record indicates he was 
precluded from doing so. R. 645. The CSRB concluded, in a decision issued 
December 6, 2006, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the six 
remanded issues. R. 659-71. 
To overturn the CSRB's December 6, 2006 decision, Blauer then 
commenced two separate legal actions. First, on December 29, 2006, Blauer 
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, initiating the present 
8 
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action. Then, on January 3, 2007, Blauer filed a new district court action 
seeking a trial de novo, of the CSRB's decision.2 
ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant this petition because the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a memorandum decision in a case in which it lacks jurisdiction. 
Acting without jurisdiction is a significant departure from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings and warrants review by this Court. In 
addition, the Court of Appeals also erred by not dismissing the case for 
mootness. The Court of Appeals' error is further exacerbated because it 
forces an administrative agency to hear the merits of moot claims over which 
it likewise has no jurisdiction. 
2
 The complaint also contained a second claim for a declaratory 
judgment against CSRB and the Department. See Docket, Blauer v. Utah 
Dep't of Workforce Servs., Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 070900108. 
The district court dismissed the petition, and Blauer did not appeal. 
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1. By failing to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted 
and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this 
Court's power of supervision. 
"[Qluestions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any 
time because such issues determine whether a court has authority to address ^ 
the merits of a particular case." Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 XJT 28, % 11, 
44 P.3d 724. Issues relating to subject matter jurisdiction are threshold
 { 
questions that should be addressed before resolving other claims. Id. The 
Court of Appeals failed to examine its own subject matter jurisdiction under 
the undisputed facts of this case. If the Court of Appeals had examined its 
own jurisdiction, it would have concluded that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear Blauer's six new claims of alleged personnel rule 
violations. Blauer's failure to preserve and process the new grievances 
within the statutory time limits deprived not only the CSRB of jurisdiction to 
hear those claims, but also precluded aray judicial review of them. Both this 
Court and the Court of Appeals lack jurisdiction over Blauer's six new 
claims. 
The Grievance and Appeal Procedure Act (GAPA) expressly limits the 
i 
subject matter jurisdiction of both the CSRB and any reviewing court: 
"Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
10 
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established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next 
step within the t ime hmits established by this part , he has waived his right to 
process the grievance or obtain judicial review of the grievance." Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis added); see also Horn v. Utah 
Dep't of Public Safety, 962 R 2 d 95, 99 (Utah App. 1998) (stating tha t 
a[GAPAl explicitly prohibits judicial review of a career service employee's 
grievance when the employee has failed to pursue the grievance in a timely 
manner") (emphasis added); see also Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. 
Bd. of State Lands, 830 R 2 d 233, 234 (Utah 1992) ("In the absence of a 
specific s ta tute granting us jurisdiction over a writ of review from an agency 
proceeding, we have no jurisdiction.") This Court recently reaffirmed tha t 
^[wjhere the legislature has imposed a specific exhaustion r equ i r emen t . . . 
we will enforce it strictly/ Strict enforcement of [a statutory exhaustion] 
provision dictates tha t if a par ty Tails to exhaust [its] administrative 
remedies prior to filing suit, the suit must be dismissed/" Salt Lake City 
Mission v. Salt Lake City, 2008 UT 31 , f 6, — P.3d — (quoting Patterson v. 
Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, f 17, 67 R 3 d 466) (final brackets in original).3 
3In addition to the specific exhaustion requirement in GAPA, the Court of Appeals 
may be similarly barred from hearing the claims under the common law doctrine of failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies. However, because the statutory provision is 
dispositive, this Court need not examine the common law doctrine. 
11 
00191 
- * y • * • • - • - •' • 
*. * * » 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Even if the CSRB may have been required, under the law of the case 
doctrine, to hear the merits of the six new claims, the Court of Appeals was 
not similarly bound. A district court ruling did not relieve the Court of 
Appeals of its "first duty to determine if it has jurisdiction." Barney v. 
Division of Occupational & Prof I Licensing, 828 P.2d 542, 543-44 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). Blauer's failure to pursue timely antecedent grievances deprived 
not only the CSRB of jurisdiction to hear those grievances, but it also 
deprived the Court of Appeals and this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (West 2004). 
The undisputed record demonstrates that Blauer did not raise 
antecedent grievances regarding four of the new claims, that he failed to 
appeal beyond the department head regarding the fifth claim, and that his 
sixth claim was subsumed by his previous demotion appeal and had never 
been pursued as a grievance in its own right. Blauer did not dispute these 
jurisdictional facts, either before the CSRB or the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, he waived any challenge to the undisputed evidence in the 
record that he had not preserved the grievances as required by GAPA. See 
Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89 at f 23, 16 P.3d 540. 
Blauer's failure to strictly adhere to GAPA's statutory framework not 
only deprived the CSRB of subject matter jurisdiction, but it also deprived the 
12 
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Court of Appeals of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims. Due to a 
lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals had no authority to issue an order 
remanding the case to the CSRB. See Barney, 828 R2d 542, 543-44 (stating 
that a[i]f the court concludes it does not have jurisdiction, it retains only the 
authority to dismiss the action"). 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals would continue to lack subject 
t; 
matter jurisdiction if this matter is appealed again after the CSRB considers 
the merits of Blauer's six new grievances. Intervening consideration by the 
CSRB would do nothing to change Blauer's failure to preserve his six new 
grievances for judicial review, because GAPA's preservation requirements 
will still not have been be met. Indeed, those requirements can never be met 
because more than a year has passed since the alleged events giving rise to 
the grievances. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-401(5) & 67~19a-402 (West 
2004) (specifying time limits for initiating and processing grievance with 
employing agency and to CSRB). Similarly, the Court of Appeals would also 
lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear Blauer's discrimination claims, 
because the exclusive remedy for discrimination claims lies with the Division 
of Antidiscrimination and Labor and a subsequent appeal from that agency, 
not from the CSRB. Buckner v. Kennard, 99 R3d 842, 852 (Utah 2004) 
(stating that "the exclusive remedy for an employee claiming a violation of 
13 
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the UADA [Utah Antidiscrimination Act] is an appeal to the Division of 
Antidiscrimination and Labor"); see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-5-107(15) 
(West 2004) (stating that UADA is the "exclusive remedy under State law for 
employment discrimination"). 
By erroneously exercising subject matter jurisdiction and remanding 
the case to the CSRB, the Court of Appeals would potentially be faced with a 
jurisdictional dilemma if the case were to be appealed again. The Court of 
Appeals would either have to erroneously exercise jurisdiction again to review 
the CSRB's decision or decline jurisdiction due to Blauer's failure to 
preserve the grievances for judicial review. Instead, the Court of Appeals 
should have declined jurisdiction in the first instance. This Court should 
grant this petition for certiorari, vacate the Court of Appeals' memorandum 
decision, and dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals' disregard of the jurisdictional limitations set by 
statute is contrary to public policy. When undisputed facts demonstrate an 
express statutory lack of both agency jurisdiction and court jurisdiction, it is a 
waste of taxpayer resources to force an agency to nevertheless hear those 
barred claims. It is particularly wasteful here, because the scope of the 
district court's preservation ruling is ambiguous. In citing the district 
court's memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals omitted the following 
14 
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sentence, which at least raises a question as to whether the district court's 
preservation ruling was limited only to district court jurisdiction or also 
applied to CSRB's jurisdiction: "In other words, the Court declines to follow 
defendant's reasoning that these grounds for grieving were not raised 
administratively and are therefore deemed waived or that this Court has no 
jurisdiction to consider them." R. 579. 
Given this ambiguity, and that the district court's formal order only 
remanded the claims for consideration, without specifically requiring 
consideration on the merits, and given the undisputed facts demonstrating 
that Blauer has indeed failed to preserve his grievances, the Court of 
Appeals' mechanical application of the law of the case doctrine was in error. 
Instead, the Court of Appeals should have determined that the unique 
circumstances of this case - implicating subject matter jurisdiction of both the 
reviewing agency and Utah's appellate courts - constitute an appropriate 
exception to the law of the case doctrine that would therefore justify relieving 
the CSRB of the district court's mandate. See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 
892 R2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995) (stating that aany change with respect to 
the legal issues governed by the mandate must be made by the appellate 
court that established it or by a court to which it, in turns, owes obedience") 
(emphasis added). 
I5 
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Since a court can reconsider its own prior decision in contravention to 
the law of the case doctrine "when the court is convinced that its prior 
decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice," Id., 
then surely the Court of Appeals could have properly overridden a district 
court's clearly erroneous jurisdictional determination to avoid a manifest 
injustice. The Department respectfully asserts that, where the undisputed 
evidence establishes that neither the CSRB, the district court, nor the Court 
of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals' 
memorandum decision works a manifest injustice by requiring the CSRB and 
the parties to undergo the expense of a hearing on the merits. Such a result is 
particularly unjust, given that this case is now moot and that the Court of 
Appeals would continue to lack jurisdiction if the case were to be appealed 
again. 
2. The Court of Appeals ruled on a moot case and has ordered CSRB to 
hear the merits of a moot case 
The well-settled and strong judicial policy against issuing advisory 
opinions dictates that courts refrain from adjudicating moot questions. 
Richards v. Baum, 914 R2d 719, 720 (Utah 1996). "An appeal is moot if 
during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the 
16
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controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief requested impossible 
or of no legal effect." Id. (quoting Franklin Fin v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 
R2d 1040,1043 (Utah 1983). 
After the Department had filed its answer brief in this matter, the 
Court of Appeals in a separate appeal affirmed the tennination of Blauer's 
employment with the Department. Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2007 
UT App 280,167 R3d 1102 (Blauer I). Blauer's dismissal was for job 
abandonment and not for any job performance issues that may be directly or 
indirectly related to this appeal.4 Blauer's six new claims related to job 
performance parameters, being assigned tasks outside of his job description, 
access to his personnel file, retaliation for requesting accommodations, and 
negative letters in his personnel file. R. 29-30, 57-62. Blauer never lost pay 
nor was he demoted. Thus, any remedy that Blauer may seek for any alleged 
violations of personnel rules has been rendered moot by his intervening 
dismissal, which dismissal has now been affirmed on appeal. In particular, 
any reassignment of job duties - which has been the core remedy sought by 
4See Blauer, 2007 UT App 280 at 1 1 (stating that Blauer was dismissed 
"for his failure to return to work within one year of taking leave"). CSRB 
noted that Blauer's intervening dismissal had rendered at least part of 
Blauer's claims moot. R. 687. The appeal of Blauer's dismissal was pending 
before this Court when CSRB issued its decision in the present matter. 
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Blauer throughout this and previous appeals — has been rendered moot by 
Blauer*s dismissal. The CSRB cannot provide Blauer with a remedy with 
any legal effect. Thus, not only did the Court of Appeals rule on a moot case, 
it ordered CSRB to conduct a hearing on moot claims- By so doing, the Court 
of Appeals has so far departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings as 
to call for a review of the decision by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals failed to consider its own subject matter 
jurisdiction when it mechanically applied the "law of the case" doctrine to 
this case. The Court of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal because GAPA expressly restricts the subject matter jurisdiction of 
both CSRB and any reviewing court to only those grievances that have been 
timely preserved and pursued within the employing agency and then 
subsequently appealed to the CSRB. By not preserving his grievances, Blauer 
deprived the Court of Appeals of subject matter jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal, regardless of whether the CSRB was bound by the law of the case to 
hear the grievances. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals should have 
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dismissed the appeal because the intervening affirmation of Blauer's 
dismissal rendered the appeal moot. 
The Court of Appeals' compound mistake of deciding a moot case 
without jurisdiction is substantial enough to warrant review by this Court. 
Accordingly, the Department respectfully asks this Court to grant this 
petition. 
Dated this 27th day of May, 2008. 
4/CLIFFORDTETERSEN 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for the Department of 
Workforce Services 
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FILED 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF UTM£H APPEI I ATE COURTS 
- °
o 0 o
° " AUG 0 6 2008 
Lorin Blauer, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Utah Department of Workforce 
Services, an agency of the State 
of Utah, and Utah Career Service 
Review Board, 
Defendants and Petitioners, 
Case No. 20080457-SC 
20061177-CA 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on May 27, 2008. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 51(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
is denied. 
For The C o u r t : 
D a t e d i-Wo^ 
A s s o c i a t e J u s t i c e 
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